Add 4 latest advisories and 2 latest errata notices:

Fix bsnmpd remote denial of service vulnerability. [SA-14:01]

Fix ntpd distributed reflection Denial of Service vulnerability.
[SA-14:02]

Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [SA-14:03]

Fix BIND remote denial of service vulnerability. [SA-14:04]

Disable hardware RNGs by default. [EN-14:01]

Fix incorrect coalescing of stack entry with mmap. [EN-14:02]
This commit is contained in:
Xin LI 2014-01-14 19:57:49 +00:00
parent 1d54309d42
commit dcb9c59cc2
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=43519
26 changed files with 1369 additions and 0 deletions

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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-14:01.random Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: /dev/random should not make direct usage of hardware RNG
Category: core
Module: random
Announced: 2014-01-14
Affects: All versions of FreeBSD prior to 10.0-BETA1
Corrected: 2014-01-14 19:27:42 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p3)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p10)
2014-01-14 19:27:42 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p7)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p14)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:http://security.freebsd.org/>.
I. Background
The random(4) and urandom(4) devices return an endless supply of pseudo-random
bytes when read. Cryptographic algorithms often depend on the secrecy of these
pseudo-random values for security.
Yarrow is a secure pseudo-random number generator that combines entropy from
several entropy sources, mitigating a possible attack when someone could
predict the output when they are able to intercept one or more of the
entropy sources
II. Problem Description
When a hardware RNG exists, the FreeBSD random(4) and urandom(4) devices
would use their output directly.
III. Impact
Someone who has control over these hardware RNGs would be able to
predicate the output from random(4) and urandom(4) devices and may be able
to reveal unique keys that are used to encrypt data.
IV. Workaround
Disable the hardware RNGs by adding the following settings to /boot/loader.conf
and reboot the system:
hw.nehemiah_rng_enable=0
hw.ivy_rng_enable=0
V. Solution
Hardware RNGs would be disabled by default with this errata notice. They
can be re-enabled by setting the corresponding loader tunables to non-zero
value.
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your present system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 9.2 and 8.4]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:01/random-9.2-8.4.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:01/random-9.2-8.4.patch.asc
# gpg --verify random-9.2-8.4.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 9.1]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:01/random-9.1.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:01/random-9.1.patch.asc
# gpg --verify random-9.1.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 8.3]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:01/random-8.3.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:01/random-8.3.patch.asc
# gpg --verify random-8.3.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
3) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r260644
releng/8.3/ r260647
releng/8.4/ r260647
stable/9/ r260644
releng/9.1/ r260647
releng/9.2/ r260647
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
The latest revision of this Errata Notice is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-14:01.random.asc
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-EN-14:02.mmap Errata Notice
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: mmap should not coalesce stack entry
Category: core
Module: kernel
Announced: 2014-01-14
Credits: Konstantin Belousov
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2013-12-30 08:57:54 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-PRERELEASE)
2013-12-31 08:02:34 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC4)
2013-12-31 08:02:34 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC3-p1)
2013-12-31 08:02:34 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC2-p1)
2013-12-31 08:02:34 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC1-p1)
2013-12-30 09:04:06 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p3)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p10)
2014-01-14 19:33:28 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p7)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p14)
For general information regarding FreeBSD Errata Notices and Security
Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security
branches, and the following sections, please visit
<URL:http://security.freebsd.org/>.
I. Background
The FreeBSD virtual memory system allows growing stack by mapping anonymous
memory region on top of a stack via mmap(2) system call with MAP_STACK bit
enabled in flags parameter.
II. Problem Description
The FreeBSD virtual memory system tries to coalesce adjacent memory regions
into one single object when possible. When growing the stack via mmap(2), it
will also try to coalesce the newly allocated memory into the existing object.
This would result in a failed assertion later in vm_map_stack(), which expects
that a new object is returned.
III. Impact
The system will panic when this happens.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security
branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your present system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:02/mmap.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/EN-14:02/mmap.patch.asc
# gpg --verify mmap.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
3) To update your system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r260645
releng/8.3/ r260647
releng/8.4/ r260647
stable/9/ r260082
releng/9.1/ r260647
releng/9.2/ r260647
stable/10/ r260081
releng/10.0/ r260122
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
The latest revision of this Errata Notice is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-EN-14:02.mmap.asc
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:01.bsnmpd Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: bsnmpd remote denial of service vulnerability
Category: contrib
Module: bsnmp
Announced: 2014-01-14
Credits: Dirk Meyer
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2014-01-14 19:02:14 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-PRERELEASE)
2014-01-14 19:10:38 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE)
2014-01-14 19:10:38 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC5-p1)
2014-01-14 19:10:38 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC4-p1)
2014-01-14 19:10:38 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC3-p1)
2014-01-14 19:10:38 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC2-p1)
2014-01-14 19:10:38 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC1-p1)
2014-01-14 19:17:20 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p3)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p10)
2014-01-14 19:17:20 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p7)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p14)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-1452
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The bsnmpd is a simple and extensible SNMP daemon serves the Internet SNMP
(Simple Network Management Protocol).
II. Problem Description
The bsnmpd(8) daemon is prone to a stack-based buffer-overflow when it
has received a specifically crafted GETBULK PDU request.
III. Impact
This issue could be exploited to execute arbitrary code in the context of
the service daemon, or crash the service daemon, causing a denial-of-service.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems not running bsnmpd(8) are not
vulnerable.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:01/bsnmpd.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:01/bsnmpd.patch.asc
# gpg --verify bsnmpd.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart the bsnmpd(8) daemons, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r260642
releng/8.3/ r260647
releng/8.4/ r260647
stable/9/ r260642
releng/9.1/ r260647
releng/9.2/ r260647
stable/10/ r260638
releng/10.0/ r260640
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<other info on vulnerability>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-1452>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:01.bsnmpd.asc>
