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<chapter id="mac">
  <chapterinfo>
    <authorgroup>
      <author>
	<firstname>Tom</firstname>
	<surname>Rhodes</surname>
	<contrib>Written by </contrib>
      </author>
    </authorgroup>
  </chapterinfo>

  <title>Mandatory Access Control</title>

  <sect1 id="mac-synopsis">
    <title>Synopsis</title>

    <indexterm><primary>MAC</primary></indexterm>
    <indexterm>
      <primary>Mandatory Access Control</primary>
      <see>MAC</see>
    </indexterm>

    <para>&os;&nbsp;5.X introduced new security extensions from the
      TrustedBSD project based on the &posix;.1e draft.  Two of the most
      significant new security mechanisms are file system Access Control
      Lists (<acronym>ACLs</acronym>) and Mandatory Access Control
      (<acronym>MAC</acronym>) facilities.  Mandatory Access Control allows
      new access control modules to be loaded, implementing new security
      policies.  Some provide protections of a narrow subset of the
      system, hardening a particular service, while others provide
      comprehensive labeled security across all subjects and objects.
      The mandatory part
      of the definition comes from the fact that the enforcement of
      the controls is done by administrators and the system, and is
      not left up to the discretion of users as is done with
      discretionary access control (<acronym>DAC</acronym>, the standard
      file and System V <acronym>IPC</acronym> permissions on &os;).</para>

    <para>This chapter will focus on the
      Mandatory Access Control Framework (MAC Framework), and a set
      of pluggable security policy modules enableing various security
      mechanisms.</para>

    <para>After reading this chapter, you will know:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para>What <acronym>MAC</acronym> security policy modules are currently
          included in &os; and their associated mechanisms.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>What <acronym>MAC</acronym> security policy modules implement as
	  well as the difference between a labeled and non-labeled
	  policy.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>How to efficiently configure a system to use
	  the <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>How to configure the different security policy modules included with the
	  <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
        <para>How to implement a more secure environment using the
	  <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework and the examples
	  shown.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>How to test the <acronym>MAC</acronym> configuration
	  to ensure the framework has been properly implemented.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>Before reading this chapter, you should:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para>Understand &unix; and &os; basics
	  (<xref linkend="basics">).</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>Be familiar with
	  the basics of kernel configuration/compilation
	  (<xref linkend="kernelconfig">).</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>Have some familiarity with security and how it
	  pertains to &os; (<xref linkend="security">).</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <warning>
      <para>The improper use of the
	information in this chapter may cause loss of system access,
	aggravation of users, or inability to access the features
	provided by X11.  More importantly, <acronym>MAC</acronym> should not
	be relied upon to completely secure a system.  The
	<acronym>MAC</acronym> framework only augments
	existing security policy; without sound security practices and
	regular security checks, the system will never be completely
	secure.</para>

      <para>It should also be noted that the examples contained
	within this chapter are just that, examples.  It is not
	recommended that these particular settings be rolled out
	on a production system.  Implementing the various security policy modules takes
	a good deal of thought.  One who does not fully understand
	exactly how everything works may find him or herself going
	back through the entire system and reconfiguring many files
	or directories.</para>
    </warning>

    <sect2>
      <title>What Will Not Be Covered</title>

      <para>This chapter covers a broad range of security issues relating
	to the <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework; however, the
	development of new <acronym>MAC</acronym> security policy modules
	will not be covered.  A number of security policy modules included with the
	<acronym>MAC</acronym> framework have specific characteristics
	which are provided for both testing and new module
	development. These include the &man.mac.test.4;,
	&man.mac.stub.4; and &man.mac.none.4;.
        For more information on these security policy modules and the various
	mechanisms they provide, please review the manual pages.</para>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-inline-glossary">
    <title>Key Terms in this Chapter</title>

    <para>Before reading this chapter, a few key terms must be
      explained.  This will hopefully clear up any confusion that
      may occur and avoid the abrupt introduction of new terms
      and information.</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>compartment</emphasis>: A compartment is a
	  set of programs and data to be partitioned or separated,
	  where users are given explicit access to specific components
	  of a system.  Also, a compartment represents a grouping,
	  such as a work group, department, project, or topic.  Using
	  compartments, it is possible to implement a need-to-know
	  security policy.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>integrity</emphasis>: Integrity, as a key
	  concept, is the level of trust which can be placed on data.
	  As the integrity of the data is elevated, so does the ability
	  to trust that data.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>label</emphasis>: A label is a security
	  attribute which can be applied to files, directories, or
	  other items in the system.  It could be considered
	  a confidentiality stamp; when a label is placed on
	  a file it describes the security properties for that specific
	  file and will only permit access by files, users, resources,
	  etc. with a similar security setting.  The meaning and
	  interpretation of label values depends on the policy configuration: while
	  some policies might treat a label as representing the
	  integrity or secrecy of an object, other policies might use
	  labels to hold rules for access.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>level</emphasis>: The increased or decreased
	  setting of a security attribute.  As the level increases,
	  its security is considered to elevate as well.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>multilabel</emphasis>: The
	  <option>multilabel</option> property is a file system option
	  which can be set in single user mode using the
	  &man.tunefs.8; utility, during the boot operation
	  using the &man.fstab.5; file, or during the creation of
	  a new file system.  This option will permit an administrator
	  to apply different <acronym>MAC</acronym> labels on different
	  objects.  This option
	  only applies to security policy modules which support labeling.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>object</emphasis>: An object or system
	  object is an entity through which information flows
	  under the direction of a <emphasis>subject</emphasis>.
	  This includes directories, files, fields, screens, keyboards,
	  memory, magnetic storage, printers or any other data
	  storage/moving device.  Basically, an object is a data container or
	  a system resource; access to an <emphasis>object</emphasis>
	  effectively means access to the data.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>policy</emphasis>: A collection of rules
	  which defines how objectives are to be achieved.  A
	  <emphasis>policy</emphasis> usually documents how certain
	  items are to be handled.  This chapter will
	  consider the term <emphasis>policy</emphasis> in this
	  context as a <emphasis>security policy</emphasis>; i.e.
	  a collection of rules which will control the flow of data
	  and information and define whom will have access to that
	  data and information.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>sensitivity</emphasis>: Usually used when
	  discussing <acronym>MLS</acronym>.  A sensitivity level is
	  a term used to describe how important or secret the data
	  should be.  As the sensitivity level increases, so does the
	  importance of the secrecy, or confidentiality of the data.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>single label</emphasis>: A single label is
	  when the entire file system uses one label to
	  enforce access control over the flow of data.  When a file
	  system has this set, which is any time when the
	  <option>multilabel</option> option is not set, all
	  files will conform to the same label setting.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><emphasis>subject</emphasis>: a subject is any
	  active entity that causes information to flow between
	  <emphasis>objects</emphasis>; e.g. a user, user processor,
	  system process, etc.  On &os;, this is almost always a thread
	  acting in a process on behalf of a user.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-initial">
    <title>Explanation of MAC</title>

    <para>With all of these new terms in mind, consider how the
      <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework augments the security of
      the system as a whole.  The various security policy modules provided by
      the <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework could be used to
      protect the network and file systems, block users from
      accessing certain ports and sockets, and more.  Perhaps
      the best use of the policy modules is to blend them together, by loading
      several security policy modules at a time for a multi-layered
      security environment.  In a multi-layered security environment,
      multiple policy modules are in effect to keep security in check.  This
      is different to a hardening policy, which typically hardens
      elements of a system that is used only for specific purposes.
      The only downside is administrative overhead in cases of
      multiple file system labels, setting network access control
      user by user, etc.</para>

    <para>These downsides are minimal when compared to the lasting
      effect of the framework; for instance, the ability to pick and choose
      which policies are required for a specific configuration keeps
      performance overhead down.  The reduction of support for unneeded
      policies can increase the overall performance of the system as well as
      offer flexibility of choice.  A good implementation would
      consider the overall security requirements and effectively implement
      the various security policy modules offered by the framework.</para>

    <para>Thus a system utilizing <acronym>MAC</acronym> features
      should at least guarantee that a user will not be permitted
      to change security attributes at will; all user utilities,
      programs and scripts must work within the constraints of
      the access rules provided by the selected security policy modules; and
      that total control of the <acronym>MAC</acronym> access
      rules are in the hands of the system administrator.</para>

    <para>It is the sole duty of the system administrator to
      carefully select the correct security policy modules.  Some environments
      may need to limit access control over the network; in these
      cases, the &man.mac.portacl.4;, &man.mac.ifoff.4; and even
      &man.mac.biba.4; policy modules might make good starting points.  In other
      cases, strict confidentiality of file system objects might
      be required.  Policy modules such as &man.mac.bsdextended.4;
      and &man.mac.mls.4; exist for this purpose.</para>

    <para>Policy decisions could be made based on network
      configuration.  Perhaps only certain users should be permitted
      access to facilities provided by &man.ssh.1; to access the
      network or the Internet.  The &man.mac.portacl.4; would be
      the policy module of choice for these situations.  But what should be
      done in the case of file systems?  Should all access to certain
      directories be severed from other groups or specific
      users?  Or should we limit user or utility access to specific
      files by setting certain objects as classified?</para>

