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Approved by:	so
This commit is contained in:
Gordon Tetlow 2019-06-19 16:54:06 +00:00
parent 0050b1446c
commit dcab058f7e
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=53171
8 changed files with 641 additions and 0 deletions
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-19:11.net Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Incorrect locking in networking stack
Category: core
Module: net
Announced: 2019-06-19
Affects: FreeBSD 12.x
Corrected: 2019-04-01 14:19:09 UTC (stable/12, 12.0-STABLE)
2019-06-19 16:41:18 UTC (releng/12.0, 12.0-RELEASE-p6)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
Some parts of the network stack use a synchronization primitive, epoch(9),
that is new in FreeBSD 12.0. In some places where reader-writer locks were
previously used, existing KPIs were preserved and their implementations
replaced with epoch(9).
II. Problem Description
A pair of KPIs that were converted to epoch(9) were modified incorrectly, and
thus failed to provide the synchronization guarantees expected by their
consumers.
III. Impact
The bug can cause kernel memory corruption or kernel assertion failures,
depending on whether the INVARIANTS option is configured. The bug is more
likely to impact heavily loaded systems.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Perform one of the following:
1) Update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Afterwards, reboot the system.
2) Update your system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-19:11/net.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-19:11/net.patch.asc
# gpg --verify net.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:https://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r345764
releng/12.0/ r349198
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=236846>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-19:11.net.asc>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-19:08.rack Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Resource exhaustion in non-default RACK TCP stack
Category: core
Module: inet
Announced: 2019-06-19
Credits: Jonathan Looney (Netflix)
Peter Lei (Netflix)
Affects: FreeBSD 12.0 and later
Corrected: 2019-06-19 16:25:39 UTC (stable/12, 12.0-STABLE)
2019-06-19 16:43:05 UTC (releng/12.0, 12.0-RELEASE-p6)
CVE Name: CVE-2019-5599
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) of the TCP/IP protocol suite provides
a connection-oriented, reliable, sequence-preserving data stream service.
A TCP loss detection algorithm called RACK ("Recent ACKnowledgment") uses the
notion of time, in addition to packet or sequence counts, to detect losses
for modern TCP implementations that support per-packet timestamps and the
selective acknowledgment (SACK) option.
FreeBSD ships an optional implementation of RACK. Please note this is not
included by default. If RACK was not specifically compiled, installed, and
loaded, the system is not vulnerable.
II. Problem Description
While processing acknowledgements, the RACK code uses several linked lists to
maintain state entries. A malicious attacker can cause the lists to grow
unbounded. This can cause an expensive list traversal on every packet being
processed, leading to resource exhaustion and a denial of service.
III. Impact
An attacker with the ability to send specially crafted TCP traffic to a
victim system can degrade network performance and/or consume excessive CPU by
exploiting the inefficiency of traversing the potentially very large RACK
linked lists with relatively small bandwidth cost.
IV. Workaround
By default RACK is not compiled or loaded into the TCP stack. To determine
if you are using RACK, check the net.inet.tcp.functions_available sysctl.
If it includes a line with "rack", the RACK stack is loaded.
To disable RACK, unload the kernel module with:
# kldunload tcp_rack
Note: it may be required to use the force flag (-f) with the kldunload.
