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Add EN-20:03 through EN-20:06 and SA-20:04 through SA-20:09.

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Gordon Tetlow 2020-03-19 17:20:56 +00:00
parent ea82915183
commit bc912e3b54
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=53996
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-20:03.sshd Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Misleading log messages upon successful sshd login
Category: contrib
Module: sshd
Announced: 2020-03-19
Affects: FreeBSD 12.1
Corrected: 2019-11-28 02:18:19 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:34:11 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The sshd server implements the secure shell protocol, providing remote
access.
II. Problem Description
Due to a programming error, error messages of the form "Failed unknown for
user <user> ..." will be emitted to auth.log for successful logins.
III. Impact
Log files will be confusing, and programs like fail2ban that parse logs will
not function correctly.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and restart the sshd
service.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# nohup service sshd restart
2) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-20:03/sshd.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-20:03/sshd.patch.asc
# gpg --verify sshd.patch.asc
c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r355160
releng/12.1/ r359134
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=234793>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-20:03.sshd.asc>
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-20:04.pfctl Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Missing pfctl(8) tunable
Category: core
Module: pfctl(8)
Announced: 2020-03-19
Credits: Rubicon Communications, LLC (netgate.com)
Affects: FreeBSD 11.3-RELEASE
Corrected: 2020-02-12 14:50:13 UTC (stable/11, 11.3-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:35:15 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p7)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
Packet filtering takes place in the kernel. A pseudo-device, /dev/pf, allows
userland processes to control the behavior of the packet filter through an
ioctl(2) interface. Commands include enabling and disabling the filter,
loading rulesets, adding and removing individual rules or state table entries,
and retrieving statistics. The most commonly used functions are covered by
the pfctl(8) utility.
II. Problem Description
pf(4) ioctls frequently take a variable number of elements as argument.
This can potentially allow users to request very large allocations.
A failing non-blocking pf(4) allocation can tie up resources resulting in
concurrent blocking allocations entering vm_wait() and inducing reclamation
of caches.
III. Impact
The kernel will reject very large tables to avoid resource exhaustion
attacks. Some users run into this limit with legitimate table
configurations.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, however systems that do not employ pf(4) nor
use pf(4) table definitions larger than 65535 entries are unaffected.
V. Solution
Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for an errata update"
2) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 11.3]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-20:04/pfctl.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-20:04/pfctl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify pfctl.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/11/ r357822
releng/11.3/ r359135
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-20:04.pfctl.asc>
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-20:05.mlx5en Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Fix packet forwarding performance in mlx5en(4) driver
Category: core
Module: mlx5en
Announced: 2020-03-19
Affects: FreeBSD 12.1
Corrected: 2019-11-07 13:12:38 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:41:29 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
Add CSUM_SND_TAG flag and set this flag for outgoing ratelimited mbufs.
This fixes an issue that redirected packets are dropped in the mlx5en
transmit routine.
II. Problem Description
Ratelimiting support in the network stack reuses an mbuf field for a
different purpose to avoid having to grow the mbuf size. This can a cause
packet drop in the forwarding case if the field in question is not cleared
prior to transmit.
III. Impact
All packets going through firewall code are dropped when using mlx5en(4).
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available. Systems not using mlx5en(4) are not affected.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# reboot
2) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 12.1]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-20:05/mlx5en.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-20:05/mlx5en.patch.asc
# gpg --verify mlx5en.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r354440
releng/12.1/ r359136
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=243871>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-20:05.mlx5en.asc>
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-20:06.ipv6 Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Incorrect checksum calculations with IPv6 extension headers
Category: core
Module: netinet6
Announced: 2020-03-19
Credits: Francis Dupont <fdupont@isc.org>
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2020-03-02 22:54:32 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:43:37 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
2020-03-03 08:24:09 UTC (stable/11, 11.3-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:43:37 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p7)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
Upper layer transport protocols, e.g., TCP, UDP, or SCTP, include
checksums in their headers. IPv6 is a network protocol, which can
add extension headers between its own header and that of the upper
layer protocol.
II. Problem Description
Pseudo header checksum calculations can be delayed until the IPv6
output routine or offloaded to the NIC. In case IPv6 extension
headers are present, FreeBSD currently never offloads to the NIC.
When passing the data to the functions doing the delayed checksum
calculations, the contents of the extension headers were erroneously
included as part of the checksum.
III. Impact
Upper layer transport protocol checksums may be wrong for IPv6 packets,
such as IPv6 fragments, or IPv6 packets with a Destination Options or
Hop-by-Hop Options extension header.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available. Packets sent over IPv4 or IPv6 without
any extension headers are unaffected.
