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Add SA-18:13 and EN-18:13 through EN-18:15.

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Approved by:	so
This commit is contained in:
Gordon Tetlow 2018-11-27 20:00:28 +00:00
parent 465be99682
commit 9c48c2519a
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=52522
14 changed files with 4382 additions and 0 deletions
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-18:13.icmp Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: ICMP buffer underwrite
Category: core
Module: kernel
Announced: 2018-11-27
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2018-11-08 21:58:51 UTC (stable/11, 11.2-STABLE)
2018-11-27 19:43:16 UTC (releng/11.2, 11.2-RELEASE-p5)
CVE Name: CVE-2018-17156
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
ICMP messages are control messages used to send error messages and
operational information.
II. Problem Description
The icmp_error routine allocates either an mbuf or a cluster depending on the
size of the data to be quoted in the ICMP reply, but the calculation failed
to account for additional padding on 64-bit platforms when using a
non-default sysctl value for net.inet.icmp.quotelen.
III. Impact
For systems that set net.inet.icmp.quotelen to a non-default value, a buffer
underwrite condition occurs.
IV. Workaround
Reset net.inet.icmp.quotelen to default value of 8 using sysctl(8):
# sysctl net.inet.icmp.quotelen=8
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Afterwards, reboot the system.
2) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Afterwards, reboot the system.
3) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 11.2]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-18:13/icmp.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-18:13/icmp.patch.asc
# gpg --verify icmp.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/11/ r340268
releng/11.2/ r341089
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<other info on the problem>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-17156>
<URL:https://www.reddit.com/r/BSD/comments/9v6xwg/remotely_triggerable_icmp_buffer_underwrite_in/>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-18:13.icmp.asc>
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Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-18:14.tzdata Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Timezone database information update
Category: contrib
Module: zoneinfo
Announced: 2018-11-27
Credits: Philip Paeps
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2018-10-31 02:01:28 UTC (stable/11, 11.2-STABLE)
2018-11-27 19:44:39 UTC (releng/11.2, 11.2-RELEASE-p5)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The tzsetup(8) program allows the user to specify the default local timezone.
Based on the selected timezone, tzsetup(8) copies one of the files from
/usr/share/zoneinfo to /etc/localtime. This file actually controls the
conversion.
II. Problem Description
Several changes in Daylight Savings Time happened after previous FreeBSD
releases were released that would affect many people who live in different
countries. Because of these changes, the data in the zoneinfo files need to
be updated, and if the local timezone on the running system is affected,
tzsetup(8) needs to be run so the /etc/localtime is updated.
III. Impact
An incorrect time will be displayed on a system configured to use one of the
affected timezones if the /usr/share/zoneinfo and /etc/localtime files are
not updated, and all applications on the system that rely on the system time,
such as cron(8) and syslog(8), will be affected.
IV. Workaround
The system administrator can install an updated timezone database from the
misc/zoneinfo port and run tzsetup(8) to get the timezone database corrected.
Applications that store and display times in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
are not affected.
V. Solution
Please note that some third party software, for instance PHP, Ruby, Java and
Perl, may be using different zoneinfo data source, in such cases this
software must be updated separately. For software packages that is installed
via binary packages, they can be upgraded by executing `pkg upgrade'.
Following the instructions in this Errata Notice will update all of the
zoneinfo files to be the same as what was released with FreeBSD release.
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date. Restart all the affected
applications and daemons, or reboot the system.
2) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Restart all the affected applications and daemons, or reboot the system.
3) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-18:14/tzdata-2018g.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-18:14/tzdata-2018g.patch.asc
# gpg --verify tzdata-2018g.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart all the affected applications and daemons, or reboot the system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/11/ r339938
releng/11.2/ r341091
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-18:14.tzdata.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-18:15.loader Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Deferred kernel loading breaks loader password
Category: core
Module: loader
Announced: 2018-11-27
Credits: Devin Teske
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2018-10-24 23:17:17 UTC (stable/11, 11.2-STABLE)
2018-11-27 19:45:25 UTC (releng/11.2, 11.2-RELEASE-p5)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The loader is a FreeBSD component which is part of the boot sequence for a
machine. The loader is most commonly visible with the "beastie" boot menu,
allowing specification of different boot time parameters.
II. Problem Description
A change in the loader to allow deferred loading of the kernel introduced a
bug when using a loader password. After this change and when the loader
password is enabled, the menu is not loaded and instead the machine goes into
the autoboot routine. The autoboot routine then fails when the kernel has
not yet been loaded, yielding a loader prompt where the user has full control
of the boot process.
III. Impact
Setting the loader password with the intention of preventing the user from
bypassing the boot process instead causes the boot to fail and gives the user
full control of the boot process.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems that do not use a loader password are
not vulnerable.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Afterward, reboot the system.
2) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Afterward, reboot the system.
3) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 11.2]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-18:15/loader.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-18:15/loader.patch.asc
# gpg --verify loader.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html> and reboot
the system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/11/ r339697
releng/11.2/ r341093
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-18:15.loader.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-18:13.nfs Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in NFS server code
Category: core
Module: nfs
Announced: 2018-11-27
Credits: Jakub Jirasek, Secunia Research at Flexera
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2018-11-23 20:41:54 UTC (stable/11, 11.2-STABLE)
2018-11-27 19:42:16 UTC (releng/11.2, 11.2-RELEASE-p5)
CVE Name: CVE-2018-17157, CVE-2018-17158, CVE-2018-17159
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The Network File System (NFS) allows a host to export some or all of its file
systems so that other hosts can access them over the network and mount them
as if they were local. FreeBSD includes both server and client
implementations of NFS.
II. Problem Description
Insufficient and improper checking in the NFS server code could cause a
denial of service or possibly remote code execution via a specially crafted
network packet.
III. Impact
A remote attacker could cause the NFS server to crash, resulting in a denial
of service, or possibly execute arbitrary code on the server.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems that do not provide NFS services are
not vulnerable.
Additionally, it is highly recommended the NFS service port (default port
number 2049) is protected via a host or network based firewall to prevent
arbitrary, untrusted clients from being able to connect.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Afterward, reboot the system.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Afterward, reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 11.2]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:13/nfs.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-18:13/nfs.patch.asc
# gpg --verify nfs.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/11/ r340854
releng/11.2/ r341088
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://www.flexerasoftware.com/enterprise/company/about/secunia-research/>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-17157>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-17158>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-17159>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-18:13.nfs.asc>
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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
--- sys/netinet/ip_icmp.c.orig
+++ sys/netinet/ip_icmp.c
@@ -310,7 +310,8 @@
#endif
icmplen = min(icmplen, M_TRAILINGSPACE(m) -
sizeof(struct ip) - ICMP_MINLEN);
- m_align(m, ICMP_MINLEN + icmplen);
+ m_align(m, sizeof(struct ip) + ICMP_MINLEN + icmplen);
+ m->m_data += sizeof(struct ip);
m->m_len = ICMP_MINLEN + icmplen;
/* XXX MRT make the outgoing packet use the same FIB
@@ -352,6 +353,8 @@
* reply should bypass as well.
*/
m->m_flags |= n->m_flags & M_SKIP_FIREWALL;
+ KASSERT(M_LEADINGSPACE(m) >= sizeof(struct ip),
+ ("insufficient space for ip header"));
m->m_data -= sizeof(struct ip);
m->m_len += sizeof(struct ip);
m->m_pkthdr.len = m->m_len;

