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Gordon Tetlow 2019-02-05 18:38:28 +00:00
parent 2cf5c6c843
commit 09a1676909
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=52797
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-19:06.dtrace Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: DTrace incompatibility with SMAP-enabled systems
Category: core
Module: dtrace
Announced: 2019-02-05
Credits: Mateusz Guzik
Affects: FreeBSD 12.0
Corrected: 2018-12-19 23:29:44 UTC (stable/12, 12.0-STABLE)
2019-02-05 17:54:09 UTC (releng/12.0, 12.0-RELEASE-p3)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
DTrace is a dynamic tracing framework that can be used to analyze the kernel
and userspace applications in various ways.
II. Problem Description
When tracing userspace applications, the kernel component of DTrace may need
to access userspace memory. With the addition of SMAP support to the amd64
kernel, the kernel is not able to arbitrarily access userspace memory: it
must set a CPU flag to enable access. The code used by DTrace to perform
such accesses was not updated accordingly.
III. Impact
The problem means that certain DTrace actions do not work on SMAP-enabled
systems. This does not affect the application being traced.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date and reboot.
2) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +30 "Rebooting for errata update"
3) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-19:06/dtrace.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-19:06/dtrace.patch.asc
# gpg --verify dtrace.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r342267
releng/12.0/ r343783
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-19:06.dtrace.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-19:07.lle Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: LLE table lookup code race condition
Category: core
Module: net
Announced: 2019-02-05
Credits: Mark Johnston
Affects: FreeBSD 12.0
Corrected: 2019-01-25 20:24:53 UTC (stable/12, 12.0-STABLE)
2019-02-05 17:59:50 UTC (releng/12.0, 12.0-RELEASE-p3)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
A LLE (link layer entry) table stores information about hosts on a network
and is used to translate between network layer addresses and data link layer
addresses. The ARP cache, for example, is implemented using an LLE table.
LLEs typically expire after some period, so there exist mechanisms to
automatically remove them from their tables upon expiration.
II. Problem Description
The LLE table lookup code for IPv4 and IPv6 contains a race which results in
a condition where the expiry period of an LLE is extended after it has been
removed from the table and freed. By the time that the updated timer fires,
the LLE structure has been freed, and so the timer code is operating on freed
memory.
III. Impact
When the race is triggered, the result is typically a kernel panic. It may
otherwise cause undefined system behavior.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date and reboot.
2) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +30 "Rebooting for errata update"
3) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-19:07/lle.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-19:07/lle.patch.asc
# gpg --verify lle.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r343454
releng/12.0/ r343787
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=234296>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-19:07.lle.asc>
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139
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-19:01.syscall Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: System call kernel data register leak
Category: core
Module: kernel
Announced: 2019-02-05
Credits: Konstantin Belousov
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2019-02-05 17:52:06 UTC (stable/12, 12.0-STABLE)
2019-02-05 18:05:05 UTC (releng/12.0, 12.0-RELEASE-p3)
2019-02-05 17:54:02 UTC (stable/11, 11.2-STABLE)
2019-02-05 18:07:45 UTC (releng/11.2, 11.2-RELEASE-p9)
CVE Name: CVE-2019-5595
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The FreeBSD/amd64 architecture defines the SYSCALL instruction for syscalls,
and uses registers calling conventions for passing syscalls arguments and
return values in addition to the registers usage imposed by the SYSCALL and
SYSRET instructions in long mode. In particular, the arguments are passed in
registers specified by the C ABI, and the content of the registers specified
as caller-save, is undefined after the return from syscall.
II. Problem Description
The callee-save registers are used by kernel and for some of them (%r8, %r10,
and for non-PTI configurations, %r9) the content is not sanitized before
return from syscalls, potentially leaking sensitive information.
III. Impact
Typically an address of some kernel data structure used in the syscall
implementation, is exposed.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
and reboot.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10m "Rebooting for security update"
3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 12.0]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:01/syscall.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:01/syscall.patch.asc
# gpg --verify syscall.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 11.2]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:01/syscall.11.2.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:01/syscall.11.2.patch.asc
# gpg --verify syscall.patch.11.2.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r343781
releng/12.0/ r343788
stable/11/ r343782
releng/11.2/ r343789
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-5595>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-19:01.syscall.asc>
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136
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@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-19:02.fd Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: File description reference count leak
Category: core
Module: unix
Announced: 2019-02-05
Credits: Peter Holm
Affects: FreeBSD 12.0
Corrected: 2019-02-05 17:56:22 UTC (stable/12, 12.0-STABLE)
2019-02-05 18:11:15 UTC (releng/12.0, 12.0-RELEASE-p3)
2019-02-05 17:57:30 UTC (stable/11, 11.2-STABLE)
CVE Name: CVE-2019-5596
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
UNIX-domain sockets are used for inter-process communication. It is
possible to use UNIX-domain sockets to transfer rights, encoded as file
descriptors, to another process.
II. Problem Description
FreeBSD 12.0 attempts to handle the case where the receiving process does
not provide a sufficiently large buffer for an incoming control message
containing rights. In particular, to avoid leaking the corresponding
descriptors into the receiving process' descriptor table, the kernel handles
the truncation case by closing descriptors referenced by the discarded
message.
The code which performs this operation failed to release a reference obtained
on the file corresponding to a received right. This bug can be used to cause
the reference counter to wrap around and free the file structure.
III. Impact
A local user can exploit the bug to gain root privileges or escape from
a jail.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
and reboot.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +30 "Rebooting for security update"
3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 12.0]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:02/fd.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:02/fd.patch.asc
# gpg --verify fd.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r343785
releng/12.0/ r343790
stable/11/ r343786
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-5596>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-19:02.fd.asc>
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

