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Publish SA-16:15 revised, SA-16:32, EN-16:17, EN-16:18.

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This commit is contained in:
Gleb Smirnoff 2016-10-25 17:32:49 +00:00
parent d8fcebec14
commit d25bbfa0fb
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=49582
14 changed files with 843 additions and 31 deletions
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-16:17.vm Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Virtual Memory issues
Category: core
Module: Virtual Memory subsystem
Announced: 2016-10-25
Credits:
Affects: FreeBSD 10.3
Corrected: 2016-07-25 13:31:18 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE)
2016-10-25 16:45:55 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p11)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches,
and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.freebsd.org/>.
I. Background
The virtual memory subsystem manages address spaces of the processes, and
tightly cooperates with the file systems and process management to provide
the execution environment for the applications.
II. Problem Description
Due to increased parallelism and optimizations in several parts of the
system, the previously latent bugs in VM become much easier to trigger,
affecting a significant number of the FreeBSD users. The exact technical
details of the issues are provided in the commit messages of the merged
revisions, which are listed below with short summaries.
r301184 prevent parallel object collapses, fixes object lifecycle
r301436 do not leak the vm object lock, fixes overcommit disable
r302243 avoid the active object marking for vm.vmtotal sysctl, fixes
"vodead" hangs
r302513 vm_fault() race with the vm_object_collapse(), fixes spurious
SIGSEGV
r303291 postpone BO_DEAD, fixes panic on fast vnode reclaim
III. Impact
Due to the bugs, spurious SIGSEGV might be delivered to processes, causing
hangs on the "vodead" state on filesystem operations might be observed,
system might hang or panic during rapid UFS vnodes reclamation.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your present system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
3) To update your present system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 10.3]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-16:17/vm.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-16:17/vm.patch.asc
# gpg --verify vm.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/10/ r303291
releng/10.3/ r307929
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=204764>
<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=204426>
The latest revision of this Errata Notice is available at
https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-16:17.vm.asc
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-16:18 Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Loader may hang during boot
Category: core
Module: loader
Announced: 2016-10-25
Affects: FreeBSD 11.0
Corrected: 2016-10-08 00:01:07 UTC (stable/11, 11.0-STABLE)
2016-10-25 16:50:10 UTC (releng/11.0, 11.0-RELEASE-p2)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The loader is the final stage (boot3) of the boot process and is responsible
for loading the kernel and starting the operating system. GELIBoot is a
feature present in the loader that allows it to boot the system from an
encrypted disks.
II. Problem Description
A programming error in GELIBoot causes the loader to attempt to read past
the end of the disk if the size of the final partition is not a multiple of
4 kB.
III. Impact
On most systems, reading past the end of the disk will result in the read
failing, and the boot process will continue normally. On some systems, the
read past the end of the disk will be retried a number of times and will
result in the boot process being slower than usual. On Amazon EC2 instances,
and possibly other virtualization platforms, this issue causes the boot
process to hang and never complete.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems with 4 kB aligned partitions will not
result in an attempt to read past the end of the disk.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
3) To update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 11.0]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-16:18/loader.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-16:18/loader.patch.asc
# gpg --verify loader.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/11/ r306834
releng/11.0/ r307930
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=213196>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-16:18.loader.asc>
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@ -2,27 +2,36 @@
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-16:15.sysarch Security Advisory
FreeBSD-SA-16:15.sysarch [REVISED] Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Incorrect argument validation in sysarch(2)
Category: core
Module: kernel
Announced: 2016-03-16
Credits: Core Security
Announced: 2016-10-25
Credits: Core Security, ahaha from Chaitin Tech
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2016-03-16 22:35:55 UTC (stable/10, 10.2-STABLE)
2016-03-16 22:31:04 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p14)
2016-03-16 22:30:56 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p31)
2016-03-16 22:36:02 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
2016-03-16 22:30:03 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p39)
Corrected: 2016-10-25 17:14:50 UTC (stable/11, 11.0-STABLE)
2016-10-25 17:11:20 UTC (releng/11.0, 11.0-RELEASE-p2)
2016-10-25 17:16:08 UTC (stable/10, 10.3-STABLE)