V. Solution
Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release /
security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Perform one of the following:
1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Since the tcp_rack kernel module is not built by default, recompile,
reinstall, and reload the kernel module.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:08/rack.patch
# fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:08/rack.patch.asc
# gpg --verify rack.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile, reinstall, and reload the tcp_rack kernel module.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/12/ r349197
releng/12.0/ r349199
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://github.com/Netflix/security-bulletins/blob/master/advisories/third-party/2019-001.md>
<URL:https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-5599>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:https://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-19:08.rack.asc>
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114
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@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
--- sys/net/if.c.orig
+++ sys/net/if.c
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
+#include <sys/sched.h>
+#include <sys/smp.h>
#include <machine/stdarg.h>
#include <vm/uma.h>
@@ -1755,6 +1757,30 @@
ifd->ifi_noproto = ifp->if_get_counter(ifp, IFCOUNTER_NOPROTO);
}
+struct ifnet_read_lock {
+ struct mtx mtx; /* lock protecting tracker below */
+ struct epoch_tracker et;
+};
+
+DPCPU_DEFINE_STATIC(struct ifnet_read_lock, ifnet_addr_read_lock);
+DPCPU_DEFINE_STATIC(struct ifnet_read_lock, ifnet_maddr_read_lock);
+
+static void
+ifnet_read_lock_init(void __unused *arg)
+{
+ struct ifnet_read_lock *pifrl;
+ int cpu;
+
+ CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
+ pifrl = DPCPU_ID_PTR(cpu, ifnet_addr_read_lock);
+ mtx_init(&pifrl->mtx, "ifnet_addr_read_lock", NULL, MTX_DEF);
+
+ pifrl = DPCPU_ID_PTR(cpu, ifnet_maddr_read_lock);
+ mtx_init(&pifrl->mtx, "ifnet_maddr_read_lock", NULL, MTX_DEF);
+ }
+}
+SYSINIT(ifnet_read_lock_init, SI_SUB_CPU + 1, SI_ORDER_FIRST, &ifnet_read_lock_init, NULL);
+
/*
* Wrapper functions for struct ifnet address list locking macros. These are
* used by kernel modules to avoid encoding programming interface or binary
@@ -1764,35 +1790,47 @@
void
if_addr_rlock(struct ifnet *ifp)
{
- MPASS(*(uint64_t *)&ifp->if_addr_et == 0);
- epoch_enter_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &ifp->if_addr_et);
+ struct ifnet_read_lock *pifrl;
+
+ sched_pin();
+ pifrl = DPCPU_PTR(ifnet_addr_read_lock);
+ mtx_lock(&pifrl->mtx);
+ epoch_enter_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &pifrl->et);
}
void
if_addr_runlock(struct ifnet *ifp)
{
- epoch_exit_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &ifp->if_addr_et);
-#ifdef INVARIANTS
- bzero(&ifp->if_addr_et, sizeof(struct epoch_tracker));
-#endif
+ struct ifnet_read_lock *pifrl;
+
+ pifrl = DPCPU_PTR(ifnet_addr_read_lock);
+
+ epoch_exit_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &pifrl->et);
+ mtx_unlock(&pifrl->mtx);
+ sched_unpin();
}
void
if_maddr_rlock(if_t ifp)
{
+ struct ifnet_read_lock *pifrl;
- MPASS(*(uint64_t *)&ifp->if_maddr_et == 0);
- epoch_enter_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &ifp->if_maddr_et);
+ sched_pin();
+ pifrl = DPCPU_PTR(ifnet_maddr_read_lock);
+ mtx_lock(&pifrl->mtx);
+ epoch_enter_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &pifrl->et);
}
void
if_maddr_runlock(if_t ifp)
{
+ struct ifnet_read_lock *pifrl;
- epoch_exit_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &ifp->if_maddr_et);
-#ifdef INVARIANTS