256
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@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
--- sys/cddl/dev/dtrace/amd64/dtrace_asm.S.orig
+++ sys/cddl/dev/dtrace/amd64/dtrace_asm.S
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@
void
dtrace_copy(uintptr_t src, uintptr_t dest, size_t size)
*/
- ENTRY(dtrace_copy)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_copy_nosmap)
pushq %rbp
movq %rsp, %rbp
@@ -218,14 +218,28 @@
smovb /* move from %ds:rsi to %ed:rdi */
leave
ret
- END(dtrace_copy)
+ END(dtrace_copy_nosmap)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_copy_smap)
+ pushq %rbp
+ movq %rsp, %rbp
+
+ xchgq %rdi, %rsi /* make %rsi source, %rdi dest */
+ movq %rdx, %rcx /* load count */
+ stac
+ repz /* repeat for count ... */
+ smovb /* move from %ds:rsi to %ed:rdi */
+ clac
+ leave
+ ret
+ END(dtrace_copy_smap)
+
/*
void
dtrace_copystr(uintptr_t uaddr, uintptr_t kaddr, size_t size,
volatile uint16_t *flags)
*/
- ENTRY(dtrace_copystr)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_copystr_nosmap)
pushq %rbp
movq %rsp, %rbp
@@ -248,56 +262,121 @@
leave
ret
- END(dtrace_copystr)
+ END(dtrace_copystr_nosmap)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_copystr_smap)
+ pushq %rbp
+ movq %rsp, %rbp
+
+ stac
+0:
+ movb (%rdi), %al /* load from source */
+ movb %al, (%rsi) /* store to destination */
+ addq $1, %rdi /* increment source pointer */
+ addq $1, %rsi /* increment destination pointer */
+ subq $1, %rdx /* decrement remaining count */
+ cmpb $0, %al
+ je 2f
+ testq $0xfff, %rdx /* test if count is 4k-aligned */
+ jnz 1f /* if not, continue with copying */
+ testq $CPU_DTRACE_BADADDR, (%rcx) /* load and test dtrace flags */
+ jnz 2f
+1:
+ cmpq $0, %rdx
+ jne 0b
+2:
+ clac
+ leave
+ ret
+
+ END(dtrace_copystr_smap)
+
/*
uintptr_t
dtrace_fulword(void *addr)
*/
- ENTRY(dtrace_fulword)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fulword_nosmap)
movq (%rdi), %rax
ret
- END(dtrace_fulword)
+ END(dtrace_fulword_nosmap)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fulword_smap)
+ stac
+ movq (%rdi), %rax
+ clac
+ ret
+ END(dtrace_fulword_smap)
+
/*
uint8_t
dtrace_fuword8_nocheck(void *addr)
*/
- ENTRY(dtrace_fuword8_nocheck)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fuword8_nocheck_nosmap)
xorq %rax, %rax
movb (%rdi), %al
ret
- END(dtrace_fuword8_nocheck)
+ END(dtrace_fuword8_nocheck_nosmap)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fuword8_nocheck_smap)
+ stac
+ xorq %rax, %rax
+ movb (%rdi), %al
+ clac
+ ret
+ END(dtrace_fuword8_nocheck_smap)
+
/*
uint16_t
dtrace_fuword16_nocheck(void *addr)
*/
- ENTRY(dtrace_fuword16_nocheck)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fuword16_nocheck_nosmap)
xorq %rax, %rax
movw (%rdi), %ax
ret
- END(dtrace_fuword16_nocheck)
+ END(dtrace_fuword16_nocheck_nosmap)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fuword16_nocheck_smap)
+ stac
+ xorq %rax, %rax
+ movw (%rdi), %ax
+ clac
+ ret
+ END(dtrace_fuword16_nocheck_smap)
+
/*
uint32_t
dtrace_fuword32_nocheck(void *addr)
*/
- ENTRY(dtrace_fuword32_nocheck)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fuword32_nocheck_nosmap)
xorq %rax, %rax
movl (%rdi), %eax
ret