2016-10-25 17:11:15 UTC (releng/10.3, 10.3-RELEASE-p11)
2016-10-25 17:11:11 UTC (releng/10.2, 10.2-RELEASE-p24)
2016-10-25 17:11:07 UTC (releng/10.1, 10.1-RELEASE-p41)
2016-10-25 17:16:58 UTC (stable/9, 9.3-STABLE)
2016-10-25 17:11:02 UTC (releng/9.3, 9.3-RELEASE-p49)
CVE Name: CVE-2016-1885
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
0. Revision history
v1.0 2016-03-16 Initial release.
v1.1 2016-10-25 Revised patch to address a problem pointed out by
ahaha from Chaitin Tech.
I. Background
The IA-32 architecture allows programs to define segments, which provides
@ -38,10 +47,10 @@ II. Problem Description
A special combination of sysarch(2) arguments, specify a request to
uninstall a set of descriptors from the LDT. The start descriptor
is cleared and the number of descriptors are provided. Due to invalid
use of a signed intermediate value in the bounds checking during argument
validity verification, unbound zero'ing of the process LDT and adjacent
memory can be initiated from usermode.
is cleared and the number of descriptors are provided. Due to lack
of sufficient bounds checking during argument validity verification,
unbound zero'ing of the process LDT and adjacent memory can be initiated
from usermode.
III. Impact
@ -77,14 +86,27 @@ Reboot is required.
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
[*** v1.1 NOTE ***] If your sources are not yet patched using the initially
published advisory patches, then you need to apply both sysarch.patch and
sysarch-01.patch. If your sources are already updated, or patched with
patches from the initial advisory, then you need to apply sysarch-01.patch
only.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[ FreeBSD system not patched with original SA-16:15 patch]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:15/sysarch.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:15/sysarch.patch.asc
# gpg --verify sysarch.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
[ FreeBSD system that has been patched with original SA-16:15 patch]
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:15/sysarch-01.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:15/sysarch-01.patch.asc
# gpg --verify sysarch-01.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch(es). Execute the following commands as root for
every patch file downloaded:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
@ -100,11 +122,14 @@ affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/9/ r296958
releng/9.3/ r296953
stable/10/ r296957
releng/10.1/ r296954
releng/10.2/ r296955
stable/9/ r307941
releng/9.3/ r307931
stable/10/ r307940
releng/10.1/ r307932
releng/10.2/ r307933
releng/10.3/ r307934
stable/11/ r307938
releng/11.0/ r307935
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
@ -125,17 +150,17 @@ The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:15.sysarch.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-16:32.bhyve Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: bhyve - privilege escalation vulnerability
Category: core
Module: bhyve
Announced: 2016-10-25
Credits: Ilja van Sprundel, IOActive
Affects: FreeBSD 11.0 amd64
Corrected: 2016-10-25 17:15:32 UTC (stable/11, 11.0-STABLE)
2016-10-25 17:11:20 UTC (releng/11.0, 11.0-RELEASE-p2)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
bhyve is a BSD licensed hypervisor that supports running a variety of
virtual machines (guests).
II. Problem Description
An unchecked array reference in the VGA device emulation code could
potentially allow guests access to the heap of the bhyve process.
Since the bhyve process is running as root, this may allow guests to
obtain full control of the hosts they are running on.
III. Impact
For bhyve virtual machines with the "fbuf" framebuffer device
configured, if exploited, a malicious guest could obtain full access
to not just the host system, but to other virtual machines running on
the system.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, however systems not using bhyve for
virtualization are not vulnerable. Additionally systems using bhyve
but without the "fbuf" framebuffer device configured are not
vulnerable.
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
No reboot is needed. Rather the bhyve process for vulnerable virtual
machines should be restarted.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 platforms
can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:32/bhyve.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-16:32/bhyve.patch.asc
# gpg --verify bhyve.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart the bhyve process(es).
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/11/ r307939
releng/11.0/ r307935
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-16:32.bhyve.asc>
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235
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@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
--- sys/kern/vfs_subr.c.orig
+++ sys/kern/vfs_subr.c
@@ -2934,7 +2934,13 @@
TAILQ_EMPTY(&vp->v_bufobj.bo_clean.bv_hd) &&
vp->v_bufobj.bo_clean.bv_cnt == 0,
("vp %p bufobj not invalidated", vp));
- vp->v_bufobj.bo_flag |= BO_DEAD;
+
+ /*
+ * For VMIO bufobj, BO_DEAD is set in vm_object_terminate()
+ * after the object's page queue is flushed.
+ */
+ if (vp->v_bufobj.bo_object == NULL)
+ vp->v_bufobj.bo_flag |= BO_DEAD;
BO_UNLOCK(&vp->v_bufobj);
/*
--- sys/vm/vm_fault.c.orig
+++ sys/vm/vm_fault.c
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
vm_prot_t prot;
long ahead, behind;
int alloc_req, era, faultcount, nera, reqpage, result;
- boolean_t growstack, is_first_object_locked, wired;