    <para>In the file system case, access to objects might be
      considered confidential to some users, but not to others.
      For an example, a large development team might be broken
      off into smaller groups of individuals.  Developers in
      project A might not be permitted to access objects written
      by developers in project B.  Yet they might need to access
      objects created by developers in project C; that is quite a
      situation indeed.  Using the different security policy modules provided by
      the <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework; users could
      be divided into these groups and then given access to the
      appropriate areas without fear of information
      leakage.</para>

    <para>Thus, each security policy module has a unique way of dealing with
      the overall security of a system.  Module selection should be based
      on a well thought out security policy.  In many cases, the
      overall policy may need to be revised and reimplemented on
      the system.  Understanding the different security policy modules offered by
      the <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework will help administrators
      choose the best policies for their situations.</para>

    <para>The default &os; kernel does not include the option for
      the <acronym>MAC</acronym> framework; thus the following
      kernel option must be added before trying any of the examples or
      information in this chapter:</para>

    <programlisting>options	MAC</programlisting>

    <para>And the kernel will require a rebuild and a reinstall.</para>

    <caution>
      <para>While the various manual pages for <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	policy modules state that they may be built into the kernel,
	it is possible to lock the system out of
	the network and more.  Implementing <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	is much like implementing a firewall, care must be taken
	to prevent being completely locked out of the system.  The
	ability to revert back to a previous configuration should be
	considered while the implementation of <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	remotely should be done with extreme caution.</para>
    </caution>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-understandlabel">
    <title>Understanding MAC Labels</title>

    <para>A <acronym>MAC</acronym> label is a security attribute
      which may be applied to subjects and objects throughout
      the system.</para>

    <para>When setting a label, the user must be able to comprehend
      what it is, exactly, that is being done.  The attributes
      available on an object depend on the policy module loaded, and that
      policy modules interpret their attributes in different
      ways.  If improperly configured due to lack of comprehension, or
      the inability to understand the implications, the result will
      be the unexpected and perhaps, undesired, behavior of the
      system.</para>

    <para>The security label on an object is used as a part of a
      security access control decision by a policy.  With some
      policies, the label by itself contains all information necessary
      to make a decision; in other models, the labels may be processed
      as part of a larger rule set, etc.</para>

    <para>For instance, setting the label of <literal>biba/low</literal>
      on a file will represent a label maintained by the Biba security policy module,
      with a value of <quote>low</quote>.</para>

    <para>A few policy modules which support the labeling feature in
      &os; offer three specific predefined labels.  These
      are the low, high, and equal labels.  Although they enforce
      access control in a different manner with each policy module, you
      can be sure that the low label will be the lowest setting,
      the equal label will set the subject or object to be disabled
      or unaffected, and the high label will enforce the highest
      setting available in the Biba and <acronym>MLS</acronym>
      policy modules.</para>

    <para>Within single label file system environments, only one label may be
      used on objects.  This will enforce one set of
      access permissions across the entire system and in many
      environments may be all that is required.  There are a few
      cases where multiple labels may be set on objects
      or subjects in the file system.  For those cases, the
      <option>multilabel</option> option may be passed to
      &man.tunefs.8;.</para>

    <para>In the case of Biba and <acronym>MLS</acronym>, a numeric
      label may be set to indicate the precise level of hierarchical
      control.  This numeric level is used to partition or sort
      information into different groups of say, classification only
      permitting access to that group or a higher group level.</para>

    <para>In most cases the administrator will only be setting up a
      single label to use throughout the file system.</para>

    <para><emphasis>Hey wait, this is similar to <acronym>DAC</acronym>!
      I thought <acronym>MAC</acronym> gave control strictly to the
      administrator.</emphasis>  That statement still holds true, to some
      extent as <username>root</username> is the one in control and who
      configures the policies so that users are placed in the
      appropriate categories/access levels.  Alas, many policy modules can
      restrict the <username>root</username> user as well.  Basic
      control over objects will then be released to the group, but
      <username>root</username> may revoke or modify the settings
      at any time.  This is the hierarchal/clearance model covered
      by policies such as Biba and <acronym>MLS</acronym>.</para>

    <sect2>
      <title>Label Configuration</title>

      <para>Virtually all aspects of label policy module configuration
	will be performed using the base system utilities.  These
	commands provide a simple interface for object or subject
	configuration or the manipulation and verification of
	the configuration.</para>

      <para>All configuration may be done by use of the
	&man.setfmac.8; and &man.setpmac.8; utilities.
	The <command>setfmac</command> command is used to set
	<acronym>MAC</acronym> labels on system objects while the
	<command>setpmac</command> command is used to set the labels
	on system subjects.  Observe:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setfmac biba/high test</userinput></screen>

      <para>If no errors occurred with the command above, a prompt
	will be returned.  The only time these commands are not
	quiescent is when an error occurred; similarly to the
	&man.chmod.1; and &man.chown.8; commands.  In some cases this
	error may be a <errorname>Permission denied</errorname> and
	is usually obtained when the label is being set or modified
	on an object which is restricted.<footnote><para>Other conditions
	may produce different failures.  For instance, the file may not
	be owned by the	user attempting to relabel the object, the
	object may not exist or	may be read only.  A mandatory policy
	will not allow the process to relabel the file, maybe because
	of a property of the file, a property of the process, or a
	property of the proposed new label value.  For example: a user
	running at low integrity tries to change the label of a high
	integrity file.  Or perhaps a user running at low integrity
	tries to change the label of a low integrity file to a high
	integrity label.</para></footnote>  The system administrator
	may use the following commands to overcome this:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setfmac biba/high test</userinput>
<errorname>Permission denied</errorname>
&prompt.root; <userinput>setpmac biba/low setfmac biba/high test</userinput>
&prompt.root; <userinput>getfmac test</userinput>
test: biba/high</screen>

      <para>As we see above, <command>setpmac</command>
	can be used to override the policy module's settings by assigning
	a different label to the invoked process.  The
	<command>getpmac</command> utility is usually used with currently
	running processes, such as <application>sendmail</application>:
	although it takes a process ID in place of
	a command the logic is extremely similar.  If users
	attempt to manipulate a file not in their access, subject to the
	rules of the loaded policy modules, the
	<errorname>Operation not permitted</errorname> error
	will be displayed by the <function>mac_set_link</function>
	function.</para>

      <sect3>
	<title>Common Label Types</title>

	<para>For the &man.mac.biba.4;, &man.mac.mls.4; and
	  &man.mac.lomac.4; policy modules, the ability to assign
	  simple labels is provided.  These take the form of high,
	  equal and low, what follows is a brief description of
	  what these labels provide:</para>

	<itemizedlist>
	  <listitem>
	    <para>The <literal>low</literal> label is considered the
	      lowest label setting an object or subject may have.
	      Setting this on objects or subjects will block their
	      access to objects or subjects marked high.</para>
	  </listitem>

	  <listitem>
	    <para>The <literal>equal</literal> label should only be
	      placed on objects considered to be exempt from the
	      policy.</para>
	  </listitem>

	  <listitem>
	    <para>The <literal>high</literal> label grants an object or
	      subject the highest possible setting.</para>
	  </listitem>
	</itemizedlist>

	<para>With respect to each policy module, each of those settings
	  will instate a different information flow directive.  Reading
	  the proper manual pages will further explain the traits of
	  these generic label configurations.</para>

        <sect4>
	  <title>Advanced Label Configuration</title>

	  <para>Numeric grade numbers used for
	    <literal>comparison:compartment+compartment</literal>; thus
	    the following:</para>

	  <programlisting>biba/10:2+3+6(5:2+3-20:2+3+4+5+6)</programlisting>

	  <para>May be interpreted as:</para>

	  <para><quote>Biba Policy Label</quote>/<quote>Grade 10</quote>
	    :<quote>Compartments 2, 3 and 6</quote>:
	    (<quote>grade 5 ...</quote>)</para>

	  <para>In this example, the first grade would be considered
	    the <quote>effective grade</quote> with
	    <quote>effective compartments</quote>, the second grade
	    is the low grade and the last one is the high grade.
	    In most configurations these settings will not be used;
	    indeed, they offered for more advanced
	    configurations.</para>

	  <para>When applied to system objects, they will only have a
	    current grade/compartments as opposed to system subjects
	    as they reflect the range of available rights in the system,
	    and network interfaces, where they are used for access
	    control.</para>

	  <para>The grade and compartments in a subject and object pair
	    are used to construct a relationship referred to as
	    <quote>dominance</quote>, in which a subject dominates an
	    object, the object dominates the subject, neither dominates
	    the other, or both dominate each other.  The
	    <quote>both dominate</quote> case occurs when the two labels
	    are equal.  Due to the information flow nature of Biba, you
	    have rights to a set of compartments,
	    <quote>need to know</quote>, that might correspond to
	    projects, but objects also have a set of compartments.
	    Users may have to subset their rights using
	    <command>su</command> or <command>setpmac</command> in order
	    to access objects in a compartment from which they are not
	    restricted.</para>
	</sect4>
      </sect3>

      <sect3>
	<title>Users and Label Settings</title>

	<para>Users themselves are required to have labels so that
	  their files and processes may properly interact with the
	  security policy defined on the system.  This is
	  configured through the <filename>login.conf</filename> file
	  by use of login classes.  Every policy module that uses labels
	  will implement the user class setting.</para>

	<para>An example entry containing every policy module setting is displayed
	  below:</para>