- END(dtrace_fuword32_nocheck)
+ END(dtrace_fuword32_nocheck_nosmap)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fuword32_nocheck_smap)
+ stac
+ xorq %rax, %rax
+ movl (%rdi), %eax
+ clac
+ ret
+ END(dtrace_fuword32_nocheck_smap)
+
/*
uint64_t
dtrace_fuword64_nocheck(void *addr)
*/
- ENTRY(dtrace_fuword64_nocheck)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fuword64_nocheck_nosmap)
movq (%rdi), %rax
ret
- END(dtrace_fuword64_nocheck)
+ END(dtrace_fuword64_nocheck_nosmap)
+ ENTRY(dtrace_fuword64_nocheck_smap)
+ stac
+ movq (%rdi), %rax
+ clac
+ ret
+ END(dtrace_fuword64_nocheck_smap)
+
/*
void
dtrace_probe_error(dtrace_state_t *state, dtrace_epid_t epid, int which,
--- sys/cddl/dev/dtrace/amd64/dtrace_isa.c.orig
+++ sys/cddl/dev/dtrace/amd64/dtrace_isa.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <machine/md_var.h>
#include <machine/reg.h>
#include <machine/stack.h>
+#include <x86/ifunc.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/vm_param.h>
@@ -664,3 +665,70 @@
}
return (dtrace_fuword64_nocheck(uaddr));
}
+
+/*
+ * ifunc resolvers for SMAP support
+ */
+void dtrace_copy_nosmap(uintptr_t, uintptr_t, size_t);
+void dtrace_copy_smap(uintptr_t, uintptr_t, size_t);
+DEFINE_IFUNC(, void, dtrace_copy, (uintptr_t, uintptr_t, size_t), static)
+{
+
+ return ((cpu_stdext_feature & CPUID_STDEXT_SMAP) != 0 ?
+ dtrace_copy_smap : dtrace_copy_nosmap);
+}
+
+void dtrace_copystr_nosmap(uintptr_t, uintptr_t, size_t, volatile uint16_t *);
+void dtrace_copystr_smap(uintptr_t, uintptr_t, size_t, volatile uint16_t *);
+DEFINE_IFUNC(, void, dtrace_copystr, (uintptr_t, uintptr_t, size_t,
+ volatile uint16_t *), static)
+{
+
+ return ((cpu_stdext_feature & CPUID_STDEXT_SMAP) != 0 ?
+ dtrace_copystr_smap : dtrace_copystr_nosmap);
+}
+
+uintptr_t dtrace_fulword_nosmap(void *);
+uintptr_t dtrace_fulword_smap(void *);
+DEFINE_IFUNC(, uintptr_t, dtrace_fulword, (void *), static)
+{
+
+ return ((cpu_stdext_feature & CPUID_STDEXT_SMAP) != 0 ?
+ dtrace_fulword_smap : dtrace_fulword_nosmap);
+}
+
+uint8_t dtrace_fuword8_nocheck_nosmap(void *);
+uint8_t dtrace_fuword8_nocheck_smap(void *);
+DEFINE_IFUNC(, uint8_t, dtrace_fuword8_nocheck, (void *), static)
+{
+
+ return ((cpu_stdext_feature & CPUID_STDEXT_SMAP) != 0 ?
+ dtrace_fuword8_nocheck_smap : dtrace_fuword8_nocheck_nosmap);
+}
+
+uint16_t dtrace_fuword16_nocheck_nosmap(void *);
+uint16_t dtrace_fuword16_nocheck_smap(void *);
+DEFINE_IFUNC(, uint16_t, dtrace_fuword16_nocheck, (void *), static)
+{
+
+ return ((cpu_stdext_feature & CPUID_STDEXT_SMAP) != 0 ?
+ dtrace_fuword16_nocheck_smap : dtrace_fuword16_nocheck_nosmap);
+}
+
+uint32_t dtrace_fuword32_nocheck_nosmap(void *);
+uint32_t dtrace_fuword32_nocheck_smap(void *);
+DEFINE_IFUNC(, uint32_t, dtrace_fuword32_nocheck, (void *), static)
+{
+
+ return ((cpu_stdext_feature & CPUID_STDEXT_SMAP) != 0 ?
+ dtrace_fuword32_nocheck_smap : dtrace_fuword32_nocheck_nosmap);
+}
+
+uint64_t dtrace_fuword64_nocheck_nosmap(void *);
+uint64_t dtrace_fuword64_nocheck_smap(void *);
+DEFINE_IFUNC(, uint64_t, dtrace_fuword64_nocheck, (void *), static)
+{
+
+ return ((cpu_stdext_feature & CPUID_STDEXT_SMAP) != 0 ?
+ dtrace_fuword64_nocheck_smap : dtrace_fuword64_nocheck_nosmap);
+}

