Fix the length calculation for the final block of a sendfile(2)
transmission which could be tricked into rounding up to the nearest page size, leaking up to a page of kernel memory. [13:11] In IPv6 and NetATM, stop SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCSIFBRDADDR, SIOCSIFDSTADDR and SIOCSIFNETMASK at the socket layer rather than pass them on to the link layer without validation or credential checks. [SA-13:12] Prevent cross-mount hardlinks between different nullfs mounts of the same underlying filesystem. [SA-13:13] Security: CVE-2013-5666 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:11.sendfile Security: CVE-2013-5691 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl Security: CVE-2013-5710 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs Approved by: so
This commit is contained in:
Dag-Erling Smørgrav
parent
e8346ce7d0
commit
c4d9a19be3
Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=42642
12 changed files with 620 additions and 0 deletions
126
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:11.sendfile.asc
Normal file
126
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:11.sendfile.asc
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@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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Hash: SHA1
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=============================================================================
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FreeBSD-SA-13:11.sendfile Security Advisory
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The FreeBSD Project
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Topic: Kernel memory disclosure in sendfile(2)
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Category: core
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Module: sendfile
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Announced: 2013-09-10
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Credits: Ed Maste
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Affects: FreeBSD 9.2-RC1 and 9.2-RC2
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Corrected: 2013-09-10 10:07:21 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
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2013-09-10 10:08:20 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RC1-p2)
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2013-09-10 10:08:20 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RC2-p2)
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CVE Name: CVE-2013-5666
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For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
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including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
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following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
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I. Background
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The sendfile(2) system call allows a server application (such as an
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HTTP or FTP server) to transmit the contents of a file over a network
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connection without first copying it to application memory. High
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performance servers such as Apache and ftpd use sendfile.
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II. Problem Description
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On affected systems, if the length passed to sendfile(2) is non-zero
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and greater than the length of the file being transmitted, sendfile(2)
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will pad the transmission up to the requested length or the next
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pagesize boundary, whichever is smaller.
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The content of the additional bytes transmitted in this manner depends
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on the underlying filesystem, but may potentially include information
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useful to an attacker.
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III. Impact
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An unprivileged user with the ability to run arbitrary code may be
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able to obtain arbitrary kernel memory contents.
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IV. Workaround
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No workaround is available.
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V. Solution
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Perform one of the following:
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1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
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release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
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2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
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The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
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FreeBSD release branches.
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a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
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detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
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[FreeBSD 9.2-STABLE]
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:11/sendfile-9.2-stable.patch
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:11/sendfile-9.2-stable.patch.asc
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# gpg --verify sendfile-9.2-stable.patch.asc
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[FreeBSD 9.2-RC1 and 9.2-RC2]
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:11/sendfile-9.2-rc.patch
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:11/sendfile-9.2-rc.patch.asc
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# gpg --verify sendfile-9.2-rc.patch.asc
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b) Apply the patch.
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# cd /usr/src
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# patch < /path/to/patch
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c) Recompile your kernel as described in
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<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
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system.
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3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
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Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
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platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
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# freebsd-update fetch
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# freebsd-update install
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VI. Correction details
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The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
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affected branch.