- bzero(&ifp->if_maddr_et, sizeof(struct epoch_tracker));
-#endif
+ pifrl = DPCPU_PTR(ifnet_maddr_read_lock);
+
+ epoch_exit_preempt(net_epoch_preempt, &pifrl->et);
+ mtx_unlock(&pifrl->mtx);
+ sched_unpin();
}
/*
--- sys/net/if_var.h.orig
+++ sys/net/if_var.h
@@ -381,8 +381,7 @@
*/
struct netdump_methods *if_netdump_methods;
struct epoch_context if_epoch_ctx;
- struct epoch_tracker if_addr_et;
- struct epoch_tracker if_maddr_et;
+ void *if_unused[4];
/*
* Spare fields to be added before branching a stable branch, so

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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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190
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@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
--- sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c.orig
+++ sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2016-2018
+ * Copyright (c) 2016-2019
* Netflix Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@
static int32_t rack_sack_block_limit = 128;
static int32_t rack_use_sack_filter = 1;
static int32_t rack_tlp_threshold_use = TLP_USE_TWO_ONE;
+static uint32_t rack_map_split_limit = 0; /* unlimited by default */
/* Rack specific counters */
counter_u64_t rack_badfr;
@@ -228,6 +229,8 @@
counter_u64_t rack_to_alloc;
counter_u64_t rack_to_alloc_hard;
counter_u64_t rack_to_alloc_emerg;
+counter_u64_t rack_alloc_limited_conns;
+counter_u64_t rack_split_limited;
counter_u64_t rack_sack_proc_all;
counter_u64_t rack_sack_proc_short;
@@ -261,6 +264,8 @@
rack_ack_received(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcp_rack *rack,
struct tcphdr *th, uint16_t nsegs, uint16_t type, int32_t recovery);
static struct rack_sendmap *rack_alloc(struct tcp_rack *rack);
+static struct rack_sendmap *rack_alloc_limit(struct tcp_rack *rack,
+ uint8_t limit_type);
static struct rack_sendmap *
rack_check_recovery_mode(struct tcpcb *tp,
uint32_t tsused);
@@ -445,6 +450,8 @@
counter_u64_zero(rack_sack_proc_short);
counter_u64_zero(rack_sack_proc_restart);
counter_u64_zero(rack_to_alloc);
+ counter_u64_zero(rack_alloc_limited_conns);
+ counter_u64_zero(rack_split_limited);
counter_u64_zero(rack_find_high);
counter_u64_zero(rack_runt_sacks);
counter_u64_zero(rack_used_tlpmethod);
@@ -622,6 +629,11 @@
OID_AUTO, "pktdelay", CTLFLAG_RW,
&rack_pkt_delay, 1,
"Extra RACK time (in ms) besides reordering thresh");
+ SYSCTL_ADD_U32(&rack_sysctl_ctx,
+ SYSCTL_CHILDREN(rack_sysctl_root),
+ OID_AUTO, "split_limit", CTLFLAG_RW,
+ &rack_map_split_limit, 0,
+ "Is there a limit on the number of map split entries (0=unlimited)");
SYSCTL_ADD_S32(&rack_sysctl_ctx,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(rack_sysctl_root),
OID_AUTO, "inc_var", CTLFLAG_RW,
@@ -757,7 +769,19 @@
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(rack_sysctl_root),
OID_AUTO, "allocemerg", CTLFLAG_RD,
&rack_to_alloc_emerg,
- "Total alocations done from emergency cache");
+ "Total allocations done from emergency cache");
+ rack_alloc_limited_conns = counter_u64_alloc(M_WAITOK);
+ SYSCTL_ADD_COUNTER_U64(&rack_sysctl_ctx,
+ SYSCTL_CHILDREN(rack_sysctl_root),
+ OID_AUTO, "alloc_limited_conns", CTLFLAG_RD,
+ &rack_alloc_limited_conns,
+ "Connections with allocations dropped due to limit");
+ rack_split_limited = counter_u64_alloc(M_WAITOK);
+ SYSCTL_ADD_COUNTER_U64(&rack_sysctl_ctx,
+ SYSCTL_CHILDREN(rack_sysctl_root),
+ OID_AUTO, "split_limited", CTLFLAG_RD,
+ &rack_split_limited,
+ "Split allocations dropped due to limit");
rack_sack_proc_all = counter_u64_alloc(M_WAITOK);
SYSCTL_ADD_COUNTER_U64(&rack_sysctl_ctx,
SYSCTL_CHILDREN(rack_sysctl_root),
@@ -1121,10 +1145,11 @@
{
struct rack_sendmap *rsm;
- counter_u64_add(rack_to_alloc, 1);