+ boolean_t dead, growstack, is_first_object_locked, wired;
int map_generation;
vm_object_t next_object;
vm_page_t marray[VM_FAULT_READ_MAX];
@@ -423,11 +423,18 @@
fs.pindex = fs.first_pindex;
while (TRUE) {
/*
- * If the object is dead, we stop here
+ * If the object is marked for imminent termination,
+ * we retry here, since the collapse pass has raced
+ * with us. Otherwise, if we see terminally dead
+ * object, return fail.
*/
- if (fs.object->flags & OBJ_DEAD) {
+ if ((fs.object->flags & OBJ_DEAD) != 0) {
+ dead = fs.object->type == OBJT_DEAD;
unlock_and_deallocate(&fs);
- return (KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE);
+ if (dead)
+ return (KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE);
+ pause("vmf_de", 1);
+ goto RetryFault;
}
/*
--- sys/vm/vm_meter.c.orig
+++ sys/vm/vm_meter.c
@@ -93,30 +93,32 @@
CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, NULL, 0, sysctl_vm_loadavg, "S,loadavg",
"Machine loadaverage history");
+/*
+ * This function aims to determine if the object is mapped,
+ * specifically, if it is referenced by a vm_map_entry. Because
+ * objects occasionally acquire transient references that do not
+ * represent a mapping, the method used here is inexact. However, it
+ * has very low overhead and is good enough for the advisory
+ * vm.vmtotal sysctl.
+ */
+static bool
+is_object_active(vm_object_t obj)
+{
+
+ return (obj->ref_count > obj->shadow_count);
+}
+
static int
vmtotal(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
- struct proc *p;
struct vmtotal total;
- vm_map_entry_t entry;
vm_object_t object;
- vm_map_t map;
- int paging;
+ struct proc *p;
struct thread *td;
- struct vmspace *vm;
bzero(&total, sizeof(total));
+
/*
- * Mark all objects as inactive.
- */
- mtx_lock(&vm_object_list_mtx);
- TAILQ_FOREACH(object, &vm_object_list, object_list) {
- VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(object);
- vm_object_clear_flag(object, OBJ_ACTIVE);
- VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(object);
- }
- mtx_unlock(&vm_object_list_mtx);
- /*
* Calculate process statistics.
*/
sx_slock(&allproc_lock);
@@ -136,11 +138,15 @@
case TDS_INHIBITED:
if (TD_IS_SWAPPED(td))
total.t_sw++;
- else if (TD_IS_SLEEPING(td) &&
- td->td_priority <= PZERO)
- total.t_dw++;
- else
- total.t_sl++;
+ else if (TD_IS_SLEEPING(td)) {
+ if (td->td_priority <= PZERO)
+ total.t_dw++;
+ else
+ total.t_sl++;
+ if (td->td_wchan ==
+ &cnt.v_free_count)
+ total.t_pw++;
+ }
break;
case TDS_CAN_RUN:
@@ -158,29 +164,6 @@
}
}
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
- /*
- * Note active objects.
- */
- paging = 0;
- vm = vmspace_acquire_ref(p);
- if (vm == NULL)
- continue;
- map = &vm->vm_map;
- vm_map_lock_read(map);
- for (entry = map->header.next;
- entry != &map->header; entry = entry->next) {
- if ((entry->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP) ||
- (object = entry->object.vm_object) == NULL)
- continue;
- VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(object);
- vm_object_set_flag(object, OBJ_ACTIVE);
- paging |= object->paging_in_progress;
- VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(object);
- }
- vm_map_unlock_read(map);
- vmspace_free(vm);
- if (paging)
- total.t_pw++;
}
sx_sunlock(&allproc_lock);
/*
@@ -206,9 +189,18 @@
*/
continue;
}
+ if (object->ref_count == 1 &&
+ (object->flags & OBJ_NOSPLIT) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Also skip otherwise unreferenced swap
+ * objects backing tmpfs vnodes, and POSIX or
+ * SysV shared memory.
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
total.t_vm += object->size;
total.t_rm += object->resident_page_count;
- if (object->flags & OBJ_ACTIVE) {
+ if (is_object_active(object)) {
total.t_avm += object->size;
total.t_arm += object->resident_page_count;
}
@@ -216,7 +208,7 @@
/* shared object */
total.t_vmshr += object->size;
total.t_rmshr += object->resident_page_count;
- if (object->flags & OBJ_ACTIVE) {
+ if (is_object_active(object)) {
total.t_avmshr += object->size;
total.t_armshr += object->resident_page_count;
}
--- sys/vm/vm_object.c.orig
+++ sys/vm/vm_object.c
@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@
vinvalbuf(vp, V_SAVE, 0, 0);
+ BO_LOCK(&vp->v_bufobj);
+ vp->v_bufobj.bo_flag |= BO_DEAD;
+ BO_UNLOCK(&vp->v_bufobj);
+
VM_OBJECT_WLOCK(object);
}
@@ -1722,6 +1726,9 @@
* case.
*/
if (backing_object->ref_count == 1) {
+ vm_object_pip_add(object, 1);
+ vm_object_pip_add(backing_object, 1);
+
/*
* If there is exactly one reference to the backing
* object, we can collapse it into the parent.
@@ -1793,11 +1800,13 @@
KASSERT(backing_object->ref_count == 1, (
"backing_object %p was somehow re-referenced during collapse!",
backing_object));
+ vm_object_pip_wakeup(backing_object);
backing_object->type = OBJT_DEAD;
backing_object->ref_count = 0;
VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(backing_object);
vm_object_destroy(backing_object);
+ vm_object_pip_wakeup(object);
object_collapses++;
} else {
vm_object_t new_backing_object;
@@ -2130,6 +2139,7 @@
*/
if (!reserved && !swap_reserve_by_cred(ptoa(next_size),
prev_object->cred)) {
+ VM_OBJECT_WUNLOCK(prev_object);
return (FALSE);
}
prev_object->charge += ptoa(next_size);
--- sys/vm/vm_object.h.orig
+++ sys/vm/vm_object.h
@@ -181,7 +181,6 @@
*/
#define OBJ_FICTITIOUS 0x0001 /* (c) contains fictitious pages */
#define OBJ_UNMANAGED 0x0002 /* (c) contains unmanaged pages */
-#define OBJ_ACTIVE 0x0004 /* active objects */
#define OBJ_DEAD 0x0008 /* dead objects (during rundown) */
#define OBJ_NOSPLIT 0x0010 /* dont split this object */
#define OBJ_PIPWNT 0x0040 /* paging in progress wanted */