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Branch/path Revision
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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stable/9/ r255443
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releng/9.2/ r255444
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
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following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
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machine with Subversion installed:
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# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
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Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
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<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
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VII. References
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<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-5666>
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The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:11.sendfile.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
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Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (FreeBSD)
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iEYEARECAAYFAlIu8rIACgkQFdaIBMps37K01ACgmwaW3PZhjDqWSlTHusjIPNVy
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A/YAn3DFUAvlX8sH89taM+sedjbD5In8
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=gZwu
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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150
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl.asc
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150
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl.asc
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@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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Hash: SHA1
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=============================================================================
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FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl Security Advisory
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The FreeBSD Project
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Topic: Insufficient credential checks in network ioctl(2)
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Category: core
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Module: sys_netinet6 sys_netatm
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Announced: 2013-09-10
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Credits: Loganaden Velvindron
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Gleb Smirnoff
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Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
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Corrected: 2013-09-10 10:07:21 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
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2013-09-10 10:08:20 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RC1-p2)
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2013-09-10 10:08:20 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RC2-p2)
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2013-09-10 10:08:20 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RC3-p1)
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2013-09-10 10:15:33 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p7)
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2013-09-10 10:12:09 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
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2013-09-10 10:14:19 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p4)
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2013-09-10 10:13:14 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p11)
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CVE Name: CVE-2013-5691
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For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
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including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
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following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
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I. Background
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The ioctl(2) system call allows an application to perform device- or
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protocol-specific operations through a file or socket descriptor
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associated with a specific device or protocol.
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The SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCSIFBRDADDR, SIOCSIFDSTADDR and SIOCSIFNETMASK
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ioctl requests are used to associate a network address, broadcast
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address, destination address (for point-to-point interfaces) or
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netmask with an interface. They operate on the assumption that each
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interface only has one address per protocol, and are therefore of
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limited use for IPv4, where interfaces may have more than one address.
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They were never implemented for IPv6, where interfaces nearly always
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have at least two, and in many cases three, addresses; nor were they
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ever implemented for ATM.
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II. Problem Description
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As is commonly the case, the IPv6 and ATM network layer ioctl request
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handlers are written in such a way that an unrecognized request is
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passed on unmodified to the link layer, which will either handle it or
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return an error code.
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Network interface drivers, however, assume that the SIOCSIFADDR,
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SIOCSIFBRDADDR, SIOCSIFDSTADDR and SIOCSIFNETMASK requests have been
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handled at the network layer, and therefore do not perform input
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validation or verify the caller's credentials. Typical link-layer
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actions for these requests may include marking the interface as "up"
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and resetting the underlying hardware.
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III. Impact
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An unprivileged user with the ability to run arbitrary code can cause
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any network interface in the system to perform the link layer actions
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associated with a SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCSIFBRDADDR, SIOCSIFDSTADDR or
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SIOCSIFNETMASK ioctl request; or trigger a kernel panic by passing a
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specially crafted address structure which causes a network interface
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driver to dereference an invalid pointer.
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Although this has not been confirmed, the possibility that an attacker
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may be able to execute arbitrary code in kernel context can not be
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ruled out.
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IV. Workaround
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No workaround is available.
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V. Solution
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Perform one of the following:
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1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
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release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
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2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
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The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
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FreeBSD release branches.
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a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
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detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:12/ifioctl.patch
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:12/ifioctl.patch.asc
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# gpg --verify ifioctl.patch.asc
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b) Apply the patch.
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# cd /usr/src
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# patch < /path/to/patch
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c) Recompile your kernel as described in
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<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
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system.
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3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
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Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
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platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
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# freebsd-update fetch
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# freebsd-update install
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VI. Correction details
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The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
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affected branch.