	<programlisting>default:\
	:copyright=/etc/COPYRIGHT:\
	:welcome=/etc/motd:\
	:setenv=MAIL=/var/mail/$,BLOCKSIZE=K:\
	:path=~/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:\
	:manpath=/usr/share/man /usr/local/man:\
	:nologin=/usr/sbin/nologin:\
	:cputime=1h30m:\
	:datasize=8M:\
	:vmemoryuse=100M:\
	:stacksize=2M:\
	:memorylocked=4M:\
	:memoryuse=8M:\
	:filesize=8M:\
	:coredumpsize=8M:\
	:openfiles=24:\
	:maxproc=32:\
	:priority=0:\
	:requirehome:\
	:passwordtime=91d:\
	:umask=022:\
	:ignoretime@:\
	:label=partition/13,mls/5,biba/10(5-15),lomac10[2]:</programlisting>

	<para>The <literal>label</literal> option is used to set the
	  user class default label which will be enforced by
	  <acronym>MAC</acronym>.  Users will never be permitted to
	  modify this value, thus it can be considered not optional
	  in the user case.  In a real configuration, however, the
	  administrator will never wish to enable every policy module.
	  It is recommended that the rest of this chapter be reviewed
	  before any of this configuration is implemented.</para>

	<note>
	  <para>Users may change their label after the initial login;
	    however, this change is subject constraints of the policy.
	    The example above tells the Biba policy that a process's
	    minimum integrity is 5, its maximum is 15, but the default
	    effective label is 10.  The process will run at 10 until
	    it chooses to change label, perhaps due to the user using
	    the setpmac command, which will be constrained by Biba to
	    the range set at login.</para>
	</note>

	<para>In all cases, after a change to
	  <filename>login.conf</filename>, the login class capability
	  database must be rebuilt using <command>cap_mkdb</command>
	  and this will be reflected throughout every forthcoming
	  example or discussion.</para>

	<para>It is useful to note that many sites may have a
	  particularly large number of users requiring several
	  different user classes.  In depth planning is required
	  as this may get extremely difficult to manage.</para>

	<para>Future versions of &os; will include a new way to
	  deal with mapping users to labels; however, this will
	  not be available until some time after &os;&nbsp;5.3.</para>
      </sect3>

      <sect3>
	<title>Network Interfaces and Label Settings</title>

	<para>Labels may also be set on network interfaces to help
	  control the flow of data across the network.  In all cases
	  they function in the same way the policies function with
	  respect to objects.  Users at high settings in
	  <literal>biba</literal>, for example, will not be permitted
	  to access network interfaces with a label of low.</para>

	<para>The <option>maclabel</option> may be passed to
	  <command>ifconfig</command> when setting the
	  <acronym>MAC</acronym> label on network interfaces.  For
	  example:</para>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>ifconfig bge0 maclabel biba/equal</userinput></screen>

	<para>will set the <acronym>MAC</acronym> label of
	  <literal>biba/equal</literal> on the &man.bge.4; interface.
	  When using a setting similar to
	  <literal>biba/high(low-high)</literal> the entire label should
	  be quoted; otherwise an error will be returned.</para>

	<para>Each policy module which supports labeling has a tunable
	  which may be used to disable the <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	  label on network interfaces.  Setting the label to
	  <option>equal</option> will have a similar effect.  Review
	  the output from <command>sysctl</command>, the policy manual
	  pages, or even the information found later in this chapter
	  for those tunables.</para>
      </sect3>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>Singlelabel or Multilabel?</title>
<!-- Stopped here with my edits -->
      <para>By default the system will use the
	<option>singlelabel</option> option.  But what does this
	mean to the administrator?  There are several differences
	which, in their own right, offer pros and cons to the
	flexibility in the systems security model.</para>

      <para>The <option>singlelabel</option> only permits for one
	label, for instance <literal>biba/high</literal> to be used
	for each subject or object.  It provides for lower
	administration overhead but decreases the flexibility of
	policies which support labeling.  Many administrators may
	want to use the <option>multilabel</option> option in
	their security policy.</para>

      <para>The <option>multilabel</option> option will permit each
	subject or object to have its own independent
	<acronym>MAC</acronym> label in
	place of the standard <option>singlelabel</option> option
	which will allow only one label throughout the partition.
	The <option>multilabel</option> and <option>single</option>
	label options are only required for the policies which
	implement the labeling feature, including the Biba, Lomac,
	<acronym>MLS</acronym> and <acronym>SEBSD</acronym>
	policies.</para>
    
      <para>In many cases, the <option>multilabel</option> may not need
	to be set at all.  Consider the following situation and
	security model:</para>

      <itemizedlist>
	<listitem>
	  <para>&os; web-server using the <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	    framework and a mix of the various policies.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para>This machine only requires one label,
	    <literal>biba/high</literal>, for everything in the system.
	    Here the file system would not require the
	    <option>multilabel</option> option as a single label
	    will always be in effect.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para>But, this machine will be a web server and should have
	    the web server run at <literal>biba/low</literal> to prevent
	    write up capabilities.  The Biba policy and how it works
	    will be discussed later, so if the previous comment was
	    difficult to interpret just continue reading and return.
	    The server could use a separate partition set at
	    <literal>biba/low</literal> for most if not all of its
	    runtime state.  Much is lacking from this example, for
	    instance the restrictions on data, configuration and user
	    settings; however, this is just a quick example to prove the
	    aforementioned point.</para>
	</listitem>
      </itemizedlist>

      <para>If any of the non-labeling policies are to be used,
	then the <option>multilabel</option> option would never
	be required.  These include the <literal>seeotheruids</literal>,
	<literal>portacl</literal> and <literal>partition</literal>
	policies.</para>

      <para>It should also be noted that using
	<option>multilabel</option> with a partition and establishing
	a security model based on <option>multilabel</option>
	functionality could open the doors for higher administrative
	overhead as everything in the file system would have a label.
	This includes directories, files, and even device
	nodes.</para>

      <para>The following command will set <option>multilabel</option>
	on the file systems to have multiple labels.  This may only be
	done in single user mode:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>tunefs -l enable /</userinput></screen>

      <para>This is not a requirement for the swap file
	system.</para>

      <note>
	<para>Some users have experienced problems with setting the
	  <option>multilabel</option> flag on the root partition.
	  If this is the case, please review the
	  <xref linkend="mac-troubleshoot"> of this chapter.</para>
      </note>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>Controlling MAC with Tunables</title>

      <para>Without any modules loaded, there are still some parts
        of <acronym>MAC</acronym> which may be configured using
	the <command>sysctl</command> interface.  These tunables
	are described below and in all cases the number one (1)
	means enabled while the number zero (0) means
	disabled:</para>

      <itemizedlist>
	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.enforce_fs</literal> defaults to
	    one (1) and enforces <acronym>MAC</acronym> file system
	    policies on the file systems.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.enforce_kld</literal> defaults to
	    one (1) and enforces <acronym>MAC</acronym> kernel linking
	    policies on the dynamic kernel linker (see
	    &man.kld.4;).</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.enforce_network</literal> defaults
	    to one (1) and enforces <acronym>MAC</acronym> network
	    policies.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.enforce_pipe</literal> defaults
	    to one (1) and enforces <acronym>MAC</acronym> policies
	    on pipes.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.enforce_process</literal> defaults
	    to one (1) and enforces <acronym>MAC</acronym> policies
	    on processes which utilize inter-process
	    communication.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.enforce_socket</literal> defaults
	    to one (1) and enforces <acronym>MAC</acronym> policies
	    on sockets (see the &man.socket.2; manual page).</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.enforce_system</literal> defaults
	    to one (1) and enforces <acronym>MAC</acronym> policies
	    on system activities such as accounting and
	    rebooting.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.enforce_vm</literal> defaults
	    to one (1) and enforces <acronym>MAC</acronym> policies
	    on the virtual memory system.</para>
	</listitem>
      </itemizedlist>

      <note>
	<para>Every policy or <acronym>MAC</acronym> option supports
	  tunables.  These usually hang off of the
	  <literal>security.mac.&lt;policyname&gt;</literal> tree.
	  To view all of the tunables from <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	  use the following command:</para>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>sysctl -da | grep mac</userinput></screen>
      </note>

      <para>This should be interpreted as all of the basic
	<acronym>MAC</acronym> policies are enforced by default.
	If the modules were built into the kernel the system
	would be extremely locked down and most likely unable to
	communicate with the local network or connect to the Internet,
	etc.  This is why building the modules into the kernel is not
	completely recommended.  Not because it limits the ability to
	disable features on the fly with <command>sysctl</command>,
	but it permits the administrator to instantly switch the
	policies of a system without the requirement of rebuilding
	and reinstalling a new system.</para>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-modules">
    <title>Module Configuration</title>

    <para>Every module included with the <acronym>MAC</acronym>
      framework may be either compiled into the kernel as noted above
      or loaded as a run-time kernel module.
      The recommended method is to add the module name to the
      <filename>/boot/loader.conf</filename> file so that it will load
      during the initial boot operation.</para>