16
share/security/patches/EN-16:17/vm.patch.asc Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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iQIcBAABCgAGBQJYD5UZAAoJEO1n7NZdz2rnveQP/18XosglN8If641FhVryq35Y
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

34
share/security/patches/EN-16:18/loader.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
--- sys/boot/geli/geliboot.c.orig
+++ sys/boot/geli/geliboot.c
@@ -77,17 +77,25 @@
int error;
off_t alignsector;
- alignsector = (lastsector * DEV_BSIZE) &
- ~(off_t)(DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE - 1);
+ alignsector = rounddown2(lastsector * DEV_BSIZE, DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE);
+ if (alignsector + DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE > ((lastsector + 1) * DEV_BSIZE)) {
+ /* Don't read past the end of the disk */
+ alignsector = (lastsector * DEV_BSIZE) + DEV_BSIZE
+ - DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE;
+ }
error = read_func(NULL, dskp, alignsector, &buf, DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE);
if (error != 0) {
return (error);
}
- /* Extract the last DEV_BSIZE bytes from the block. */
- error = eli_metadata_decode(buf + (DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE - DEV_BSIZE),
- &md);
+ /* Extract the last 4k sector of the disk. */
+ error = eli_metadata_decode(buf, &md);
if (error != 0) {
- return (error);
+ /* Try the last 512 byte sector instead. */
+ error = eli_metadata_decode(buf +
+ (DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE - DEV_BSIZE), &md);
+ if (error != 0) {
+ return (error);
+ }
}
if (!(md.md_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_GELIBOOT)) {

16
share/security/patches/EN-16:18/loader.patch.asc Normal file
View file

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

21
share/security/patches/SA-16:15/sysarch-01.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
--- sys/amd64/amd64/sys_machdep.c.orig
+++ sys/amd64/amd64/sys_machdep.c
@@ -608,6 +608,8 @@
largest_ld = uap->start + uap->num;
if (largest_ld > max_ldt_segment)
largest_ld = max_ldt_segment;
+ if (largest_ld < uap->start)
+ return (EINVAL);
i = largest_ld - uap->start;
mtx_lock(&dt_lock);
bzero(&((struct user_segment_descriptor *)(pldt->ldt_base))
@@ -620,7 +622,8 @@
/* verify range of descriptors to modify */
largest_ld = uap->start + uap->num;
if (uap->start >= max_ldt_segment ||
- largest_ld > max_ldt_segment)
+ largest_ld > max_ldt_segment ||
+ largest_ld < uap->start)
return (EINVAL);
}

16
share/security/patches/SA-16:15/sysarch-01.patch.asc Normal file
View file

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17
share/security/patches/SA-16:32/bhyve.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
--- usr.sbin/bhyve/vga.c.orig
+++ usr.sbin/bhyve/vga.c
@@ -161,10 +161,10 @@
*/
struct {
uint8_t dac_state;
- int dac_rd_index;
- int dac_rd_subindex;
- int dac_wr_index;
- int dac_wr_subindex;
+ uint8_t dac_rd_index;
+ uint8_t dac_rd_subindex;
+ uint8_t dac_wr_index;
+ uint8_t dac_wr_subindex;
uint8_t dac_palette[3 * 256];
uint32_t dac_palette_rgb[256];
} vga_dac;

16
share/security/patches/SA-16:32/bhyve.patch.asc Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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12
share/xml/advisories.xml
View file

@ -10,6 +10,18 @@
<month>
<name>10</name>
<day>
<name>25</name>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-16:32.bhyve</name>
</advisory>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-16:15.sysarch</name>
</advisory>
</day>
<day>
<name>10</name>

16
share/xml/notices.xml
View file

@ -7,6 +7,22 @@
<year>
<name>2016</name>
<month>
<name>10</name>
<day>
<name>25</name>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-16:18.loader</name>
</notice>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-16:17.vm</name>
</notice>
</day>
</month>
<month>
<name>8</name>