18
share/security/patches/EN-19:06/dtrace.patch.asc Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

81
share/security/patches/EN-19:07/lle.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
--- sys/netinet/in.c.orig
+++ sys/netinet/in.c
@@ -1372,15 +1372,13 @@
IF_AFDATA_LOCK_ASSERT(llt->llt_ifp);
KASSERT(l3addr->sa_family == AF_INET,
("sin_family %d", l3addr->sa_family));
+ KASSERT((flags & (LLE_UNLOCKED | LLE_EXCLUSIVE)) !=
+ (LLE_UNLOCKED | LLE_EXCLUSIVE),
+ ("wrong lle request flags: %#x", flags));
+
lle = in_lltable_find_dst(llt, sin->sin_addr);
-
if (lle == NULL)
return (NULL);
-
- KASSERT((flags & (LLE_UNLOCKED|LLE_EXCLUSIVE)) !=
- (LLE_UNLOCKED|LLE_EXCLUSIVE),("wrong lle request flags: 0x%X",
- flags));
-
if (flags & LLE_UNLOCKED)
return (lle);
@@ -1389,6 +1387,17 @@
else
LLE_RLOCK(lle);
+ /*
+ * If the afdata lock is not held, the LLE may have been unlinked while
+ * we were blocked on the LLE lock. Check for this case.
+ */
+ if (__predict_false((lle->la_flags & LLE_LINKED) == 0)) {
+ if (flags & LLE_EXCLUSIVE)
+ LLE_WUNLOCK(lle);
+ else
+ LLE_RUNLOCK(lle);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
return (lle);
}
--- sys/netinet6/in6.c.orig
+++ sys/netinet6/in6.c
@@ -2311,16 +2311,13 @@
IF_AFDATA_LOCK_ASSERT(llt->llt_ifp);
KASSERT(l3addr->sa_family == AF_INET6,
("sin_family %d", l3addr->sa_family));
+ KASSERT((flags & (LLE_UNLOCKED | LLE_EXCLUSIVE)) !=
+ (LLE_UNLOCKED | LLE_EXCLUSIVE),
+ ("wrong lle request flags: %#x", flags));
lle = in6_lltable_find_dst(llt, &sin6->sin6_addr);
-
if (lle == NULL)
return (NULL);
-
- KASSERT((flags & (LLE_UNLOCKED|LLE_EXCLUSIVE)) !=
- (LLE_UNLOCKED|LLE_EXCLUSIVE),("wrong lle request flags: 0x%X",
- flags));
-
if (flags & LLE_UNLOCKED)
return (lle);
@@ -2328,6 +2325,18 @@
LLE_WLOCK(lle);
else
LLE_RLOCK(lle);
+
+ /*
+ * If the afdata lock is not held, the LLE may have been unlinked while
+ * we were blocked on the LLE lock. Check for this case.
+ */
+ if (__predict_false((lle->la_flags & LLE_LINKED) == 0)) {
+ if (flags & LLE_EXCLUSIVE)
+ LLE_WUNLOCK(lle);
+ else
+ LLE_RUNLOCK(lle);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
return (lle);
}