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:02.ntpd Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: ntpd distributed reflection Denial of Service vulnerability
Category: contrib
Module: ntpd
Announced: 2014-01-14
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2014-01-14 19:04:33 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-PRERELEASE)
2014-01-14 19:12:40 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RELEASE)
2014-01-14 19:12:40 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC5-p1)
2014-01-14 19:12:40 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC4-p1)
2014-01-14 19:12:40 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC3-p1)
2014-01-14 19:12:40 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC2-p1)
2014-01-14 19:12:40 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC1-p1)
2014-01-14 19:20:41 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p3)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p10)
2014-01-14 19:20:41 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p7)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p14)
CVE Name: CVE-2013-5211
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The ntpd(8) daemon is an implementation of the Network Time Protocol (NTP)
used to synchronize the time of a computer system to a reference time
source.
II. Problem Description
The ntpd(8) daemon supports a query 'monlist' which provides a history of
recent NTP clients without any authentication.
III. Impact
An attacker can send 'monlist' queries and use that as an amplification of
a reflection attack.
IV. Workaround
The administrator can implement one of the following possible workarounds
to mitigate the attack:
1) Restrict access to ntpd(8). This can be done by adding the following
lines to /etc/ntp.conf:
restrict -4 default nomodify nopeer noquery notrap
restrict -6 default nomodify nopeer noquery notrap
restrict 127.0.0.1
restrict -6 ::1
restrict 127.127.1.0
And restart the ntpd(8) daemon. Time service is not affected and the
administrator can still perform queries from local host.
2) Use IP based restrictions in ntpd(8) itself or in IP firewalls to
restrict which systems can access ntpd(8).
3) Replace the base system ntpd(8) with net/ntp-devel (version 4.2.7p76 or
newer)
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:02/ntpd.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:02/ntpd.patch.asc
# gpg --verify ntpd.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart the ntpd(8) daemon, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Note that the patch would disable monitoring features of ntpd(8) daemon
by default. If the feature is desirable, the administrator can choose
to enable it and firewall access to ntpd(8) service.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r260641
releng/8.3/ r260647
releng/8.4/ r260647
stable/9/ r260641
releng/9.1/ r260647
releng/9.2/ r260647
stable/10/ r260639
releng/10.0/ r260641
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hackers-spend-christmas-break-launching-large-scale-ntp-reflection-attacks>
<URL:https://cert.litnet.lt/en/docs/ntp-distributed-reflection-dos-attacks>
<URL:http://bugs.ntp.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-5211>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:02.ntpd.asc>
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Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:03.openssl Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities
Category: contrib
Module: openssl
Announced: 2014-01-14
Affects: FreeBSD 10.0 prior to 10.0-RC5
Corrected: 2014-01-07 20:04:41 UTC (stable/10, 10.0-PRERELEASE)
2014-01-07 20:06:20 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC5)
2014-01-07 20:06:20 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC4-p1)
2014-01-07 20:06:20 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC3-p1)
2014-01-07 20:06:20 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC2-p1)
2014-01-07 20:06:20 UTC (releng/10.0, 10.0-RC1-p1)
CVE Name: CVE-2013-4353, CVE-2013-6449, CVE-2013-6450
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
FreeBSD includes software from the OpenSSL Project. The OpenSSL Project is
a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured
Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3)
and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength
general purpose cryptography library.
II. Problem Description
A carefully crafted invalid TLS handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL
pointer exception. [CVE-2013-4353]
A flaw in DTLS handling can cause an application using OpenSSL and DTLS to
crash. [CVE-2013-6450]
A flaw in OpenSSL can cause an application using OpenSSL to crash when using
TLS version 1.2. [CVE-2013-6449]
III. Impact
An attacker can send a specifically crafted packet that could cause an OpenSSL
enabled application to crash, resulting in a Denial of Service.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:03/openssl.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:03/openssl.patch.asc
# gpg --verify openssl.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart all deamons using the library, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/10/ r260404
releng/10.0/ r260405
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-4353>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-6449>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-6450>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:03.openssl.asc>
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Hash: SHA512
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-14:04.bind Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: BIND remote denial of service vulnerability
Category: contrib
Module: bind
Announced: 2014-01-14
Credits: ISC
Affects: FreeBSD 8.x and FreeBSD 9.x
Corrected: 2014-01-14 19:38:37 UTC (stable/9, 9.2-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.2, 9.2-RELEASE-p3)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p10)
2014-01-14 19:38:37 UTC (stable/8, 8.4-STABLE)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.4, 8.4-RELEASE-p7)
2014-01-14 19:42:28 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p14)
CVE Name: CVE-2014-0591
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols.
The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server.
II. Problem Description
Because of a defect in handling queries for NSEC3-signed zones, BIND can
crash with an "INSIST" failure in name.c when processing queries possessing
certain properties. This issue only affects authoritative nameservers with
at least one NSEC3-signed zone. Recursive-only servers are not at risk.
III. Impact
An attacker who can send a specially crafted query could cause named(8)
to crash, resulting in a denial of service.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems not running authoritative DNS service
with at least one NSEC3-signed zone using named(8) are not vulnerable.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 8.3, 8.4, 9.1, 9.2-RELEASE and 8.4-STABLE]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:04/bind-release.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:04/bind-release.patch.asc
# gpg --verify bind-release.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 9.2-STABLE]
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:04/bind-stable-9.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-14:04/bind-stable-9.patch.asc
# gpg --verify bind-stable-9.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each
affected branch.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/8/ r260646
releng/8.3/ r260647
releng/8.4/ r260647
stable/9/ r260646
releng/9.1/ r260647
releng/9.2/ r260647
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the
following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a
machine with Subversion installed:
# svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base
Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number:
<URL:http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=NNNNNN>
VII. References
<URL:https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01078>
<URL:http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0591>
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
<URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-14:04.bind.asc>
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View file

