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Xin LI 2014-06-05 13:03:07 +00:00
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commit 05be27dd8f
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities
Category: contrib
Module: openssl
Announced: 2014-06-05
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2014-06-05 12:32:38 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-STABLE)
2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p5)
2014-06-05 12:53:06 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-BETA1)
2014-06-05 12:53:06 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-BETA1-p2)
2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p8)
2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p15)
2014-06-05 12:32:38 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-06-05 12:33:23 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p12)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-0195, CVE-2014-0221, CVE-2014-0224, CVE-2014-3470
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
general purpose cryptography library.
II. Problem Description
Receipt of an invalid DTLS fragment on an OpenSSL DTLS client or server can
lead to a buffer overrun. [CVE-2014-0195]
Receipt of an invalid DTLS handshake on an OpenSSL DTLS client can lead the
code to unnecessary recurse. [CVE-2014-0221]
Carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in
OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. [CVE-2014-0224]
Carefully crafted packets can lead to a NULL pointer deference in OpenSSL
TLS client code if anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are enabled. [CVE-2014-3470]
III. Impact
A remote attacker may be able to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client
or server by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or
server. [CVE-2014-0195]
A remote attacker who can send an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS
client can crash the remote OpenSSL DTLS client. [CVE-2014-0221]
A remote attacker who can send a carefully crafted handshake can force the
use of weak keying material between a vulnerable client and a vulnerable
server and decrypt and/or modify traffic from the attacked client and
server in a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. [CVE-2014-0224]
A remote attacker who can send carefully crafted packets can cause OpenSSL
TLS client to crash. [CVE-2014-3470]
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 10.0]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-10.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl-10.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 9.x and 8.x]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:14/openssl-9.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl-9.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r267103
releng/8.4/ r267104
stable/9/ r267106
releng/9.1/ r267104
releng/9.2/ r267104
stable/10/ r267103
releng/10.0/ r267104
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0195>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0221>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0224>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3470>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl.asc>
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Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy)
@@ -627,8 +627,17 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
}
else
+ {
frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ {
+ item = NULL;
+ frag = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
* retransmit and can be dropped.
*/
@@ -784,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
int i,al;
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+ redo:
/* see if we have the required fragment already */
if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
{
@@ -842,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_num = 0;
- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
- max, ok);
+ goto redo;
}
else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
{
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (working copy)
@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -915,6 +916,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->hit=1;
}
else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
@@ -2510,6 +2512,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate?
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (working copy)
@@ -1301,6 +1301,15 @@ start:
goto f_err;
}
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
rr->length=0;
if (s->msg_callback)
@@ -1435,7 +1444,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
{
- if (s->session == NULL)
+ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
{
/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy)
@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ {
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ }
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (working copy)
@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
* effected, but we can't prevent that.
*/
#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN

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@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy)
@@ -620,8 +620,17 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header
frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
}
else
+ {
frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ {
+ item = NULL;
+ frag = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
* retransmit and can be dropped.
*/
@@ -777,6 +786,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
int i,al;
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+ redo:
/* see if we have the required fragment already */
if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
{
@@ -835,8 +845,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int st
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_num = 0;
- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
- max, ok);
+ goto redo;
}
else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
{
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c (working copy)
@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -777,6 +778,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->hit=1;
}
else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
@@ -2170,6 +2172,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
int field_size = 0;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
* computation as part of client certificate?
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c (working copy)
@@ -1147,6 +1147,15 @@ start:
goto f_err;
}
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
rr->length=0;
if (s->msg_callback)
@@ -1278,7 +1287,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
{
- if (s->session == NULL)
+ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
{
/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c (working copy)
@@ -523,6 +523,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -533,6 +534,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (revision 267031)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h (working copy)
@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
* effected, but we can't prevent that.
*/
#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
typedef struct ssl3_state_st
{

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@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
<month> <month>
<name>6</name> <name>6</name>
<day>
<name>5</name>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-14:14.openssl</name>
</advisory>
</day>
<day> <day>
<name>3</name> <name>3</name>