    <para>The following sections will discuss the various
      <acronym>MAC</acronym> modules and cover their features.
      Implementing them into a specific environment will also
      be a consideration of this chapter.  Some modules support
      the use of labeling, which is controlling access by enforcing
      a label such as <quote>this is allowed and this is not</quote>.
      A label configuration file may control how files may be accessed,
      network communication can be exchanged, and more.  The previous
      section showed how the <option>multilabel</option> flag could
      be set on file systems to enable per-file or per-partition
      access control.</para>

    <para>A single label configuration would enforce only one label
      across the system, that is why the <command>tunefs</command>
      option is called <option>multilabel</option>.</para>

    <sect2 id="mac-seeotheruids">
      <title>The MAC seeotheruids Module</title>

      <indexterm>
        <primary>MAC See Other UIDs Policy</primary>
      </indexterm>
      <para>Module name: <filename>mac_seeotheruids.ko</filename></para>

      <para>Kernel configuration line:
        <literal>options MAC_SEEOTHERUIDS</literal></para>

      <para>Boot option:
	<literal>mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"</literal></para>

      <para>The &man.mac.seeotheruids.4; module mimics and extends
	the <literal>security.bsd.see_other_uids</literal> and
	<literal>security.bsd.see_other_gids</literal>
	<command>sysctl</command> tunables.  This option does
	not require any labels to be set before configuration and
	can operate transparently with the other modules.</para>

      <para>After loading the module, the following
	<command>sysctl</command> tunables may be used to control
	the features:</para>

      <itemizedlist>
	<listitem>
	  <para><literal>security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled</literal>
	    will enable the module's features and use the default
	    settings.  These default settings will deny users the
	    ability to view processes and sockets owned by other
	    users.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para>
	    <literal>security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled</literal>
	    will allow a certain group to be exempt from this policy.
	    To exempt specific groups from this policy, use the
	    <literal>security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid=<replaceable>XXX</replaceable></literal>
	    <command>sysctl</command> tunable.  In the above example,
	    the <replaceable>XXX</replaceable> should be replaced with the
	    numeric group ID to be exempted.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para>
	    <literal>security.mac.seeotheruids.primarygroup_enabled</literal>
	    is used to exempt specific primary groups from this policy.
	    When using this tunable, the
	    <literal>security.mac.seeotheruids.specificgid_enabled</literal>
	    may not be set.</para>
	</listitem>
      </itemizedlist>

      <para>It should be noted that the <username>root</username>
	user is not exempt from this policy.  This is one of the
	large differences between the <acronym>MAC</acronym> version
	and the standard tunable version included by default:
	<literal>security.bsd.seeotheruids</literal>.</para>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-bsdextended">
    <title>The MAC bsdextended Module</title>

    <indexterm>
    <primary>MAC</primary>
      <secondary>File System Firewall Policy</secondary>
    </indexterm>
    <para>Module name: <filename>mac_bsdextended.ko</filename></para>

    <para>Kernel configuration line:
      <literal>options MAC_BSDEXTENDED</literal></para>

    <para>Boot option:
      <literal>mac_bsdextended_load="YES"</literal></para>

    <para>The &man.mac.bsdextended.4; module enforces the file system
      firewall.  This module's policy provides an extension to the
      standard file system permissions model, permitting an
      administrator to create a firewall-like ruleset to protect files,
      utilities, and directories in the file system hierarchy.</para>

    <para>The policy may be created using a utility, &man.ugidfw.8;,
      that has a syntax similar to that of &man.ipfw.8;.  More tools
      can be written by using the functions in the
      &man.libugidfw.3; library.</para>

    <para>Extreme caution should be taken when working with this
      module; incorrect use could block access to certain parts of
      the file system.</para>

    <sect2>
      <title>Examples</title>

      <para>After the &man.mac.bsdextended.4; module has
	been loaded, the following command may be used to list the
	current rule configuration:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>ugidfw list</userinput>
0 slots, 0 rules</screen>

      <para>As expected, there are no rules defined.  This means that
	everything is still completely accessible.  To create a rule
	which will block all access by users but leave
	<username>root</username> unaffected, simply run the
	following command:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>ugidfw add subject not uid root new object not uid root mode n</userinput></screen>

      <note>
	<para>In releases prior to &os;&nbsp;5.3, the
	  <parameter>add</parameter> parameter did not exist.  In those
	  cases the <parameter>set</parameter> should be used
	  instead.  See below for a command example.</para></note>

      <para>This is a very bad idea as it will block all users from
	issuing even the most simple commands, such as
	<command>ls</command>.  A more patriotic list of rules
	might be:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>ugidfw set 2 subject uid <replaceable>user1</replaceable> object uid <replaceable>user2</replaceable> mode n</userinput>
&prompt.root; <userinput>ugidfw set 3 subject uid <replaceable>user1</replaceable> object gid <replaceable>user2</replaceable> mode n</userinput></screen>

      <para>This will block any and all access, including directory
	listings, to <username><replaceable>user2</replaceable></username>'s home
	directory from the username <username>user1</username>.</para>

      <para>In place of <username>user1</username>, the
	<option>not uid <replaceable>user2</replaceable></option> could
	be passed.  This will enforce the same access restrictions
	above for all users in place of just one user.</para>

      <note>
	<para>The <username>root</username> user will be unaffected
	    by these changes.</para>
      </note>

      <para>This should give a general idea of how the
	&man.mac.bsdextended.4; module may be used to help fortify
	a file system.  For more information, see the
	&man.mac.bsdextended.4; and the &man.ugidfw.8; manual
	pages.</para>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-ifoff">
    <title>The MAC ifoff Module</title>

    <indexterm>
      <primary>MAC Interface Silencing Policy</primary>
    </indexterm>
    <para>Module name: <filename>mac_ifoff.ko</filename></para>

    <para>Kernel configuration line:
      <literal>options MAC_IFOFF</literal></para>

    <para>Boot option: <literal>mac_ifoff_load="YES"</literal></para>

    <para>The &man.mac.ifoff.4; module exists solely to disable network
      interfaces on the fly and keep network interfaces from being
      brought up during the initial system boot.  It does not require
      any labels to be set up on the system, nor does it have a
      dependency on other <acronym>MAC</acronym> modules.</para>

    <para>Most of the control is done through the
      <command>sysctl</command> tunables listed below.</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.ifoff.lo_enabled</literal> will
	  enable/disable all traffic on the loopback (&man.lo.4;)
	  interface.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.ifoff.bpfrecv_enabled</literal> will
	  enable/disable all traffic on the Berkeley Packet Filter
	  interface (&man.bpf.4;)</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.ifoff.other_enabled</literal> will
	  enable/disable traffic on all other interfaces.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>One of the most common uses of &man.mac.ifoff.4; is network
      monitoring in an environment where network traffic should not
      be permitted during the boot sequence.  Another suggested use
      would be to write a script which uses
      <filename role="package">security/aide</filename> to automatically
      block network traffic if it finds new or altered files in
      protected directories.</para>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-portacl">
    <title>The MAC portacl Module</title>

    <indexterm>
      <primary>MAC Port Access Control List Policy</primary>
    </indexterm>
    <para>Module name: <filename>mac_portacl.ko</filename></para>

    <para>Kernel configuration line:
      <literal>MAC_PORTACL</literal></para>

    <para>Boot option: <literal>mac_portacl_load="YES"</literal></para>

    <para>The &man.mac.portacl.4; module is used to limit binding to
      local <acronym>TCP</acronym> and <acronym>UDP</acronym> ports
      using a variety of <command>sysctl</command> variables.  In
      essence &man.mac.portacl.4; makes it possible to allow
      non-<username>root</username> users to bind to specified
      privileged ports, i.e. ports fewer than 1024.</para>

    <para>Once loaded, this module will enable the
      <acronym>MAC</acronym> policy on all sockets.  The following
      tunables are available:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.portacl.enabled</literal> will
	  enable/disable the policy completely.<footnote><para>Due to
	  a bug the <literal>security.mac.portacl.enabled</literal>
	  <command>sysctl</command> variable will not work on
	  &os;&nbsp;5.2.1 or previous releases.</para></footnote></para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.portacl.port_high</literal> will set
	  the highest port number that &man.mac.portacl.4;
	  will enable protection for.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt</literal> will,
	  when set to a non-zero value, exempt the
	  <username>root</username> user from this policy.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.portacl.rules</literal> will
	  specify the actual mac_portacl policy; see below.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>The actual <literal>mac_portacl</literal> policy, as
      specified in the <literal>security.mac.portacl.rules</literal>
      sysctl, is a text string of the form:
      <literal>rule[,rule,...]</literal> with as many rules as
      needed.  Each rule is of the form:
      <literal>idtype:id:protocol:port</literal>.  The
      <parameter>idtype</parameter> parameter can be
      <literal>uid</literal> or <literal>gid</literal> and used to
      interpret the <parameter>id</parameter> parameter as either a
      user id or group id, respectively.  The
      <parameter>protocol</parameter> parameter is used to determine if
      the rule should apply to <acronym>TCP</acronym> or
      <acronym>UDP</acronym> by setting the parameter to
      <literal>tcp</literal> or <literal>udp</literal>.  The final
      <parameter>port</parameter> parameter is the port number to allow
      the specified user or group to bind to.</para>

    <note>
      <para>Since the ruleset is interpreted directly by the kernel
	only numeric values can be used for the user ID, group ID, and
	port parameters.  I.e. user, group, and port service names
	cannot be used.</para>
    </note>