- rack->r_ctl.rc_num_maps_alloced++;
rsm = uma_zalloc(rack_zone, M_NOWAIT);
if (rsm) {
+alloc_done:
+ counter_u64_add(rack_to_alloc, 1);
+ rack->r_ctl.rc_num_maps_alloced++;
return (rsm);
}
if (rack->rc_free_cnt) {
@@ -1132,14 +1157,46 @@
rsm = TAILQ_FIRST(&rack->r_ctl.rc_free);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&rack->r_ctl.rc_free, rsm, r_next);
rack->rc_free_cnt--;
- return (rsm);
+ goto alloc_done;
}
return (NULL);
}
+/* wrapper to allocate a sendmap entry, subject to a specific limit */
+static struct rack_sendmap *
+rack_alloc_limit(struct tcp_rack *rack, uint8_t limit_type)
+{
+ struct rack_sendmap *rsm;
+
+ if (limit_type) {
+ /* currently there is only one limit type */
+ if (rack_map_split_limit > 0 &&
+ rack->r_ctl.rc_num_split_allocs >= rack_map_split_limit) {
+ counter_u64_add(rack_split_limited, 1);
+ if (!rack->alloc_limit_reported) {
+ rack->alloc_limit_reported = 1;
+ counter_u64_add(rack_alloc_limited_conns, 1);
+ }
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* allocate and mark in the limit type, if set */
+ rsm = rack_alloc(rack);
+ if (rsm != NULL && limit_type) {
+ rsm->r_limit_type = limit_type;
+ rack->r_ctl.rc_num_split_allocs++;
+ }
+ return (rsm);
+}
+
static void
rack_free(struct tcp_rack *rack, struct rack_sendmap *rsm)
{
+ if (rsm->r_limit_type) {
+ /* currently there is only one limit type */
+ rack->r_ctl.rc_num_split_allocs--;
+ }
rack->r_ctl.rc_num_maps_alloced--;
if (rack->r_ctl.rc_tlpsend == rsm)
rack->r_ctl.rc_tlpsend = NULL;
@@ -3955,7 +4012,7 @@
/*
* Need to split this in two pieces the before and after.
*/
- nrsm = rack_alloc(rack);
+ nrsm = rack_alloc_limit(rack, RACK_LIMIT_TYPE_SPLIT);
if (nrsm == NULL) {
/*
* failed XXXrrs what can we do but loose the sack
@@ -4016,7 +4073,7 @@
goto do_rest_ofb;
}
/* Ok we need to split off this one at the tail */
- nrsm = rack_alloc(rack);
+ nrsm = rack_alloc_limit(rack, RACK_LIMIT_TYPE_SPLIT);
if (nrsm == NULL) {
/* failed rrs what can we do but loose the sack info? */
goto out;
--- sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/tcp_rack.h.orig
+++ sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/tcp_rack.h
@@ -55,8 +55,10 @@
uint8_t r_sndcnt; /* Retran count, not limited by
* RACK_NUM_OF_RETRANS */
uint8_t r_in_tmap; /* Flag to see if its in the r_tnext array */
- uint8_t r_resv[3];
+ uint8_t r_limit_type; /* is this entry counted against a limit? */
+ uint8_t r_resv[2];
};
+#define RACK_LIMIT_TYPE_SPLIT 1
TAILQ_HEAD(rack_head, rack_sendmap);
@@ -242,7 +244,7 @@
uint32_t rc_num_maps_alloced; /* Number of map blocks (sacks) we
* have allocated */
uint32_t rc_rcvtime; /* When we last received data */
- uint32_t rc_notused;
+ uint32_t rc_num_split_allocs; /* num split map entries allocated */
uint32_t rc_last_output_to;
uint32_t rc_went_idle_time;
@@ -311,7 +313,8 @@
uint8_t rack_tlp_threshold_use;
uint8_t rc_allow_data_af_clo: 1,
delayed_ack : 1,
- rc_avail : 6;
+ alloc_limit_reported : 1,
+ rc_avail : 5;
uint8_t r_resv[2]; /* Fill to cache line boundary */
/* Cache line 2 0x40 */
struct rack_control r_ctl;

18
share/security/patches/SA-19:08/rack.patch.asc Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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14
share/xml/advisories.xml
View file

@ -7,6 +7,20 @@
<year>
<name>2019</name>
<month>
<name>6</name>
<day>
<name>19</name>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-19:08.rack</name>
</advisory>
</day>
</month>
<month>
<name>5</name>

13
share/xml/notices.xml
View file

@ -7,6 +7,19 @@
<year>
<name>2019</name>
<month>
<name>6</name>
<day>
<name>19</name>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-19:11.net</name>
</notice>
</day>
</month>
<month>
<name>5</name>