- Break out many of the paragraphs in the "Kernel Architecture" section
of the MAC Framework chapter of the Developer's Handbook into their own <sect2> sections. - Re-order the Policy Elements sect2 to the end of the section since most of the remainder of the subsections talk about parts of the Framework, not module structure. - Add text relating to the support for persistent labeling using extended attributes on supporting file systems. - Add concurrency/synchronization primitives to the list of framework elements. This section needs more work, and will probably grow sub-sections on most of the major elements in the element list. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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Robert Watson
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2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=16614
2 changed files with 150 additions and 90 deletions
en_US.ISO8859-1/books
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@ -168,11 +168,17 @@
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access control modules. If multiple policies are
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simultaneously loaded, the MAC Framework will usefully (for
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some definition of useful) compose the results of the
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policies. The MAC Framework contains a number of kernel
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elements:</para>
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policies.</para>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-elements">
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<title>MAC Framework Kernel Elements</title>
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<para>The MAC Framework contains a number of kernel elements:</para>
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem><para>Framework management interfaces</para></listitem>
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<listitem><para>Concurrency and synchronizatoin management
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primitives.</para></listitem>
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<listitem><para>Policy registration and management</para></listitem>
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<listitem><para>Extensible security label for kernel
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objects</para></listitem>
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@ -192,30 +198,74 @@
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<listitem><para>Various security policies implemented as MAC
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policy modules</para></listitem>
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</itemizedlist>
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</sect2>
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<para>Kernel services interact with the MAC Framework in two ways:
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they invoke a series of APIs to notify the framework of relevant
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events, and they a policy-agnostic label structure in
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security-relevent objects. This label structure is maintained by
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the MAC Framework via label management entry points, and permits
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the Framework to offer a labeling service to policy modules
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through relatively uninvasive changes to the kernel subsystem
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maintaining the object. For example, label structures have been
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added to processes, process credentials, sockets, pipes, vnodes,
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mbufs, network interfaces, IP reassembly queues, and a variety
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of other security-relevant structures. Kernel services also
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invoke the MAC Framework when they perform important security
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decisions, permitting policy modules to augment those decisions
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based on their own criteria (possibly including data stored in
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security labels).</para>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-entrypoints">
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<title>MAC Framework Entry Points</title>
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<para>Security policies are either linked directly into the kernel,
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or compiled into loadable kernel modules that may be loaded at
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boot, or dynamically using the module loading system calls at
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runtime. Policy modules interact with the system through a
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set of declared entry points, providing access to a stream of
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system events and permitting the policy to influence access
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control decisions. Each policy contains a number of elements:</para>
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<para>Kernel services interact with the MAC Framework in two ways:
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they invoke a series of APIs to notify the framework of relevant
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events, and they a policy-agnostic label structure in
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security-relevent objects. This label structure is maintained by
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the MAC Framework via label management entry points, and permits
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the Framework to offer a labeling service to policy modules
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through relatively uninvasive changes to the kernel subsystem
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maintaining the object. For example, label structures have been
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added to processes, process credentials, sockets, pipes, vnodes,
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mbufs, network interfaces, IP reassembly queues, and a variety
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of other security-relevant structures. Kernel services also
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invoke the MAC Framework when they perform important security
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decisions, permitting policy modules to augment those decisions
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based on their own criteria (possibly including data stored in
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security labels).</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-composition">
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<title>MAC Framework Policy Composition</title>
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<para>When more than one policy module is loaded into the kernel
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at a time, the results of the policy modules will be composed
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by the framework using a composition operator. This operator
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is currently hard-coded, and requires that all active policies
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must approve a request for it to occur. As policies may
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return a variety of error conditions (success, access denied,
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object doesn't exist, ...), a precedence operator selects the
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resulting error from the set of errors returned by policies.