V. Solution
Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for errata update"
2) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 11.3]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-20:06/ipv6.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-20:06/ipv6.patch.asc
# gpg --verify ipv6.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r358557
releng/12.1/ r359137
stable/11/ r358566
releng/11.3/ r359137
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=243675>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-20:06.ipv6.asc>
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-20:04.tcp Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: TCP IPv6 SYN cache kernel information disclosure
Category: core
Module: tcp
Announced: 2020-03-19
Credits: Michael Tuexen (Netflix, contractor)
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2020-03-08 14:48:21 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:46:01 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
2020-03-08 14:48:32 UTC (stable/11, 11.3-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:46:01 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p7)
CVE Name: CVE-2020-7451
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) header contains a one byte field
called Traffic Class. Two bits of this field are used for Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN), the other six bits are used as Differentiated
Services Field Codepoints (DSCP).
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a connection oriented transport
protocol, which can be used as an upper layer of IPv6. A TCP endpoint is
either acting as a client (sending initially a SYN segment) or as a server
(initially waiting to receive a SYN segment and then responding with a
SYN-ACK segment).
To mitigate the impact of some attacks against TCP servers (like
SYN-flooding), FreeBSD uses specific code to handle the TCP connection setup
for servers. This includes the transmission and retransmission of SYN-ACK
segments or responding with a challenge ACK segment to a received RST
segment.
II. Problem Description
When a TCP server transmits or retransmits a TCP SYN-ACK segment over IPv6,
the Traffic Class field is not initialized. This also applies to challenge ACK
segments, which are sent in response to received RST segments during the TCP
connection setup phase.
III. Impact
For each TCP SYN-ACK (or challenge TCP-ACK) segment sent over IPv6, one byte
of kernel memory is transmitted over the network.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available. Systems not using IPv6 are unaffected.
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
and reboot.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:04/tcp.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:04/tcp.patch.asc
# gpg --verify tcp.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r358739
releng/12.1/ r359138
stable/11/ r358740
releng/11.3/ r359138
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-7451>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-20:04.tcp.asc>
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@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-20:05.if_oce_ioctl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Insufficient oce(4) ioctl(2) privilege checking
Category: core
Module: oce(4)
Announced: 2020-03-19
Credits: Ilja Van Sprundel
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2019-12-26 16:56:42 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:48:29 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
2019-12-26 16:58:11 UTC (stable/11, 11.3-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:48:29 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p7)
CVE Name: CVE-2019-15876
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The primary interface used for network driver configuration is ioctl(2).
Several ioctl(2) commands are reserved for driver-specific purposes. For
instance, a driver may use one of these ioctls to implement an interface for
updating device firmware.
II. Problem Description
The driver-specific ioctl(2) command handlers in oce(4) failed to check
whether the caller has sufficient privileges to perform the corresponding
operation.
III. Impact
The oce(4) handler permits unprivileged users to send passthrough commands to
device firmware.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available. Systems that do not contain devices driven by
oce(4) are unaffected.
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
and reboot.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:05/if_oce_ioctl.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:05/if_oce_ioctl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify if_oce_ioctl.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r356089
releng/12.1/ r359139
stable/11/ r356090
releng/11.3/ r359139
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-15876>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-20:05.if_oce_ioctl.asc>
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@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-20:06.if_ixl_ioctl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Insufficient ixl(4) ioctl(2) privilege checking
Category: core
Module: ixl(4)
Announced: 2020-03-19
Credits: Ilja Van Sprundel
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2020-01-10 18:31:59 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:49:32 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
CVE Name: CVE-2019-15877
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The primary interface used for network driver configuration is ioctl(2).
Several ioctl(2) commands are reserved for driver-specific purposes. For
instance, a driver may use one of these ioctls to implement an interface for
updating device firmware.
II. Problem Description
The driver-specific ioctl(2) command handlers in ixl(4) failed to check
whether the caller has sufficient privileges to perform the corresponding
operation.
III. Impact
The ixl(4) handler permits unprivileged users to trigger updates to the
device's non-volatile memory (NVM).
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available. Systems that do not contain devices driven by
ixl(4) are unaffected.
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
and reboot.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:06/if_ixl_ioctl.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:06/if_ixl_ioctl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify if_ixl_ioctl.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r356606
releng/12.1/ r359140
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-15877>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-20:06.if_ixl_ioctl.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-20:07.epair Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Incorrect user-controlled pointer use in epair
Category: core
Module: kernel
Announced: 2020-03-19
Credits: Ilja van Sprundel
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2020-02-04 04:29:54 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:50:36 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
2020-02-04 04:29:53 UTC (stable/11, 11.3-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:50:36 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p7)
CVE Name: CVE-2020-7452
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The epair(4) interface provides a pair of virtual back-to-back connected
Ethernet interfaces.
II. Problem Description
Incorrect use of a potentially user-controlled pointer in the kernel allowed
vnet jailed users to panic the system and potentially execute aribitrary code
in the kernel.
