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Add advisories and patches for SA-15:02.kmem and SA-15:03.sctp.

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Xin LI 2015-01-27 19:53:31 +00:00
parent d78ba7735b
commit 4865711fb9
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=46235
7 changed files with 491 additions and 0 deletions

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-15:02.kmem Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: SCTP SCTP_SS_VALUE kernel memory corruption and disclosure
Category: core
Module: sctp
Announced: 2015-01-27
Credits: Clement LECIGNE from Google Security Team and
Francisco Falcon from Core Security Technologies
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/10, 10.1-STABLE)
2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p5)
2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p17)
2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p9)
2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p23)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-8612
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
SCTP protocol provides reliable, flow-controlled, two-way transmission
of data. It is a message oriented protocol and can support the SOCK_STREAM
and SOCK_SEQPACKET abstractions.
SCTP allows the user to choose between multiple scheduling algorithms to
optimize the sending behavior of SCTP in scenarios with different
requirements.
II. Problem Description
Due to insufficient validation of the SCTP stream ID, which serves as an array
index, a local unprivileged attacker can read or write 16-bits of kernel
memory.
III. Impact
An unprivileged process can read or modify 16-bits of memory which
belongs to the kernel. This smay lead to exposure of sensitive
information or allow privilege escalation.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:02/sctp.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:02/sctp.patch.asc
# gpg --verify sctp.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r277807
releng/8.4/ r277808
stable/9/ r277807
releng/9.3/ r277808
stable/10/ r277807
releng/10.0/ r277808
releng/10.1/ r277808
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
We would like to acknowledge Clement LECIGNE from Google Security Team and
Francisco Falcon from Core Security Technologies who discovered the issue
independently and reported to the FreeBSD Security Team.
<URL:http://www.coresecurity.com/content/freebsd-kernel-multiple-vulnerabilities>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8612>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-15:02.kmem.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-15:03.sctp Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: SCTP stream reset vulnerability
Category: core
Module: sctp
Announced: 2015-01-27
Credits: Gerasimos Dimitriadis
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/10, 10.1-STABLE)
2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p5)
2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE-p17)
2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p9)
2015-01-27 19:36:08 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2015-01-27 19:37:02 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p23)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-8613
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
SCTP protocol provides reliable, flow-controlled, two-way transmission
of data. It is a message oriented protocol and can support the SOCK_STREAM
and SOCK_SEQPACKET abstractions.
II. Problem Description
The input validation of received SCTP RE_CONFIG chunks is insufficient,
and can result in a NULL pointer deference later.
III. Impact
A remote attacker who can send a malformed SCTP packet to a FreeBSD system
that serves SCTP can cause a kernel panic, resulting in a Denial of
Service.
IV. Workaround
On FreeBSD 10.1 or later systems, the system administrator can set
net.inet.sctp.reconfig_enable to 0 to disable processing of RE_CONFIG
chunks. This workaround is not available on earlier FreeBSD releases,
but systems that do not serve SCTP connections are not vulnerable.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:03/sctp.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-15:03/sctp.patch.asc
# gpg --verify sctp.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r277807
releng/8.4/ r277808
stable/9/ r277807
releng/9.3/ r277808
stable/10/ r277807
releng/10.0/ r277808
releng/10.1/ r277808
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-8613>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-15:03.sctp.asc>
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Index: sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c
===================================================================
--- sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c (revision 277788)
+++ sys/netinet/sctp_usrreq.c (working copy)
@@ -1863,8 +1863,9 @@ flags_out:
SCTP_CHECK_AND_CAST(av, optval, struct sctp_stream_value, *optsize);
SCTP_FIND_STCB(inp, stcb, av->assoc_id);
if (stcb) {
- if (stcb->asoc.ss_functions.sctp_ss_get_value(stcb, &stcb->asoc, &stcb->asoc.strmout[av->stream_id],
- &av->stream_value) < 0) {
+ if ((av->stream_id >= stcb->asoc.streamoutcnt) ||
+ (stcb->asoc.ss_functions.sctp_ss_get_value(stcb, &stcb->asoc, &stcb->asoc.strmout[av->stream_id],
+ &av->stream_value) < 0)) {
SCTP_LTRACE_ERR_RET(inp, NULL, NULL, SCTP_FROM_SCTP_USRREQ, EINVAL);
error = EINVAL;
} else {
@@ -4032,8 +4033,9 @@ sctp_setopt(struct socket *so, int optname, void *
SCTP_CHECK_AND_CAST(av, optval, struct sctp_stream_value, optsize);
SCTP_FIND_STCB(inp, stcb, av->assoc_id);
if (stcb) {
- if (stcb->asoc.ss_functions.sctp_ss_set_value(stcb, &stcb->asoc, &stcb->asoc.strmout[av->stream_id],
- av->stream_value) < 0) {
+ if ((av->stream_id >= stcb->asoc.streamoutcnt) ||
+ (stcb->asoc.ss_functions.sctp_ss_set_value(stcb, &stcb->asoc, &stcb->asoc.strmout[av->stream_id],
+ av->stream_value) < 0)) {
SCTP_LTRACE_ERR_RET(inp, NULL, NULL, SCTP_FROM_SCTP_USRREQ, EINVAL);
error = EINVAL;
}
@@ -4043,10 +4045,12 @@ sctp_setopt(struct socket *so, int optname, void *
SCTP_INP_RLOCK(inp);
LIST_FOREACH(stcb, &inp->sctp_asoc_list, sctp_tcblist) {
SCTP_TCB_LOCK(stcb);
- stcb->asoc.ss_functions.sctp_ss_set_value(stcb,
- &stcb->asoc,
- &stcb->asoc.strmout[av->stream_id],
- av->stream_value);
+ if (av->stream_id < stcb->asoc.streamoutcnt) {
+ stcb->asoc.ss_functions.sctp_ss_set_value(stcb,
+ &stcb->asoc,
+ &stcb->asoc.strmout[av->stream_id],
+ av->stream_value);
+ }
SCTP_TCB_UNLOCK(stcb);
}
SCTP_INP_RUNLOCK(inp);

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Index: sys/netinet/sctp_input.c
===================================================================
--- sys/netinet/sctp_input.c (revision 277788)
+++ sys/netinet/sctp_input.c (working copy)
@@ -3649,6 +3649,9 @@ sctp_handle_stream_reset_response(struct sctp_tcb
/* huh ? */
return (0);
}
+ if (ntohs(respin->ph.param_length) < sizeof(struct sctp_stream_reset_response_tsn)) {
+ return (0);
+ }
if (action == SCTP_STREAM_RESET_RESULT_PERFORMED) {
resp = (struct sctp_stream_reset_response_tsn *)respin;
asoc->stream_reset_outstanding--;
@@ -4037,7 +4040,7 @@ __attribute__((noinline))
sctp_handle_stream_reset(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *m, int offset,
struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch_req)
{
- int chk_length, param_len, ptype;
+ uint16_t remaining_length, param_len, ptype;
struct sctp_paramhdr pstore;
uint8_t cstore[SCTP_CHUNK_BUFFER_SIZE];
uint32_t seq = 0;
@@ -4050,7 +4053,7 @@ __attribute__((noinline))
int num_param = 0;
/* now it may be a reset or a reset-response */
- chk_length = ntohs(ch_req->chunk_length);
+ remaining_length = ntohs(ch_req->chunk_length) - sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
/* setup for adding the response */
sctp_alloc_a_chunk(stcb, chk);
@@ -4088,20 +4091,27 @@ strres_nochunk:
ch->chunk_length = htons(chk->send_size);
SCTP_BUF_LEN(chk->data) = SCTP_SIZE32(chk->send_size);
offset += sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr);
- while ((size_t)chk_length >= sizeof(struct sctp_stream_reset_tsn_request)) {
+ while (remaining_length >= sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, sizeof(pstore), (uint8_t *) & pstore);
- if (ph == NULL)
+ if (ph == NULL) {
+ /* TSNH */
break;
+ }
param_len = ntohs(ph->param_length);
- if (param_len < (int)sizeof(struct sctp_stream_reset_tsn_request)) {
- /* bad param */
+ if ((param_len > remaining_length) ||
+ (param_len < (sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) + sizeof(uint32_t)))) {
+ /* bad parameter length */
break;
}
- ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, min(param_len, (int)sizeof(cstore)),
+ ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, min(param_len, sizeof(cstore)),
(uint8_t *) & cstore);
+ if (ph == NULL) {
+ /* TSNH */
+ break;
+ }
ptype = ntohs(ph->param_type);
num_param++;
- if (param_len > (int)sizeof(cstore)) {
+ if (param_len > sizeof(cstore)) {
trunc = 1;
} else {
trunc = 0;
@@ -4113,6 +4123,9 @@ strres_nochunk:
if (ptype == SCTP_STR_RESET_OUT_REQUEST) {
struct sctp_stream_reset_out_request *req_out;
+ if (param_len < sizeof(struct sctp_stream_reset_out_request)) {
+ break;
+ }
req_out = (struct sctp_stream_reset_out_request *)ph;
num_req++;
if (stcb->asoc.stream_reset_outstanding) {
@@ -4126,6 +4139,9 @@ strres_nochunk:
} else if (ptype == SCTP_STR_RESET_ADD_OUT_STREAMS) {
struct sctp_stream_reset_add_strm *str_add;
+ if (param_len < sizeof(struct sctp_stream_reset_add_strm)) {
+ break;
+ }
str_add = (struct sctp_stream_reset_add_strm *)ph;
num_req++;
sctp_handle_str_reset_add_strm(stcb, chk, str_add);
@@ -4132,6 +4148,9 @@ strres_nochunk:
} else if (ptype == SCTP_STR_RESET_ADD_IN_STREAMS) {
struct sctp_stream_reset_add_strm *str_add;
+ if (param_len < sizeof(struct sctp_stream_reset_add_strm)) {
+ break;
+ }
str_add = (struct sctp_stream_reset_add_strm *)ph;
num_req++;
sctp_handle_str_reset_add_out_strm(stcb, chk, str_add);
@@ -4156,6 +4175,9 @@ strres_nochunk:
struct sctp_stream_reset_response *resp;
uint32_t result;
+ if (param_len < sizeof(struct sctp_stream_reset_response)) {
+ break;
+ }
resp = (struct sctp_stream_reset_response *)ph;
seq = ntohl(resp->response_seq);
result = ntohl(resp->result);
@@ -4167,7 +4189,11 @@ strres_nochunk:
break;
}
offset += SCTP_SIZE32(param_len);
- chk_length -= SCTP_SIZE32(param_len);
+ if (remaining_length >= SCTP_SIZE32(param_len)) {
+ remaining_length -= SCTP_SIZE32(param_len);
+ } else {
+ remaining_length = 0;
+ }
}
if (num_req == 0) {
/* we have no response free the stuff */

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@ -10,6 +10,18 @@
<month>
<name>1</name>
<day>
<name>27</name>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-15:03.sctp</name>
</advisory>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-15:02.kmem</name>
</advisory>
</day>
<day>
<name>14</name>