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While it is not guaranteed that the resulting composition will
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be useful or secure, we've found that it is for many useful
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selections of policies.</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-labels">
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<title>MAC Framework Labeling Support</title>
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<para>As many interesting access control extensions rely on
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security labels on objects, the MAC Framework provides a set
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of policy-agnostic label management system calls covering
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a variety of user-exposed objects. Common label types
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include partition identifiers, sensitivity labels, integrity
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labels, compartments, domains, roles, and types. Policy
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modules participate in the internalization and externalization
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of string-based labels provides by user applications, and can
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expose multiple label elements to applications if desired.</para>
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<para>In the case of file system labels, special support is
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provided for the persistent storage of security labels in
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extended attributes. Where available, EA transactions
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are used to permit consistent compound updates of
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security labels on vnodes.</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-policy-elements">
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<title>MAC Framework Policy Elements</title>
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<para>Security policies are either linked directly into the kernel,
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or compiled into loadable kernel modules that may be loaded at
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boot, or dynamically using the module loading system calls at
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runtime. Policy modules interact with the system through a
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set of declared entry points, providing access to a stream of
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system events and permitting the policy to influence access
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control decisions. Each policy contains a number of elements:</para>
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem><para>Optional configuration parameters for
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@ -233,28 +283,8 @@
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<listitem><para>Declaration of poicy identity, module entry
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points, and policy properties.</para></listitem>
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</itemizedlist>
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</sect2>
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<para>When more than one policy module is loaded into the kernel
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at a time, the results of the policy modules will be composed
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by the framework using a composition operator. This operator
|
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is currently hard-coded, and requires that all active policies
|
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must approve a request for it to occur. As policies may
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return a variety of error conditions (success, access denied,
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object doesn't exist, ...), a precedence operator selects the
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resulting error from the set of errors returned by policies.
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While it is not guaranteed that the resulting composition will
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be useful or secure, we've found that it is for many useful
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selections of policies.</para>
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<para>As many interesting access control extensions rely on
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security labels on objects, the MAC Framework provides a set
|
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of policy-agnostic label management system calls covering
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a variety of user-exposed objects. Common label types
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include partition identifiers, sensitivity labels, integrity
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labels, compartments, domains, roles, and types. Policy
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modules participate in the internalization and externalization
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of string-based labels provides by user applications, and can
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expose multiple label elements to applications if desired.</para>
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</sect1>
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<sect1 id="mac-userland-arch">
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@ -168,11 +168,17 @@
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access control modules. If multiple policies are
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simultaneously loaded, the MAC Framework will usefully (for
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some definition of useful) compose the results of the
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policies. The MAC Framework contains a number of kernel
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elements:</para>
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policies.</para>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-elements">
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<title>MAC Framework Kernel Elements</title>
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<para>The MAC Framework contains a number of kernel elements:</para>
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem><para>Framework management interfaces</para></listitem>
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<listitem><para>Concurrency and synchronizatoin management
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primitives.</para></listitem>
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<listitem><para>Policy registration and management</para></listitem>
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<listitem><para>Extensible security label for kernel
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objects</para></listitem>
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|
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@ -192,30 +198,74 @@
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<listitem><para>Various security policies implemented as MAC
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policy modules</para></listitem>
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</itemizedlist>
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</sect2>
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<para>Kernel services interact with the MAC Framework in two ways:
|
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they invoke a series of APIs to notify the framework of relevant
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events, and they a policy-agnostic label structure in
|
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security-relevent objects. This label structure is maintained by
|
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the MAC Framework via label management entry points, and permits
|
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the Framework to offer a labeling service to policy modules
|
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through relatively uninvasive changes to the kernel subsystem
|
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maintaining the object. For example, label structures have been
|
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added to processes, process credentials, sockets, pipes, vnodes,
|
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mbufs, network interfaces, IP reassembly queues, and a variety
|
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of other security-relevant structures. Kernel services also
|
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invoke the MAC Framework when they perform important security
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decisions, permitting policy modules to augment those decisions
|
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based on their own criteria (possibly including data stored in
|
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security labels).</para>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-entrypoints">
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<title>MAC Framework Entry Points</title>
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|
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<para>Security policies are either linked directly into the kernel,