    <para>By default, on &unix;-like systems, ports fewer than 1024
      can only be used by/bound to privileged processes,
      i.e. those run as <username>root</username>.  For
      &man.mac.portacl.4; to allow non-privileged processes to bind
      to ports below 1024 this standard &unix; restriction has to be
      disabled.  This can be accomplished by setting the &man.sysctl.8;
      variables <literal>net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedlow</literal> and
      <literal>net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh</literal>
      to zero.</para>

    <para>See the examples below or review the &man.mac.portacl.4;
      manual page for further information.</para>

    <sect2>
      <title>Examples</title>

      <para>The following examples should illuminate the above
	discussion a little better:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>sysctl security.mac.portacl.port_high=1023</userinput>
&prompt.root; <userinput>sysctl net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedlow=0 net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh=0</userinput></screen>

      <para>First we set &man.mac.portacl.4; to cover the standard
	privileged ports and disable the normal &unix; bind
	restrictions.</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>sysctl security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt=1</userinput></screen>

      <para>The <username>root</username> user should not be crippled
	by this policy, thus set the
	<literal>security.mac.portacl.suser_exempt</literal> to a
	non-zero value.  The &man.mac.portacl.4; module
	has now been set up to behave the same way &unix;-like systems
	behave by default.</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules=uid:80:tcp:80</userinput></screen>

      <para>Allow the user with <acronym>UID</acronym> 80 (normally
	the <username>www</username> user) to bind to port 80.
	This can be used to allow the <username>www</username>
	user to run a web server without ever having
	<username>root</username> privilege.</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>sysctl security.mac.portacl.rules=uid:1001:tcp:110,uid:1001:tcp:995</userinput></screen>

      <para>Permit the user with the <acronym>UID</acronym> of
	1001 to	bind to the <acronym>TCP</acronym> ports 110
	(<quote>pop3</quote>) and 995 (<quote>pop3s</quote>).
	This will permit this user to start a server that accepts
	connections on ports 110 and 995.</para>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-labelingpolicies">
    <title>MAC Policies with Labeling Features</title>

    <para>The next few sections will discuss <acronym>MAC</acronym>
      policies which use labels.</para>

    <para>From here on this chapter will focus on the features
      of &man.mac.biba.4;, &man.mac.lomac.4;,
      &man.mac.partition.4;, and &man.mac.mls.4;.</para>

    <note>
      <para>This is an example configuration only and should not be
        considered for a production implementation.  The goal is
	to document and show the syntax as well as examples for
	implementation and testing.</para>
    </note>

    <para>For these policies to work correctly several
      preparations must be made.</para>

    <sect2 id="mac-prep">
      <title>Preparation for Labeling Policies</title>

      <para>The following changes are required in the
	<filename>login.conf</filename> file:</para>

      <itemizedlist>
	<listitem>
	  <para>An <literal>insecure</literal> class, or another
	    class of similar type, must be
	    added.  The login class of <literal>insecure</literal>
	    is not required and just used as an example here; different
	    configurations may use another class name.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para>The <literal>insecure</literal> class should have
	    the following settings and definitions.  Several of these
	    can be altered but the line which defines the default
	    label is a requirement and must remain.</para>

	  <programlisting>insecure:\
	:copyright=/etc/COPYRIGHT:\
	:welcome=/etc/motd:\
	:setenv=MAIL=/var/mail/$,BLOCKSIZE=K:\
	:path=~/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:\
	:manpath=/usr/share/man /usr/local/man:\
	:nologin=/usr/sbin/nologin:\
	:cputime=1h30m:\
	:datasize=8M:\
	:vmemoryuse=100M:\
	:stacksize=2M:\
	:memorylocked=4M:\
	:memoryuse=8M:\
	:filesize=8M:\
	:coredumpsize=8M:\
	:openfiles=24:\
	:maxproc=32:\
	:priority=0:\
	:requirehome:\
	:passwordtime=91d:\
	:umask=022:\
	:ignoretime@:\
	:label=partition/13,mls/5,biba/low:</programlisting>

	  <para>The &man.cap.mkdb.1; command needs to be ran on
	    &man.login.conf.5; before any of the
	    users can be switched over to the new class.</para>

	  <para>The <username>root</username> should also be placed
	    into a login class; otherwise, almost every command
	    executed by <username>root</username> will require the
	    use of <command>setpmac</command>.</para>

	  <warning>
	    <para>Rebuilding the <filename>login.conf</filename>
	      database may cause some errors later with the daemon
	      class.  Simply uncommenting the daemon account and
	      rebuilding the database should alleviate these
	      issues.</para>
	  </warning>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para>Ensure that all partitions on which
	    <acronym>MAC</acronym> labeling will be implemented support
	    the <option>multilabel</option>.  We must do this because
	    many of the examples here contain different labels for
	    testing purposes.  Review the output from the
	    <command>mount</command> command as a precautionary
            measure.</para>
	</listitem>

	<listitem>
	  <para>Switch any users who will have the higher security
	    mechanisms enforced over to the new user class.  A quick
	    run of &man.pw.8; or &man.vipw.8; should do the
	    trick.</para>
	</listitem>
      </itemizedlist>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-partition">
    <title>The MAC partition Module</title>

    <indexterm>
      <primary>MAC Process Partition Policy</primary>
    </indexterm>
    <para>Module name: <filename>mac_partition.ko</filename></para>

    <para>Kernel configuration line:
      <literal>options MAC_PARTITION</literal></para>

    <para>Boot option:
      <literal>mac_partition_load="YES"</literal></para>

    <para>The &man.mac.partition.4; policy will drop processes into
      specific <quote>partitions</quote> based on their
      <acronym>MAC</acronym> label.  Think of it as a special
      type of &man.jail.8;, though that is hardly a worthy
      comparison.</para>

    <para>This is one module that should be added to the
      &man.loader.conf.5; file so that it loads
      and enables the policy during the boot process.</para>

    <para>Most configuration for this policy is done using
      the &man.setpmac.8; utility which will be explained below.
      The following <command>sysctl</command> tunable is
      available for this policy:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.partition.enabled</literal> will
	  enable the enforcement of <acronym>MAC</acronym> process
	  partitions.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>When this policy is enabled, users will only be permitted
      to see their processes but will not be permitted to work with
      certain utilities.  For instance, a user in the
      <literal>insecure</literal> class above will not be permitted
      to access the <command>top</command> command as well as many
      other commands that must spawn a process.</para>

    <para>To set or drop utilities into a partition label, use the
      <command>setpmac</command> utility:</para>

    <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setpmac partition/13 top</userinput></screen>

    <para>This will add the <command>top</command> command to the
      label set on users in the <literal>insecure</literal> class.
      Note that all processes spawned by users
      in the <literal>insecure</literal> class will stay in the
      <literal>partition/13</literal> label.</para>

    <sect2>
      <title>Examples</title>

      <para>The following command will show you the partition label
	and the process list:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>ps Zax</userinput></screen>

      <para>This next command will allow the viewing of another
	user's process partition label and that user's currently
	running processes:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>ps -ZU trhodes</userinput></screen>

      <note>
	<para>Users can see processes in <username>root</username>'s
	  label unless the &man.mac.seeotheruids.4; policy is
	  loaded.</para>
      </note>

      <para>A really crafty implementation could have all of the
	services disabled in <filename>/etc/rc.conf</filename> and
	started by a script that starts them with the proper
	labeling set.</para>

      <note>
	<para>The following policies support integer settings
	  in place of the three default labels offered.  These options,
	  including their limitations, are further explained in
	  the module manual pages.</para>
      </note>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-mls">
    <title>The MAC Multi-Level Security Module</title>

    <indexterm>
      <primary>MAC Multi-Level Security Policy</primary>
    </indexterm>
    <para>Module name: <filename>mac_mls.ko</filename></para>

    <para>Kernel configuration line:
      <literal>options MAC_MLS</literal></para>

    <para>Boot option: <literal>mac_mls_load="YES"</literal></para>

    <para>The &man.mac.mls.4; policy controls access between subjects
      and objects in the system by enforcing a strict information
      flow policy.</para>

    <para>In <acronym>MLS</acronym> environments, a
      <quote>clearance</quote> level is set in each subject or objects
      label, along with compartments.  Since these clearance or
      sensibility levels can reach numbers greater than six thousand;
      it would be a daunting task for any system administrator to
      thoroughly configure each subject or object.  Thankfully, three
      <quote>instant</quote> labels are already included in this
      policy.</para>

