Two new basic sections better describing MLS and Biba. I'll re-read these

later, just to ensure I picked up everything.

en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml

@@ -1440,15 +1440,32 @@ test: biba/high</screen>
       feed that file into the <command>setfmac</command> command.  This
       method will be explained after all policies are covered.</para>
 
-    <para>Observations: an object with lower clearance is unable to
-      observe higher clearance processes.  A basic policy would be
-      to enforce <literal>mls/high</literal> on everything not to be
-      read, even if it needs to be written.  Enforce
-      <literal>mls/low</literal> on everything not to be written, even
-      if it needs to be read.  And finally enforce
-      <literal>mls/equal</literal> on the rest.  All users marked
-      <literal>insecure</literal> should be set at
-      <literal>mls/low</literal>.</para>
+    <sect2>
+      <title>Planning Mandatory Sensitivity</title>
+
+      <para>With the Multi-Level Security Policy Module, an
+	administrator plans for controlling the flow of sensitive
+	information.  By default, with its block read up block read
+	down nature, the system defaults everything to a low state.
+	Everything is pretty much accessible and an administrator
+	slowly changes this during the configuration stage.</para>
+
+      <para>Beyond the three basic label options above, an administrator
+	may group users and groups as required to block the information
+	flow between them.  It might be easier to look at the
+	information in clearance levels familiarized with words, for
+	instance classifications such as
+	<literal>confidential</literal>, <literal>Secret</literal>,
+	and <literal>Top Secret</literal>.  Some administrators might
+	just create different groups based on project levels.
+	Regardless of classification method, a well thought out plan
+	must exist before implementing such a restrictive policy.</para>
+
+      <para>Some example situations for this security policy module
+	could be an e-commerce web server, a file server holding critical
+	company information, and financial institution environments.
+	The most unlikely place would be a personal workstation with
+	only two or three users.</para>
   </sect1>
 
   <sect1 id="mac-biba">
@@ -1563,11 +1580,47 @@ test: biba/high</screen>
 &prompt.root; <userinput>getfmac test</userinput>
 test: biba/low</screen>
 
-    <para>Observations: a lower integrity subject is unable to write
-      to a higher integrity subject; a higher integrity subject cannot
-      observe or read a lower integrity object.  Setting a label at the
-      lowest possible grade could make it inaccessible to
-      subjects.</para>
+    <sect2>
+      <title>Planning Mandatory Integrity</title>
+
+      <para>Integrity, different from sensitivity, guarantees that the
+	information will never be manipulated by untrusted parties.
+	This includes information passed between subjects, objects,
+	and both.  It ensures that users will only be able to modify
+	and in some cases even access information they explicitly need
+	to.</para>
+
+      <para>The &man.mac.biba.4; security policy module permits an
+ 	administrator to address which files and programs a user or
+	users may see and invoke, while assuring that the programs and
+	files are free from threats and trusted by the system for that
+	user or users.</para>
+
+      <para>During the initial planning phase, an administrator must be
+	prepared to partition users into grades, levels, and areas.
+	Users will be blocked access not only to data but programs
+	and utilities both before and after they start.  The system will
+	default to a high label once this policy module is enabled, and
+	it is up to the administrator to configure the different grades
+	and levels for users.  Instead of using clearance levels as
+	described above, a good planning method could include topics.
+	For instance, only allow developers to access the source code
+	repository, source code compiler, and other development
+	utilities.  While other users would be grouped into other
+	categories such as testers, designers, or just ordinary
+	users.</para>
+	
+      <para>With its natural security control, a lower integrity subject
+	is unable to write to a higher integrity subject; a higher
+	integrity subject cannot observe or read a lower integrity
+	object.  Setting a label at the lowest possible grade could make
+	it inaccessible to subjects.  Some prospective environments for
+	this security policy module would include a constrained web
+	server, development and test machine, and source code
+	repository.  A less useful implementation would be a personal
+	workstation, a machine used as a router, or a network
+	firewall.</para>
+    </sect2>
   </sect1>
 
   <sect1 id="mac-lomac">