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Branch/path Revision
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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stable/8/ r255445
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releng/8.3/ r255446
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releng/8.4/ r255447
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stable/9/ r255443
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releng/9.1/ r255448
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releng/9.2/ r255444
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
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following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
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||||
machine with Subversion installed:
|
||||
|
||||
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
|
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Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
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<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
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VII. References
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<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-5691>
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The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (FreeBSD)
|
||||
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||||
iEYEARECAAYFAlIu8rUACgkQFdaIBMps37ImRQCdGUcSBvK6+kAN69aGChHT6fVb
|
||||
YI4AoJNveN9PSowTG0NnUkPJR9oJimZT
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||||
=xb3g
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||||
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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||||
139
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs.asc
Normal file
139
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs.asc
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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||||
Hash: SHA1
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||||
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=============================================================================
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FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs Security Advisory
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The FreeBSD Project
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Topic: Cross-mount links between nullfs(5) mounts
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Category: core
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Module: nullfs
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Announced: 2013-09-10
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Credits: Mateusz Guzik
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Konstantin Belousov
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Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
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Corrected: 2013-09-10 10:07:21 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
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2013-09-10 10:08:20 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RC1-p2)
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2013-09-10 10:08:20 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RC2-p2)
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2013-09-10 10:08:20 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RC3-p1)
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2013-09-10 10:15:33 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p7)
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2013-09-10 10:12:09 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
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2013-09-10 10:14:19 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p4)
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2013-09-10 10:13:14 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p11)
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CVE Name: CVE-2013-5710
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For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
|
||||
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
|
||||
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
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I. Background
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The nullfs(5) filesystem allows all or a part of an already mounted
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filesystem to be made available in a different part of the global
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filesystem namespace. It is commonly used to make a set of files
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available to multiple chroot(2) or jail(2) environments without
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replicating the files in each environment. A common idiom, described
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in the FreeBSD Handbook, is to mount one subtree of a filesystem
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read-only within a jail's filesystem namespace, and mount a different
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subtree of the same filesystem read-write.
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II. Problem Description
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The nullfs(5) implementation of the VOP_LINK(9) VFS operation does not
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check whether the source and target of the link are both in the same
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nullfs instance. It is therefore possible to create a hardlink from a
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location in one nullfs instance to a file in another, as long as the
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underlying (source) filesystem is the same.
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III. Impact
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If multiple nullfs views into the same filesystem are mounted in
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different locations, a user with read access to one of these views and
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write access to another will be able to create a hard link from the
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latter to a file in the former, even though they are, from the user's
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perspective, different filesystems. The user may thereby gain write
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access to files which are nominally on a read-only filesystem.
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IV. Workaround
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No workaround is available, but systems which do not use the nullfs(5)
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filesystem, or do not null-mount different subtrees of the same source
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filesystem with different permissions, are not vulnerable.
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||||
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||||
V. Solution
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||||
|
||||
Perform one of the following:
|
||||
|
||||
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
|
||||
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
|
||||
|
||||
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
|
||||
|
||||
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
|
||||
FreeBSD release branches.
|
||||
|
||||
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
|
||||
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
|
||||
|
||||
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:13/nullfs.patch
|
||||
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:13/nullfs.patch.asc
|
||||
# gpg --verify nullfs.patch.asc
|
||||
|
||||
b) Apply the patch.
|
||||
|
||||
# cd /usr/src
|
||||
# patch < /path/to/patch
|
||||
|
||||
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
|
||||
<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
|
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system.
|
||||
|
||||
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
|
||||
|
||||
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
|
||||
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
|
||||
|
||||
# freebsd-update fetch
|
||||
# freebsd-update install
|
||||
|
||||
VI. Correction details
|
||||
|
||||
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
|
||||
affected branch.
|
||||
|
||||
Branch/path Revision
|
||||
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
stable/8/ r255445
|
||||
releng/8.3/ r255446
|
||||
releng/8.4/ r255447
|
||||
stable/9/ r255443
|
||||
releng/9.1/ r255448
|
||||
releng/9.2/ r255444
|
||||
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
|
||||
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
|
||||
machine with Subversion installed:
|
||||
|
||||
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
|
||||
|
||||
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
|
||||
|
||||
<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
|
||||
|
||||
VII. References
|
||||
|
||||
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en/books/handbook/jails-application.html>
|
||||
|
||||
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-5710>
|
||||
|
||||
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
|
||||
<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs.asc>
|
||||
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
Version: GnuPG v1.4.14 (FreeBSD)
|
||||
|
||||
iEYEARECAAYFAlIu8rgACgkQFdaIBMps37KX4QCgn/PjsnAZItGRi7CMbp2jlFvS
|
||||
IokAniKX2FVr8xXuJPtrLdv+7syjCTQt
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||||
=Lj26
|
||||
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue