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When talking about avoiding information disclosure, we generally

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say we will be able to delay the actual break-in, since crackers
can still manage to get into the system if there is a hole.  So,
prefer saying "we can delay the actual attack" rather than "the
system is more secure".

Reviewed by:	trhodes
This commit is contained in:
Xin LI 2005-03-08 08:15:50 +00:00
parent 368ddbeff6
commit 930f075192
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=24024
1 changed files with 3 additions and 2 deletions
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5
en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/firewalls/chapter.sgml
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@ -1455,8 +1455,9 @@ sh /etc/ipf.rules.script</programlisting>
response returned for any of the undesirable stuff, their
packets just get dropped and vanish. This way the attacker
has no knowledge if his packets have reached your system. The
less the attackers can learn about your system the more secure
it is. The inbound 'nmap OS fingerprint' attempts rule I log
less the attackers can learn about your system, the more
time they must invest before actually doing something bad.
The inbound 'nmap OS fingerprint' attempts rule I log
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