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or compiled into loadable kernel modules that may be loaded at
|
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boot, or dynamically using the module loading system calls at
|
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runtime. Policy modules interact with the system through a
|
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set of declared entry points, providing access to a stream of
|
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system events and permitting the policy to influence access
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control decisions. Each policy contains a number of elements:</para>
|
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<para>Kernel services interact with the MAC Framework in two ways:
|
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they invoke a series of APIs to notify the framework of relevant
|
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events, and they a policy-agnostic label structure in
|
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security-relevent objects. This label structure is maintained by
|
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the MAC Framework via label management entry points, and permits
|
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the Framework to offer a labeling service to policy modules
|
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through relatively uninvasive changes to the kernel subsystem
|
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maintaining the object. For example, label structures have been
|
||||
added to processes, process credentials, sockets, pipes, vnodes,
|
||||
mbufs, network interfaces, IP reassembly queues, and a variety
|
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of other security-relevant structures. Kernel services also
|
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invoke the MAC Framework when they perform important security
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decisions, permitting policy modules to augment those decisions
|
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based on their own criteria (possibly including data stored in
|
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security labels).</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-composition">
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<title>MAC Framework Policy Composition</title>
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<para>When more than one policy module is loaded into the kernel
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at a time, the results of the policy modules will be composed
|
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by the framework using a composition operator. This operator
|
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is currently hard-coded, and requires that all active policies
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must approve a request for it to occur. As policies may
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return a variety of error conditions (success, access denied,
|
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object doesn't exist, ...), a precedence operator selects the
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resulting error from the set of errors returned by policies.
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While it is not guaranteed that the resulting composition will
|
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be useful or secure, we've found that it is for many useful
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selections of policies.</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-labels">
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<title>MAC Framework Labeling Support</title>
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|
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<para>As many interesting access control extensions rely on
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security labels on objects, the MAC Framework provides a set
|
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of policy-agnostic label management system calls covering
|
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a variety of user-exposed objects. Common label types
|
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include partition identifiers, sensitivity labels, integrity
|
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labels, compartments, domains, roles, and types. Policy
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modules participate in the internalization and externalization
|
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of string-based labels provides by user applications, and can
|
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expose multiple label elements to applications if desired.</para>
|
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|
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<para>In the case of file system labels, special support is
|
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provided for the persistent storage of security labels in
|
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extended attributes. Where available, EA transactions
|
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are used to permit consistent compound updates of
|
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security labels on vnodes.</para>
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</sect2>
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<sect2 id="mac-kernel-arch-policy-elements">
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<title>MAC Framework Policy Elements</title>
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<para>Security policies are either linked directly into the kernel,
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or compiled into loadable kernel modules that may be loaded at
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boot, or dynamically using the module loading system calls at
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runtime. Policy modules interact with the system through a
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set of declared entry points, providing access to a stream of
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system events and permitting the policy to influence access
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control decisions. Each policy contains a number of elements:</para>
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem><para>Optional configuration parameters for
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|
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@ -233,28 +283,8 @@
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<listitem><para>Declaration of poicy identity, module entry
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points, and policy properties.</para></listitem>
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</itemizedlist>
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</sect2>
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<para>When more than one policy module is loaded into the kernel
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at a time, the results of the policy modules will be composed
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by the framework using a composition operator. This operator
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is currently hard-coded, and requires that all active policies
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must approve a request for it to occur. As policies may
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return a variety of error conditions (success, access denied,
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object doesn't exist, ...), a precedence operator selects the
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resulting error from the set of errors returned by policies.
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While it is not guaranteed that the resulting composition will
|
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be useful or secure, we've found that it is for many useful
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selections of policies.</para>
|
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|
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<para>As many interesting access control extensions rely on
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security labels on objects, the MAC Framework provides a set
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of policy-agnostic label management system calls covering
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a variety of user-exposed objects. Common label types
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include partition identifiers, sensitivity labels, integrity
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labels, compartments, domains, roles, and types. Policy
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modules participate in the internalization and externalization
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of string-based labels provides by user applications, and can
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expose multiple label elements to applications if desired.</para>
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</sect1>
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||||
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<sect1 id="mac-userland-arch">
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||||
|
|
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|||
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