18
share/security/patches/EN-19:07/lle.patch.asc Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

19
share/security/patches/SA-19:01/syscall.11.2.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
--- sys/amd64/amd64/exception.S.orig
+++ sys/amd64/amd64/exception.S
@@ -496,12 +496,14 @@
movq TF_RFLAGS(%rsp),%r11 /* original %rflags */
movq TF_RIP(%rsp),%rcx /* original %rip */
movq TF_RSP(%rsp),%rsp /* user stack pointer */
+ xorl %r8d,%r8d /* zero the rest of GPRs */
+ xorl %r10d,%r10d
cmpb $0,pti
je 2f
movq PCPU(UCR3),%r9
movq %r9,%cr3
- xorl %r9d,%r9d
-2: swapgs
+2: xorl %r9d,%r9d
+ swapgs
sysretq
3: /* AST scheduled. */

18
share/security/patches/SA-19:01/syscall.11.2.patch.asc Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

19
share/security/patches/SA-19:01/syscall.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
--- sys/amd64/amd64/exception.S.orig
+++ sys/amd64/amd64/exception.S
@@ -521,12 +521,14 @@
movq TF_RFLAGS(%rsp),%r11 /* original %rflags */
movq TF_RIP(%rsp),%rcx /* original %rip */
movq TF_RSP(%rsp),%rsp /* user stack pointer */
+ xorl %r8d,%r8d /* zero the rest of GPRs */
+ xorl %r10d,%r10d
cmpq $~0,PCPU(UCR3)
je 2f
movq PCPU(UCR3),%r9
movq %r9,%cr3
- xorl %r9d,%r9d
-2: swapgs
+2: xorl %r9d,%r9d
+ swapgs
sysretq
3: /* AST scheduled. */

18
share/security/patches/SA-19:01/syscall.patch.asc Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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14
share/security/patches/SA-19:02/fd.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
--- sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c.orig
+++ sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c
@@ -1607,8 +1607,10 @@
fd = *fds++;
error = fget(td, fd, &cap_no_rights,
&fp);
- if (error == 0)
+ if (error == 0) {
fdclose(td, fp, fd);
+ fdrop(fp, td);
+ }
}
}
clen -= datalen;

18
share/security/patches/SA-19:02/fd.patch.asc Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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22
share/xml/advisories.xml
View file

@ -4,6 +4,28 @@
$FreeBSD$
</cvs:keyword>
<year>
<name>2019</name>
<month>
<name>2</name>
<day>
<name>5</name>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-19:02.fd</name>
</advisory>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-19:01.syscall</name>
</advisory>
</day>
</month>
</year>
<year>
<name>2018</name>

17
share/xml/notices.xml
View file

@ -7,6 +7,23 @@
<year>
<name>2019</name>
<month>
<name>2</name>
<day>
<name>5</name>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-19:07.lle</name>
</notice>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-19:06.dtrace</name>
</notice>
</day>
</month>
<month>
<name>1</name>