    <para>These labels are <literal>mls/low</literal>,
      <literal>mls/equal</literal> and <literal>mls/high</literal>.
      Since these labels are described in depth in the manual page,
      they will only get a brief description here:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para>The <literal>mls/low</literal> label contains a low
	  configuration which permits it to be dominated by all other
	  objects.  Anything labeled with <literal>mls/low</literal>
	  will have a low clearance level and not be permitted to access
	  information of a higher level.  In addition, this label will
	  prevent objects of a higher clearance level from writing or
	  passing information on to them.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>The <literal>mls/equal</literal> label should be
	  placed on objects considered to be exempt from the
	  policy.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>The <literal>mls/high</literal> label is the highest level
	  of clearance possible.  Objects assigned this label will
	  hold dominance over all other objects in the system; however,
	  they will not permit the leaking of information to objects
	  of a lower class.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para><acronym>MLS</acronym> provides for:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para>A hierarchical security level with a set of non
	  hierarchical categories;</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>Fixed rules: no read up, no write down (a subject can
	  have read access to objects on its own level or below, but
	  not above.  Similarly, a subject can have write access to
	  objects on its own level or above but not beneath.);</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>Secrecy (preventing inappropriate disclosure
	  of data);</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>Basis for the design of systems that concurrently handle
	  data at multiple sensitivity levels (without leaking
	  information between secret and confidential).</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>The following <command>sysctl</command> tunables are
      available for the configuration of special services and
      interfaces:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.mls.enabled</literal> is used to
	  enable/disable the <acronym>MLS</acronym> policy.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.mls.ptys_equal</literal> will label
	  all &man.pty.4; devices as <literal>mls/equal</literal> during
	  creation.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.mls.revocation_enabled</literal> is
	  used to revoke access to objects after their label changes
	  to a label of a lower grade.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.mls.max_compartments</literal> is
	  used to set the maximum number of compartment levels with
	  objects; basically the maximum compartment number allowed
	  on a system.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>To manipulate the <acronym>MLS</acronym> labels, the
      &man.setfmac.8; command has been provided.  To assign a label
      to an object, issue the following command:</para>

    <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setfmac mls/5 test</userinput></screen>

    <para>To get the <acronym>MLS</acronym> label for the file
      <filename>test</filename> issue the following command:</para>

    <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>getfmac test</userinput></screen>

    <para>This is a summary of the <acronym>MLS</acronym>
      policy's features.  Another approach is to create a master policy
      file in <filename class="directory">/etc</filename> which
      specifies the <acronym>MLS</acronym> policy information and to
      feed that file into the <command>setfmac</command> command.  This
      method will be explained after all policies are covered.</para>

    <para>Observations: an object with lower clearance is unable to
      observe higher clearance processes.  A basic policy would be
      to enforce <literal>mls/high</literal> on everything not to be
      read, even if it needs to be written.  Enforce
      <literal>mls/low</literal> on everything not to be written, even
      if it needs to be read.  And finally enforce
      <literal>mls/equal</literal> on the rest.  All users marked
      <literal>insecure</literal> should be set at
      <literal>mls/low</literal>.</para>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-biba">
    <title>The MAC Biba Module</title>

    <indexterm>
      <primary>MAC Biba Integrity Policy</primary>
    </indexterm>
    <para>Module name: <filename>mac_biba.ko</filename></para>

    <para>Kernel configuration line: <literal>options MAC_BIBA</literal></para>

    <para>Boot option: <literal>mac_biba_load="YES"</literal></para>

    <para>The &man.mac.biba.4; module loads the <acronym>MAC</acronym>
      Biba policy.  This policy works much like that of the
      <acronym>MLS</acronym> policy with the exception that the rules
      for information flow
      are slightly reversed.  This is said to prevent the downward
      flow of sensitive information whereas the <acronym>MLS</acronym>
      policy prevents the upward flow of sensitive information; thus,
      much of this section can apply to both policies.</para>

    <para>In Biba environments, an <quote>integrity</quote> label is
      set on each subject or object.  These labels are made up of
      hierarchal grades, and non-hierarchal components.  As an object's
      or subject's grade ascends, so does its integrity.</para>

    <para>Supported labels are <literal>biba/low</literal>,
      <literal>biba/equal</literal>, and <literal>biba/high</literal>;
      as explained below:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para>The <literal>biba/low</literal> label is considered the
	  lowest integrity an object or subject may have.  Setting
	  this on objects or subjects will block their write access
	  to objects or subjects marked high.  They still have read
	  access though.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>The <literal>biba/equal</literal> label should only be
	  placed on objects considered to be exempt from the
	  policy.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>The <literal>biba/high</literal> label will permit
	  writing to objects set at a lower label, but not
	  permit reading that object.  It is recommended that this
	  label be placed on objects that affect the integrity of
	  the entire system.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>Biba provides for:</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para>Hierarchical integrity level with a set of non
	  hierarchical integrity categories;</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>Fixed rules: no write up, no read down (opposite of
	  <acronym>MLS</acronym>).  A subject can have write access
	  to objects on its own level or below, but not above.  Similarly, a
	  subject can have read access to objects on its own level
	  or above, but not below;</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>Integrity (preventing inappropriate modification of
	  data);</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para>Integrity levels (instead of MLS sensitivity
	  levels).</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>The following <command>sysctl</command> tunables can
      be used to manipulate the Biba policy.</para>

    <itemizedlist>
      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.biba.enabled</literal> may be used
	  to enable/disable enforcement of the Biba policy on the
	  target machine.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.biba.ptys_equal</literal> may be
	  used to disable the Biba policy on &man.pty.4;
	  devices.</para>
      </listitem>

      <listitem>
	<para><literal>security.mac.biba.revocation_enabled</literal>
	  will force the revocation of access to objects if the label
	  is changed to dominate the subject.</para>
      </listitem>
    </itemizedlist>

    <para>To access the Biba policy setting on system objects, use
      the <command>setfmac</command> and <command>getfmac</command>
      commands:</para>

    <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setfmac biba/low test</userinput>
&prompt.root; <userinput>getfmac test</userinput>
test: biba/low</screen>

    <para>Observations: a lower integrity subject is unable to write
      to a higher integrity subject; a higher integrity subject cannot
      observe or read a lower integrity object.</para>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-lomac">
    <title>The MAC LOMAC Module</title>

    <indexterm>
      <primary>MAC LOMAC</primary>
    </indexterm>
    <para>Module name: <filename>mac_lomac.ko</filename></para>

    <para>Kernel configuration line: <literal>options MAC_LOMAC</literal></para>
    <para>Boot option: <literal>mac_lomac_load="YES"</literal></para>

    <para>Unlike the <acronym>MAC</acronym> Biba policy, the
      &man.mac.lomac.4; policy permits access to lower integrity
      objects only after decreasing the integrity level to not disrupt
      any integrity rules.</para>

    <para>The <acronym>MAC</acronym> version of the Low-watermark
      integrity policy, not to be confused with the older &man.lomac.4;
      implementation, works almost identically to Biba, but with the
      exception of using floating labels to support subject
      demotion via an auxiliary grade compartment.  This secondary
      compartment takes the form of <literal>[auxgrade]</literal>.
      When assigning a lomac policy with an auxiliary grade, it
      should look a little bit like: <literal>lomac/10[2]</literal>
      where the number two (2) is the auxiliary grade.</para>

    <para>The <acronym>MAC</acronym> LOMAC policy relies on the
      ubiquitous labeling of all system objects with integrity labels,
      permitting subjects to read from low integrity objects and then
      downgrading the label on the subject to prevent future writes to
      high integrity objects.  This is the
      <literal>[auxgrade]</literal> option discussed above, thus the
      policy may provide for greater compatibility and require less
      initial configuration than Biba.</para>

    <sect2>
      <title>Examples</title>

      <para>Like the Biba and <acronym>MLS</acronym> policies;
	the <command>setfmac</command> and <command>setpmac</command>
	utilities may be used to place labels on system objects:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setfmac /usr/home/trhodes lomac/high[low]</userinput>
&prompt.root; <userinput>getfmac /usr/home/trhodes</userinput> lomac/high[low]</screen>

      <para>Notice the auxiliary grade here is <literal>low</literal>,
	this is a feature provided only by the <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	LOMAC policy.</para>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="mac-implementing">
    <title>Implementing a Secure Environment with MAC</title>

    <indexterm>
      <primary>MAC Example Implementation</primary>
    </indexterm>

    <para>The following demonstration will implement a secure
      environment using various <acronym>MAC</acronym> modules
      with properly configured policies.  This is only a test and
      should not be considered the complete answer to everyone's
      security woes.  Just implementing a policy and ignoring it
      never works and could be disastrous in a production
      environment.</para>

    <para>Before beginning this process, the
      <literal>multilabel</literal> option must be set on each file
      system as stated at the beginning of this chapter.  Not doing
      so will result in errors.</para>

    <sect2>
      <title>Create an insecure User Class</title>

      <para>Begin the procedure by adding the following user class
       to the <filename>/etc/login.conf</filename> file:</para>

      <programlisting>insecure:\
:copyright=/etc/COPYRIGHT:\
:welcome=/etc/motd:\
:setenv=MAIL=/var/mail/$,BLOCKSIZE=K:\
:path=~/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin
:manpath=/usr/share/man /usr/local/man:\
:nologin=/usr/sbin/nologin:\
:cputime=1h30m:\
:datasize=8M:\
:vmemoryuse=100M:\
:stacksize=2M:\
:memorylocked=4M:\
:memoryuse=8M:\
:filesize=8M:\
:coredumpsize=8M:\
:openfiles=24:\
:maxproc=32:\
:priority=0:\
:requirehome:\
:passwordtime=91d:\
:umask=022:\
:ignoretime@:\
:label=partition/13,mls/5:</programlisting>

      <para>And adding the following line to the default user
	class:</para>

      <programlisting>:label=mls/equal,biba/equal,partition/15:</programlisting>

      <para>Once this is completed, the following command must be
	issued to rebuild the database:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>cap_mkdb /etc/login.conf</userinput></screen>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>Boot with the Correct Modules</title>

      <para>Add the following lines to
	<filename>/boot/loader.conf</filename> so the required
	modules will load during system initialization:</para>

      <programlisting>mac_biba_load="YES"
mac_mls_load="YES"
mac_seeotheruids_load="YES"
mac_partition_load="YES"</programlisting>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>Set All Users to Insecure</title>

      <para>All user accounts that are not <username>root</username>
	or system users will now require a login class.  The login
	class is required otherwise users will be refused access
	to common commands such as &man.vi.1;.
	The following <command>sh</command> script should do the
	trick:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>for x in `awk -F: '($3 >= 1001) && ($3 != 65534) { print $1 }' \</userinput>
	<userinput>/etc/passwd`; do pw usermod $x -L insecure; done;</userinput></screen>

      <para>The <command>cap_mkdb</command> command will need to be
	run on <filename>/etc/master.passwd</filename> after this
	change.</para>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>Complete the Configuration</title>

      <para>A contexts file should now be created; the following
	example was taken from Robert Watson's example policy and
	should be placed in
	<filename>/etc/policy.contexts</filename>.</para>

      <programlisting># This is the default BIBA/MLS policy for this system.

