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- Add Q2 report on Capsicum-based sandboxing in base

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Submitted by:	pjd
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Gabor Pali 2013-07-06 21:29:50 +00:00
parent 255e6870c9
commit 2c43088708
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=42179
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en_US.ISO8859-1/htdocs/news/status/report-2013-04-2013-06.xml
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
<!-- XXX: keep updating the number of entries -->
<p>Thanks to all the reporters for the excellent work! This report
contains 16 entries and we hope you enjoy reading it.</p>
contains 17 entries and we hope you enjoy reading it.</p>
<!-- XXX: set date for the next set of submissions -->
<p>The deadline for submissions covering between July and September 2013
@ -858,4 +858,102 @@
</ul>
</body>
</project>
<project cat='bin'>
<title>Capsicum</title>
<contact>
<person>
<name>
<given>Pawel Jakub</given>
<common>Dawidek</common>
</name>
<email>pjd@FreeBSD.org</email>
</person>
<person>
<name>
<given>Capsicum</given>
<common>Mailing List</common>
</name>
<email>cl-capsicum-discuss@lists.cam.ac.uk</email>
</person>
</contact>
<links>
<url href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/"/>
<url href="https://lists.cam.ac.uk/mailman/listinfo/cl-capsicum-discuss"/>
</links>
<body>
<p>Capsicum (lightweight OS capability and sandbox framework) is
being actively worked on. In the last few months the following
tasks have been completed:</p>
<ul>
<li>Committed Capsicum overhaul to &os; <tt>head</tt> (r247602).
This allows to use capability rights in more places, simplifies
kernel code and implements ability to limit <tt>ioctl(2)</tt>
and <tt>fcntl(2)</tt> system calls.</li>
<li><tt>hastd(8)</tt> is now using Capsicum for sandboxing, as
whitelisting ioctls is possible (r248297).</li>
<li><tt>auditdistd(8)</tt> is now using Capsicum for sandboxing,
as it is now possible to setup append-only restriction on file
descriptor (available in Perforce).</li>
<li>Implemented <tt>connectat(2)</tt> and <tt>bindat(2)</tt>
system calls for UNIX domain sockets that are allowed in
capability mode (r247667).</li>
<li>Implemented <tt>chflagsat(2)</tt> system call
(r248599).</li>
<li>Revised the Casper daemon for application capabilities.</li>
<li>Implemented <tt>libcapsicum</tt> for application
capabilities.</li>
<li>Implemented various Casper services to be able to use more
functionality within a sandbox: <tt>system.dns</tt>,
<tt>system.pwd</tt>, <tt>system.grp</tt>,
<tt>system.random</tt>, <tt>system.filesystem</tt>,
<tt>system.socket</tt>, <tt>system.sysctl</tt>.</li>
<li>Implemented Capsicum sandboxing for <tt>kdump(1)</tt> (from
r251073 to r251167). The version in Perforce also supports
sandboxing for the <tt>-r</tt> flag, using Casper
services.</li>
<li>Implemented Capsicum sandboxing for <tt>dhclient(8)</tt>
(from r252612 to r252697).</li>
<li>Implemented Capsicum sandboxing for <tt>tcpdump(8)</tt>
(available in Perforce).</li>
<li>Implemented Capsicum sandboxing for <tt>libmagic(3)</tt>
(available in Perforce).</li>
<li>Implemented the <tt>libnv</tt> library for name/value pairs
handling in the hope of wider adaptation across &os;.</li>
</ul>
<p>For Capsicum-based sandboxing in the &os; base system, the
commits referenced above and the provided code aim to serve as
examples. We would like to see more &os; tools to be sandboxed
&mdash; every tool that can parse data from untrusted sources,
for example.</p>
<p>This work is being sponsored by the &os; Foundation and
Google.</p>
</body>
<help>
<task>Get involved, make the Internet finally(!) a secure place.
Contact us at the <tt>cl-capsicum-discuss</tt> mailing list,
where we can provide guidelines on how to do sandboxing
properly. The fame is there, waiting.</task>
</help>
</project>
</report>