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
Index: sys/dev/random/probe.c
===================================================================
--- sys/dev/random/probe.c (revision 260523)
+++ sys/dev/random/probe.c (working copy)
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/selinfo.h>
@@ -57,7 +59,12 @@ random_ident_hardware(struct random_systat *systat
/* Then go looking for hardware */
#if defined(__i386__) && !defined(PC98)
if (via_feature_rng & VIA_HAS_RNG) {
- *systat = random_nehemiah;
+ int enable;
+
+ enable = 0;
+ TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("hw.nehemiah_rng_enable", &enable);
+ if (enable)
+ *systat = random_nehemiah;
}
#endif
}

View file

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@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
Index: sys/dev/random/probe.c
===================================================================
--- sys/dev/random/probe.c (revision 260523)
+++ sys/dev/random/probe.c (working copy)
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/selinfo.h>
@@ -57,7 +59,12 @@ random_ident_hardware(struct random_systat *systat
/* Then go looking for hardware */
#if defined(__amd64__) || (defined(__i386__) && !defined(PC98))
if (via_feature_rng & VIA_HAS_RNG) {
- *systat = random_nehemiah;
+ int enable;
+
+ enable = 0;
+ TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("hw.nehemiah_rng_enable", &enable);
+ if (enable)
+ *systat = random_nehemiah;
}
#endif
}