.*                              biba/high,mls/high
/sbin/dhclient                  biba/high(low),mls/high(low)
/dev(/.*)?                      biba/equal,mls/equal
# This is not an exhaustive list of all "privileged" devices.
/dev/mdctl                      biba/high,mls/high
/dev/pci                        biba/high,mls/high
/dev/k?mem                      biba/high,mls/high
/dev/io                         biba/high,mls/high
/dev/agp.*                      biba/high,mls/high
(/var)?/tmp(/.*)?               biba/equal,mls/equal
/tmp/\.X11-unix                 biba/high(equal),mls/high(equal)
/tmp/\.X11-unix/.*              biba/equal,mls/equal
/proc(/.*)?                     biba/equal,mls/equal
/mnt.*                          biba/low,mls/low
(/usr)?/home                    biba/high(low),mls/high(low)
(/usr)?/home/.*                 biba/low,mls/low
/var/mail(/.*)?                 biba/low,mls/low
/var/spool/mqueue(/.*)?         biba/low,mls/low
(/mnt)?/cdrom(/.*)?             biba/high,mls/high
(/usr)?/home/(ftp|samba)(/.*)?  biba/high,mls/high
/var/log/sendmail\.st           biba/low,mls/low
/var/run/utmp                   biba/equal,mls/equal
/var/log/(lastlog|wtmp)         biba/equal,mls/equal</programlisting>

      <para>This policy will enforce security by setting restrictions
	on both the downward and upward flow of information with
	regards to the directories and utilities listed on the
	left.</para>

      <para>This can now be read into our system by issuing the
	following command:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setfsmac -ef /etc/policy.contexts /</userinput>
&prompt.root; <userinput>setfsmac -ef /etc/policy.contexts /usr</userinput></screen>

      <note>
	<para>The above file system layout may be different depending
	  on environment.</para>
      </note>

      <para>The <filename>/etc/mac.conf</filename> file requires
	the following modifications in the main section:</para>

      <programlisting>default_labels file ?biba,?mls
default_labels ifnet ?biba,?mls
default_labels process ?biba,?mls,?partition
default_labels socket ?biba,?mls</programlisting>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>Testing the Configuration</title>

      <indexterm>
	<primary>MAC Configuration Testing</primary>
      </indexterm>

      <para>Add a user with the <command>adduser</command> command
	and place that user in the <literal>insecure</literal>
	class for these tests.</para>

      <para>The examples below will show a mix of
	<username>root</username> and regular user tests; use the
	prompt to distinguish between the two.</para>

      <sect3>
	<title>Basic Labeling Tests</title>

	<screen>&prompt.user; <userinput>getpmac</userinput>
biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15
&prompt.root; <userinput>setpmac partition/15,mls/equal top</userinput></screen>

	<note>
	  <para>The top process will be killed before we start
	    another top process.</para>
	</note>
      </sect3>

      <sect3>
	<title>MAC Seeotheruids Tests</title>

	<screen>&prompt.user; <userinput>ps Zax</userinput>
biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15  1096 #C:  S      0:00.03 -su (bash)
biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15  1101 #C:  R+     0:00.01 ps Zax</screen>

	<para>We should not be permitted to see any processes
	  owned by other users.</para>
      </sect3>

      <sect3>
	<title>MAC Partition Test</title>

	<para>Disable the <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	  <literal>seeotheruids</literal> policy for the rest of these
	  tests:</para>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>sysctl security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled=0</userinput>
&prompt.user; <userinput>ps Zax</userinput>
LABEL                                                   PID  TT  STAT      TIME COMMAND
  biba/equal(low-high),mls/equal(low-high),partition/15  1122 #C:  S+     0:00.02 top
  biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15              1096 #C:  S      0:00.05 -su (bash)
  biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15              1123 #C:  R+     0:00.01 ps Zax</screen>

	<para>All users should be permitted to see every process in
	  their partition.</para>
      </sect3>

      <sect3>
	<title>Testing Biba and MLS Labels</title>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setpmac partition/15,mls/equal,biba/high\(high-high\) top</userinput>
&prompt.user; <userinput>ps Zax</userinput>
LABEL                                                   PID  TT  STAT    TIME   COMMAND
  biba/high(high-high),mls/equal(low-high),partition/15   1251 #C:  S+     0:00.02 top
  biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15               1096 #C:  S      0:00.06 -su (bash)
  biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15               1157 #C:  R+     0:00.00 ps Zax</screen>

	<para>The Biba policy allows us to read higher-labeled
	  objects.</para>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>setpmac partition/15,mls/equal,biba/low top</userinput>
&prompt.user; <userinput>ps Zax</userinput>
LABEL                                       PID  TT  STAT      TIME COMMAND
  biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15  1096 #C:  S      0:00.07 -su (bash)
  biba/15(15-15),mls/15(15-15),partition/15  1226 #C:  R+     0:00.01 ps Zax</screen>

	<para>The Biba policy does not allow lower-labeled objects
	  to be read; however, <acronym>MLS</acronym> does.</para>

	<screen>&prompt.user; <userinput>ifconfig bge0 | grep maclabel</userinput>
maclabel biba/low(low-low),mls/low(low-low)
&prompt.user; <userinput>ping -c 1 192.0.34.166</userinput>
PING 192.0.34.166 (192.0.34.166): 56 data bytes
ping: sendto: Permission denied</screen>

	<para>Users are unable to ping
	  <hostid role="domainname">example.com</hostid>, or any domain
	  for that matter.</para>

	<para>To prevent this error from occurring, run the following
	  command:</para>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>sysctl security.mac.biba.trust_all_interfaces=1</userinput></screen>

	<para>This sets the default interface label to insecure mode,
	  so the default Biba policy label will not be enforced.</para>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>ifconfig bge0 maclabel biba/equal\(low-high\),mls/equal\(low-high\)</userinput>
&prompt.user; <userinput>ping -c 1 192.0.34.166</userinput>
PING 192.0.34.166 (192.0.34.166): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 192.0.34.166: icmp_seq=0 ttl=50 time=204.455 ms
--- 192.0.34.166 ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 204.455/204.455/204.455/0.000 ms</screen>

	<para>By setting a more correct label, we can issue
	  <command>ping</command> requests.</para>

	<para>Now to create a few files for some read and write
	  testing procedures:</para>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>touch test1 test2 test3 test4 test5</userinput>
&prompt.root; <userinput>getfmac test1</userinput>
test1: biba/equal,mls/equal
&prompt.root; <userinput>setfmac biba/low test1 test2; setfmac biba/high test4 test5; \
  setfmac mls/low test1 test3; setfmac mls/high test2 test4</userinput>
&prompt.root; <userinput>setfmac mls/equal,biba/equal test3 && getfmac test?</userinput>
test1: biba/low,mls/low
test2: biba/low,mls/high
test3: biba/equal,mls/equal
test4: biba/high,mls/high
test5: biba/high,mls/equal
&prompt.root; <userinput>chown testuser:testuser test?</userinput></screen>

	<para>All of these files should now be owned by our
	  <username>testuser</username> user.  And now for some read
	  tests:</para>

	<screen>&prompt.user; <userinput>ls</userinput>
test1   test2   test3   test4   test5
&prompt.user; <userinput>ls test?</userinput>
ls: test1: Permission denied
ls: test2: Permission denied
ls: test4: Permission denied
test3   test5</screen>

	<para>We should not be permitted to observe pairs; e.g.:
	  <literal>(biba/low,mls/low)</literal>,
	  <literal>(biba/low,mls/high)</literal> and
	  <literal>(biba/high,mls/high)</literal>.  And of course,
	  read access should be denied.  Now for some write
	  tests:</para>

	<screen>&prompt.user; <userinput>for i in `echo test*`; do echo 1 > $i; done</userinput>
-su: test1: Permission denied
-su: test4: Permission denied
-su: test5: Permission denied</screen>

	<para>Like with the read tests, write access should not be
	  permitted to write pairs; e.g.:
	  <literal>(biba/low,mls/high)</literal> and
	  <literal>(biba/equal,mls/equal)</literal>.</para>

	<screen>&prompt.user; <userinput>cat test?</userinput>
cat: test1: Permission denied
cat: test2: Permission denied
1
cat: test4: Permission denied</screen>