III. Impact
Users with root level access (or the PRIV_NET_IFCREATE privilege) can panic
the system, or potentially escape the jail or execute arbitrary code with
kernel priviliges.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available. Systems not using epair(4) are not vulnerable.
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
and reboot.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 12.1]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:07/epair.12.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:07/epair.12.patch.asc
# gpg --verify epair.12.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 11.3]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:07/epair.11.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:07/epair.11.patch.asc
# gpg --verify epair.11.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r357490
releng/12.1/ r359141
stable/11/ r357489
releng/11.3/ r359141
- - -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-7452>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-20:07.epair.asc>
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138
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-20:08.jail Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Kernel memory disclosure with nested jails
Category: core
Module: kern
Announced: 2020-03-19
Credits: Hans Christian Woithe <chwoithe@yahoo.com>
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2020-03-16 21:12:46 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:51:33 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
2020-03-16 21:12:32 UTC (stable/11, 11.3-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:51:33 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p7)
CVE Name: CVE-2020-7453
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The jail_set(2) system call allows a system administrator to lock up a
process and all its descendants inside a closed environment with very
limited ability to affect the system outside that environment, even
for processes with superuser privileges.
The jail_get(2) system call allows a system administrator to read the
configuration of running jails.
II. Problem Description
A missing NUL-termination check for the jail_set(2) configration option
"osrelease" may return more bytes when reading the jail configuration
back with jail_get(2) than were originally set.
III. Impact
For jails with a non-default setting of children.max > 0 ("nested jails")
a superuser inside a jail can create a jail and may be able to read and
take advantage of exposed kernel memory.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available. Systems not altering the default settings of
the jail configuration option children.max=0 are not affected as a root on
the base system has access to kernel memory by other means and a super
user inside a jail cannot create further jails.
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date,
and reboot.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
# shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update"
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:08/kern_jail.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:08/kern_jail.patch.asc
# gpg --verify kern_jail.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r359021
releng/12.1/ r359142
stable/11/ r359020
releng/11.3/ r359142
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-7453>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-20:08.jail.asc>
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Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-20:09.ntp Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Multiple denial of service in ntpd
Category: contrib
Module: ntp
Announced: 2020-03-19
Credits: Philippe Antoine and Miroslav Lichvar
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2020-03-04 23:54:13 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:52:41 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p3)
2020-03-05 00:18:09 UTC (stable/11, 11.3-STABLE)
2020-03-19 16:52:41 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p7)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The ntpd(8) daemon is an implementation of the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) used to synchronize the time of a computer system to a reference
time source.
II. Problem Description
Three NTP vulnerabilities are addressed by this security advisory.
NTP Bug 3610: Process_control() should exit earlier on short packets.
On systems that override the default and enable ntpdc (mode 7), fuzz testing
detected a short packet will cause ntpd to read uninitialized data.
NTP Bug 3596: Due to highly predictable transmit timestamps, an
unauthenticated, unmonitored ntpd is vulnerable to attack over IPv4. A victim
ntpd configured to receive time from an unauthenticated time source is
vulnerable to an off-path attacker with permission to query the victim. The
attacker must send from a spoofed IPv4 address of an upstream NTP server and
the victim must process a large number of packets with that spoofed IPv4
address. After eight or more successful attacks in a row, the attacker can
either modify the victim's clock by a small amount or cause ntpd to
terminate. The attack is especially effective when unusually short poll
intervals have been configured.
NTP Bug 3592: The fix for https://bugs.ntp.org/3445 introduced a bug such
that an ntpd can be prevented from initiating a time volley to its peer
resulting in a DoS.
III. Impact
All three NTP bugs may result in DoS or terimation of the ntp daemon.
IV. Workaround
Systems not using ntpd(8) are not vulnerable.
Systems running ntpd should make the following changes:
- - Disable mode 7
- - Use many trustworthy sources of time
- - Use NTP packet authentication
- - Monitor ntpd for error messages indicating attack
- - If only unauthenticated time over IPv4 is available, use the restrict
configuration directive
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 12.1-STABLE]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:09/ntp.12.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:09/ntp.12.patch.asc
# gpg --verify ntp.12.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 12.1-RELEASE]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:09/ntp.12.1.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:09/ntp.12.1.patch.asc
# gpg --verify ntp.12.1.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 11.3-STABLE]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:09/ntp.11.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:09/ntp.11.patch.asc
# gpg --verify ntp.11.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 11.3-RELEASE]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:09/ntp.11.3.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:09/ntp.11.3.patch.asc
# gpg --verify ntp.11.3.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r358659
releng/12.1/ r359144
stable/11/ r358660
releng/11.3/ r359144
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Main/SecurityNotice#March_2020_ntp_4_2_8p14_NTP_Rele>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-20:09.ntp.asc>
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