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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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3617
share/security/patches/EN-18:14/tzdata-2018g.patch Normal file
View file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

18
share/security/patches/EN-18:14/tzdata-2018g.patch.asc Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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19
share/security/patches/EN-18:15/loader.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
--- stand/forth/check-password.4th.orig
+++ stand/forth/check-password.4th
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
again \ Enter was not pressed; repeat
;
-only forth definitions also password-processing
+only forth definitions also password-processing also support-functions
: check-password ( -- )
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@
\ We should prevent the user from visiting the menu or dropping to the
\ interactive loader(8) prompt, but still allow the machine to boot...
+ any_conf_read? if load_kernel load_modules then
0 autoboot
\ Only reached if autoboot fails for any reason (including if/when

18
share/security/patches/EN-18:15/loader.patch.asc Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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70
share/security/patches/SA-18:13/nfs.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
Index: sys/fs/nfs/nfs_commonsubs.c
===================================================================
--- sys/fs/nfs/nfs_commonsubs.c (revision 341005)
+++ sys/fs/nfs/nfs_commonsubs.c (working copy)
@@ -360,10 +360,14 @@
if (offs == 0)
goto out;
/*
- * A negative offs should be considered a serious problem.
+ * A negative offs might indicate a corrupted mbuf chain and,
+ * as such, a printf is logged.
*/
- if (offs < 0)
- panic("nfsrv_advance");
+ if (offs < 0) {
+ printf("nfsrv_advance: negative offs\n");
+ error = EBADRPC;
+ goto out;
+ }
/*
* If left == -1, calculate it here.
Index: sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdport.c
===================================================================
--- sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdport.c (revision 341005)
+++ sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdport.c (working copy)
@@ -1858,9 +1858,15 @@
* cookie) should be in the reply. At least one client "hints" 0,
* so I set it to cnt for that case. I also round it up to the
* next multiple of DIRBLKSIZ.
+ * Since the size of a Readdirplus directory entry reply will always
+ * be greater than a directory entry returned by VOP_READDIR(), it
+ * does not make sense to read more than NFS_SRVMAXDATA() via
+ * VOP_READDIR().
*/
if (siz <= 0)
siz = cnt;
+ else if (siz > NFS_SRVMAXDATA(nd))
+ siz = NFS_SRVMAXDATA(nd);
siz = ((siz + DIRBLKSIZ - 1) & ~(DIRBLKSIZ - 1));
if (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV4) {
Index: sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdsocket.c
===================================================================
--- sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdsocket.c (revision 341005)
+++ sys/fs/nfsserver/nfs_nfsdsocket.c (working copy)
@@ -758,11 +758,6 @@
*repp = *tl;
op = fxdr_unsigned(int, *tl);
NFSD_DEBUG(4, "op=%d\n", op);
-
- binuptime(&start_time);
- nfsrvd_statstart(op, &start_time);
- statsinprog = 1;
-
if (op < NFSV4OP_ACCESS ||
(op >= NFSV4OP_NOPS && (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV41) == 0) ||
(op >= NFSV41_NOPS && (nd->nd_flag & ND_NFSV41) != 0)) {
@@ -774,6 +769,11 @@
} else {
repp++;
}
+
+ binuptime(&start_time);
+ nfsrvd_statstart(op, &start_time);
+ statsinprog = 1;
+
if (i == 0)
op0 = op;
if (i == numops - 1)

18
share/security/patches/SA-18:13/nfs.patch.asc Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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13
share/xml/advisories.xml
View file

@ -7,6 +7,19 @@
<year>
<name>2018</name>
<month>
<name>11</name>
<day>
<name>27</name>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-18:13.nfs</name>
</advisory>
</day>
</month>
<month>
<name>9</name>

21
share/xml/notices.xml
View file

@ -7,6 +7,27 @@
<year>
<name>2018</name>
<month>
<name>11</name>
<day>
<name>27</name>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-18:15.loader</name>
</notice>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-18:14.tzdata</name>
</notice>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-18:13.icmp</name>
</notice>
</day>
</month>
<month>
<name>9</name>