	<para>And now as <username>root</username>:</para>

	<screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>cat test2</userinput>
1</screen>
      </sect3>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>

  <sect1 id="MAC-examplehttpd">
    <title>Another Example: Using MAC to Constrain a Web Server</title>

      <para>A separate location for the web data which users
	must be capable of accessing will be appointed.  This
	will permit <literal>biba/high</literal> processes access
	rights to the web data.</para>

      <para>Begin by creating a directory to store the web
	data in:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>mkdir /usr/home/cvs</userinput></screen>

      <para>Now initialize it with <command>cvs</command>:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>cvs -d /usr/home/cvs init</userinput></screen>

      <para>The first goal is to enable the <literal>biba</literal>
	policy, thus the <literal>mac_biba_enable="YES"</literal>
	should be placed in
	<filename>/boot/loader.conf</filename>.  This assumes
	that support for <acronym>MAC</acronym> has been enabled
	in the kernel.</para>

      <para>From this point on everything in the system should
	be set at <literal>biba/high</literal> by default.</para>

      <para>The following modification must be made to the
	<filename>login.conf</filename> file, under the default
	user class:</para>

      <programlisting>:ignoretime@:\
	:umask=022:\
	:label=biba/high:</programlisting>

      <para>Every user should now be placed in the default class;
	a command such as:</para>

      <screen>&prompt.root; <userinput>for x in `awk -F: '($3 >= 1001) && ($3 != 65534) { print $1 }' \</userinput>
	<userinput>/etc/passwd`; do pw usermod $x -L default; done;</userinput></screen>

      <para>will accomplish this task in a few moments.</para>

      <para>Now create another class, web, a copy of default,
	with the label setting of <literal>biba/low</literal>.</para>

      <para>Create a user who will be used to work with the
	main web data stored in a <application>cvs</application>
	repository.  This user must be placed in our new login
	class, <username>web</username>.</para>

      <para>Since the default is <literal>biba/high</literal>
	everywhere, the repository will be the same.  The web data must
	also be the same for users to have read/write access to it;
	however, since our web server will be serving data that
	<literal>biba/high</literal> users must access, we will need to
	downgrade the data as a	whole.</para>

      <para>The perfect tools for this are &man.sh.1; and
	&man.cron.8; and are already provided in &os;.  The following
	script should do everything we want:</para>

      <programlisting>PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin; export PATH;
CVSROOT=/home/repo; export CVSROOT;
cd /home/web;
cvs -qR checkout -P htdocs;
exit;</programlisting>

      <note>
	<para>In many cases the <command>cvs</command>
	  Id tags must be placed into the web
	  site data files.</para>
      </note>

      <para>This script may now be placed into
	<username>web</username>'s home directory and the following
	&man.crontab.1; entry added:</para>

      <programlisting># Check out the web data as biba/low every twelve hours:
0       */12       *       *       *       web    /home/web/checkout.sh</programlisting>

      <para>This will check out the <acronym>HTML</acronym> sources
	every twelve hours on the machine.</para>

      <para>The default startup method for the web server must also be
	modified to start the process as <literal>biba/low</literal>.
	This can be done by making the following modification to the
	<filename>/usr/local/etc/rc.d/apache.sh</filename>
	script:</para>

      <programlisting>command="setpmac biba/low /usr/local/sbin/httpd"</programlisting>

      <para>The <application>Apache</application> configuration must be
	altered to work with the <literal>biba/low</literal> policy.  In
	this case the software must be configured to append to the
	log files in a directory set at <literal>biba/low</literal>
	or else <errorname>access denied</errorname> errors will be
	returned.</para>

      <note>
	<para>Following this example requires that the
	  <literal>docroot</literal> directive be set to
	  <filename>/home/web/htdocs</filename>; otherwise,
	  <application>Apache</application> will fail when trying
	  to locate the directory to serve documents from.</para>
      </note>

      <para>Other configuration variables must be altered as well,
	including the <acronym>PID</acronym> file,
	<literal>Scoreboardfile</literal>,
	<literal>DocumentRoot</literal>, log file locations, or any
	other variable which requires write access.
	When using <literal>biba</literal>, all write access will be
	denied to the server in areas <emphasis>not</emphasis> set at
	<literal>biba/low</literal>.</para>
<!--
PROBLEM: CAN THIS WORK?  OR SHOULD IT BE start_precmd?  More testing need here.
-->
  </sect1>

<!--
XXX

  <sect1 id="mac-examplesandbox">
    <title>An Example of a MAC Sandbox</title>

    <para>An example of placing users in a sandbox using
      <acronym>MAC</acronym> should go here.</para>
  </sect1>
-->

  <sect1 id="mac-troubleshoot">
    <title>Troubleshooting the MAC Framework</title>

    <indexterm>
      <primary>MAC Troubleshooting</primary>
    </indexterm>

    <para>During the development stage, a few users reported problems
      with normal configuration.  Some of these problems
      are listed below:</para>

    <sect2>
      <title>The <option>multilabel</option> option cannot be enabled on
	<filename>/</filename></title>

      <para>The <option>multilabel</option> flag does not stay
	enabled on my root (<filename>/</filename>) partition!</para>


      <para>It seems that one out of every fifty users has this
	problem, indeed, we had this problem during our initial
	configuration.  Further observation of this so called
	<quote>bug</quote> has lead me to believe that it is a
	result of either incorrect documentation or misinterpretation
	of the documentation.  Regardless of why it happened, the
	following steps may be taken to resolve it:</para>

      <procedure>
	<step>
	  <para>Edit <filename>/etc/fstab</filename> and set the root
	    partition at <option>ro</option> for read-only.</para>
	</step>

	<step>
	  <para>Reboot into single user mode.</para>
	</step>

	<step>
	  <para>Run <command>tunefs</command> <option>-l enable</option>
	    on <filename>/</filename>.</para>
	</step>

	<step>
	  <para>Reboot the system into normal mode.</para>
	</step>

	<step>
	  <para>Run <command>mount</command> <option>-urw</option>
	  <filename>/</filename> and change the <option>ro</option>
	  back to <option>rw</option> in <filename>/etc/fstab</filename>
	  and reboot the system again.</para>
	</step>

	<step>
	  <para>Double-check the output from the
	  <command>mount</command> to ensure that
	  <option>multilabel</option> has been properly set on the
	  root file system.</para>
	</step>
     </procedure>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>Cannot start a X11 server after <acronym>MAC</acronym></title>

      <para>After establishing a secure environment with
	<acronym>MAC</acronym>, I am no longer able to start
	X!</para>

      <para>This could be caused by the <acronym>MAC</acronym>
	<literal>partition</literal> policy or by a mislabeling in
	one of the <acronym>MAC</acronym> labeling policies.  To
	debug, try the following:</para>

      <procedure>
	<step>
	  <para>Check the error message; if the user is in the
	    <literal>insecure</literal> class, the
	    <literal>partition</literal> policy may be the culprit.
	    Try setting the user's class back to the
	    <literal>default</literal> class and rebuild the database
	    with the <command>cap_mkdb</command> command.  If this
	    does not alleviate the problem, go to step two.</para>
	</step>

	<step>
	  <para>Double-check the label policies.  Ensure that the
	    policies are set correctly for the user in question, the
	    X11 application, and
	    the <filename class="directory">/dev</filename>
	    entries.</para>
	</step>

	<step>
	  <para>If neither of these resolve the problem, send the
	    error message and a description of your environment to
	    the TrustedBSD discussion lists located at the
	    <ulink url="http://www.TrustedBSD.org">TrustedBSD</ulink>
	    website or to the &a.questions;
	    mailing list.</para>
	</step>
      </procedure>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>Error: &man..secure.path.3; cannot stat <filename>.login_conf</filename></title>

      <para>When I attempt to switch from the <username>root</username>
	to another user in the system, the error message
	<errorname>_secure_path: unable to state .login_conf</errorname>.</para>

      <para>This message is usually shown when the user has a higher
	label setting then that of the user whom they are attempting to
	become.  For instance a user on the system,
	<username>joe</username>, has a	default label of
	<option>biba/low</option>.  The <username>root</username> user,
	who has a label of <option>biba/high</option>, cannot view
	<username>joe</username>'s home directory.  This will happen
	regardless if <username>root</username> has used the
	<command>su</command> command to become <username>joe</username>,
	or not.  In this scenario, the Biba integrity model will not
	permit <username>root</username> to view objects set at a lower
	integrity level.</para>
    </sect2>

    <sect2>
      <title>The <username>root</username> username is broken!</title>

      <para>In normal or even single user mode, the
	<username>root</username> is not recognized.  The
	<command>whoami</command> command returns 0 (zero) and
	<command>su</command> returns <errorname>who are you?</errorname>.
	What could be going on?</para>

      <para>This can happen if a labeling policy has been disabled,
	either by a &man.sysctl.8; or the policy module was unloaded.
	If the policy is being disabled or has been temporarily
	disabled, then the login capabilities database needs to be
	reconfigured with the <option>label</option> option being
	removed.  Double check the <filename>login.conf</filename>
	file to ensure that all <option>label</option> options have
	been removed and rebuild the database with the
	<command>cap_mkdb</command> command.</para>
    </sect2>
  </sect1>
</chapter>

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