View file

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View file

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
Index: sys/dev/random/probe.c
===================================================================
--- sys/dev/random/probe.c (revision 259661)
+++ sys/dev/random/probe.c (working copy)
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
if (via_feature_rng & VIA_HAS_RNG) {
int enable;
- enable = 1;
+ enable = 0;
TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("hw.nehemiah_rng_enable", &enable);
if (enable)
*systat = random_nehemiah;
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
if (cpu_feature2 & CPUID2_RDRAND) {
int enable;
- enable = 1;
+ enable = 0;
TUNABLE_INT_FETCH("hw.ivy_rng_enable", &enable);
if (enable)
*systat = random_ivy;

View file

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Index: sys/vm/vm_map.c
===================================================================
--- sys/vm/vm_map.c (revision 259950)
+++ sys/vm/vm_map.c (revision 259951)
@@ -1207,6 +1207,7 @@ charged:
}
else if ((prev_entry != &map->header) &&
(prev_entry->eflags == protoeflags) &&
+ (cow & (MAP_ENTRY_GROWS_DOWN | MAP_ENTRY_GROWS_UP)) == 0 &&
(prev_entry->end == start) &&
(prev_entry->wired_count == 0) &&
(prev_entry->cred == cred ||
@@ -3339,7 +3340,6 @@ vm_map_stack(vm_map_t map, vm_offset_t addrbos, vm
* NOTE: We explicitly allow bi-directional stacks.
*/
orient = cow & (MAP_STACK_GROWS_DOWN|MAP_STACK_GROWS_UP);
- cow &= ~orient;
KASSERT(orient != 0, ("No stack grow direction"));
if (addrbos < vm_map_min(map) ||

View file

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@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
Index: contrib/bsnmp/lib/snmpagent.c
===================================================================
--- contrib/bsnmp/lib/snmpagent.c (revision 259661)
+++ contrib/bsnmp/lib/snmpagent.c (working copy)
@@ -488,6 +488,11 @@ snmp_getbulk(struct snmp_pdu *pdu, struct asn_buf
for (cnt = 0; cnt < pdu->error_index; cnt++) {
eomib = 1;
for (i = non_rep; i < pdu->nbindings; i++) {
+
+ if (resp->nbindings == SNMP_MAX_BINDINGS)
+ /* PDU is full */
+ goto done;
+
if (cnt == 0)
result = do_getnext(&context, &pdu->bindings[i],
&resp->bindings[resp->nbindings], pdu);

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View file

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
Index: contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_config.c
===================================================================
--- contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_config.c (revision 259828)
+++ contrib/ntp/ntpd/ntp_config.c (working copy)
@@ -597,6 +597,8 @@ getconfig(
#endif /* not SYS_WINNT */
}
+ proto_config(PROTO_MONITOR, 0, 0., NULL);
+
for (;;) {
if (tok == CONFIG_END)
break;

View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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View file

@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 260378)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy)
@@ -214,6 +214,12 @@ dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int
static void
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
{
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
+ }
if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c (revision 260378)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_both.c (working copy)
@@ -208,7 +208,11 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
{
const char *sender;
int slen;
-
+ /* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will
+ * set the appropriate error.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ return;
if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
{
sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c (revision 260378)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_lib.c (working copy)
@@ -4274,7 +4274,7 @@ need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
{
long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ if (s->method->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
return alg2;
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (revision 260378)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_locl.h (working copy)
@@ -621,6 +621,8 @@ extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data;
extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data;
extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data;
+#define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+
#define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, func_name, s_accept, s_connect, \
s_get_meth) \
const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c (revision 260378)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c (working copy)
@@ -414,15 +414,20 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
else
s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
reuse_dd = 1;
- else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
+ else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
+ dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ {
+ mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (!mac_ctx)
+ goto err;
+ s->write_hash = mac_ctx;
+ }
else
- /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
- dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
- mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
+ mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->compress != NULL)
{

View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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View file

