Expand the synopsis for the MAC framework a bit to include additional
information on what MAC is, how the MAC framework supports MAC policies in FreeBSD, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
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2 changed files with 74 additions and 12 deletions
en_US.ISO8859-1/books
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@ -65,12 +65,43 @@
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<sect1 id="mac-synopsis">
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<title>Synopsis</title>
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<para>MAC, or Mandatory Access Control, is a feature introduced by
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the TrustedBSD Project to supplement the existing standard DAC
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(Discretionary Access Control) policies of BSD Unix systems.</para>
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<para>This chapter introduces the MAC policy framework and
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provides documentation for a sample MAC policy module.</para>
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<para>Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is a security feature frequently
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found in commercial trusted operating systems. MAC supplements
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existing Discretionary Access Control (DAC) protections (such as
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file system permissions and access control lists) by allowing the
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security administrator to define mandatory protections for
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system objects. Mandatory protections may be distinguished from
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discretionary protections in that DAC is applied at the discretion
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of the object owner, whereas MAC protections are defined by the
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administrator and applied to all users and objects in the system
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and may not be bypassed even by object owners. A variety of
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MAC policies have been explored in security research literature
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as well as the commercial trusted operating system space. These
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include policies such as the Multi-Level Security (MLS)
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confidentiality policy, used to prevent inappropriate sharing of
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information on multi-user systems, and the Biba integrity policy,
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typically used to protect the integrity of system and user
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services.</para>
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<para>The implementation of MAC found in FreeBSD was developed by
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the TrustedBSD Project, and includes support for both a number of
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specific MAC policies, and for a flexible and extensible security
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framework to support the easy creation of new kernel security
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policies. This framework isolates the internals of specific MAC
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policies from the implementation of kernel services, and
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encapsulates the policies in policy modules. Policy modules may
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be added to the system without changes to the base kernel, and can
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augment the kernel security policy in a variety of ways. In
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addition, policies may provide a shared object implementation
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of common MAC interfaces for userland applications, permitting
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applications to be easily extended to manage labels for new
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policies. Support is provided for setting labels on user
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processes at login, as well as in a number of other locations where
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user context management occurs.</para>
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<para>This chapter introduces the MAC policy userland and kernel
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policy frameworks and provides documentation for a sample MAC
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policy module.</para>
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</sect1>
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@ -65,12 +65,43 @@
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<sect1 id="mac-synopsis">
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<title>Synopsis</title>
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<para>MAC, or Mandatory Access Control, is a feature introduced by
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the TrustedBSD Project to supplement the existing standard DAC
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(Discretionary Access Control) policies of BSD Unix systems.</para>
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<para>This chapter introduces the MAC policy framework and
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provides documentation for a sample MAC policy module.</para>
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<para>Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is a security feature frequently
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found in commercial trusted operating systems. MAC supplements
|
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existing Discretionary Access Control (DAC) protections (such as
|
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file system permissions and access control lists) by allowing the
|
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security administrator to define mandatory protections for
|
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system objects. Mandatory protections may be distinguished from
|
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discretionary protections in that DAC is applied at the discretion
|
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of the object owner, whereas MAC protections are defined by the
|
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administrator and applied to all users and objects in the system
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and may not be bypassed even by object owners. A variety of
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MAC policies have been explored in security research literature
|
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as well as the commercial trusted operating system space. These
|
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include policies such as the Multi-Level Security (MLS)
|
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confidentiality policy, used to prevent inappropriate sharing of
|
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information on multi-user systems, and the Biba integrity policy,
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typically used to protect the integrity of system and user
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services.</para>
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<para>The implementation of MAC found in FreeBSD was developed by
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the TrustedBSD Project, and includes support for both a number of
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specific MAC policies, and for a flexible and extensible security
|
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framework to support the easy creation of new kernel security
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policies. This framework isolates the internals of specific MAC
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policies from the implementation of kernel services, and
|
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encapsulates the policies in policy modules. Policy modules may
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be added to the system without changes to the base kernel, and can
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augment the kernel security policy in a variety of ways. In
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addition, policies may provide a shared object implementation
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of common MAC interfaces for userland applications, permitting
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applications to be easily extended to manage labels for new
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policies. Support is provided for setting labels on user
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processes at login, as well as in a number of other locations where
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user context management occurs.</para>
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<para>This chapter introduces the MAC policy userland and kernel
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policy frameworks and provides documentation for a sample MAC
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policy module.</para>
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</sect1>
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