@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
Index: contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c
===================================================================
--- contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c (revision 260523)
+++ contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c (working copy)
@@ -3622,8 +3622,7 @@ query_findclosestnsec3(dns_name_t *qname, dns_db_t
dns_fixedname_t fixed;
dns_hash_t hash;
dns_name_t name;
- int order;
- unsigned int count;
+ unsigned int skip = 0, labels;
dns_rdata_nsec3_t nsec3;
dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
isc_boolean_t optout;
@@ -3636,6 +3635,7 @@ query_findclosestnsec3(dns_name_t *qname, dns_db_t
dns_name_init(&name, NULL);
dns_name_clone(qname, &name);
+ labels = dns_name_countlabels(&name);
/*
* Map unknown algorithm to known value.
@@ -3667,13 +3667,14 @@ query_findclosestnsec3(dns_name_t *qname, dns_db_t
dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
optout = ISC_TF((nsec3.flags & DNS_NSEC3FLAG_OPTOUT) != 0);
if (found != NULL && optout &&
- dns_name_fullcompare(&name, dns_db_origin(db), &order,
- &count) == dns_namereln_subdomain) {
+ dns_name_issubdomain(&name, dns_db_origin(db)))
+ {
dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
- count = dns_name_countlabels(&name) - 1;
- dns_name_getlabelsequence(&name, 1, count, &name);
+ skip++;
+ dns_name_getlabelsequence(qname, skip, labels - skip,
+ &name);
ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_DNSSEC,
NS_LOGMODULE_QUERY, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
"looking for closest provable encloser");
@@ -3691,7 +3692,11 @@ query_findclosestnsec3(dns_name_t *qname, dns_db_t
ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_DNSSEC,
NS_LOGMODULE_QUERY, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
"expected covering NSEC3, got an exact match");
- if (found != NULL)
+ if (found == qname) {
+ if (skip != 0U)
+ dns_name_getlabelsequence(qname, skip, labels - skip,
+ found);
+ } else if (found != NULL)
dns_name_copy(&name, found, NULL);
return;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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View file

@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
Index: contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c
===================================================================
--- contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c (revision 260523)
+++ contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c (working copy)
@@ -5260,8 +5260,7 @@ query_findclosestnsec3(dns_name_t *qname, dns_db_t
dns_fixedname_t fixed;
dns_hash_t hash;
dns_name_t name;
- int order;
- unsigned int count;
+ unsigned int skip = 0, labels;
dns_rdata_nsec3_t nsec3;
dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
isc_boolean_t optout;
@@ -5276,6 +5275,7 @@ query_findclosestnsec3(dns_name_t *qname, dns_db_t
dns_name_init(&name, NULL);
dns_name_clone(qname, &name);
+ labels = dns_name_countlabels(&name);
dns_clientinfomethods_init(&cm, ns_client_sourceip);
dns_clientinfo_init(&ci, client);
@@ -5309,13 +5309,14 @@ query_findclosestnsec3(dns_name_t *qname, dns_db_t
dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
optout = ISC_TF((nsec3.flags & DNS_NSEC3FLAG_OPTOUT) != 0);
if (found != NULL && optout &&
- dns_name_fullcompare(&name, dns_db_origin(db), &order,
- &count) == dns_namereln_subdomain) {
+ dns_name_issubdomain(&name, dns_db_origin(db)))
+ {
dns_rdataset_disassociate(rdataset);
if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(sigrdataset))
dns_rdataset_disassociate(sigrdataset);
- count = dns_name_countlabels(&name) - 1;
- dns_name_getlabelsequence(&name, 1, count, &name);
+ skip++;
+ dns_name_getlabelsequence(qname, skip, labels - skip,
+ &name);
ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_DNSSEC,
NS_LOGMODULE_QUERY, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
"looking for closest provable encloser");
@@ -5333,7 +5334,11 @@ query_findclosestnsec3(dns_name_t *qname, dns_db_t
ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_DNSSEC,
NS_LOGMODULE_QUERY, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
"expected covering NSEC3, got an exact match");
- if (found != NULL)
+ if (found == qname) {
+ if (skip != 0U)
+ dns_name_getlabelsequence(qname, skip, labels - skip,
+ found);
+ } else if (found != NULL)
dns_name_copy(&name, found, NULL);
return;
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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View file

@ -4,6 +4,35 @@
$FreeBSD$
</cvs:keyword>
<year>
<name>2014</name>
<month>
<name>1</name>
<day>
<name>14</name>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-14:01.bsnmpd</name>
</advisory>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-14:02.ntpd</name>
</advisory>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-14:03.openssl</name>
</advisory>
<advisory>
<name>FreeBSD-SA-14:04.bind</name>
</advisory>
</day>
</month>
</year>
<year>
<name>2013</name>

View file

@ -4,6 +4,26 @@
$FreeBSD$
</cvs:keyword>
<year>
<name>2014</name>
<month>
<name>1</name>
<day>
<name>14</name>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-14:01.random</name>
</notice>
<notice>
<name>FreeBSD-EN-14:02.mmap</name>
</notice>
</day>
</month>
</year>
<year>
<name>2013</name>