Add latest security advisories:

Fix Denial of Service vulnerability in named(8) with DNS64. [13:01]

  Fix Denial of Service vulnerability in libc's glob(3) functionality.
  [13:02]

Security:	CVE-2012-5688
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind
Security:	CVE-2010-2632
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc
This commit is contained in:
Bjoern A. Zeeb 2013-02-19 13:56:49 +00:00
parent 97cfdd6ed0
commit fef748c3be
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=41014
7 changed files with 503 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: BIND remote DoS with deliberately crafted DNS64 query
Category: contrib
Module: bind
Announced: 2013-02-19
Affects: FreeBSD 9.x and later
Corrected: 2013-01-08 09:05:09 UTC (stable/9, 9.1-STABLE)
2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.0, 9.0-RELEASE-p6)
2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p1)
CVE Name: CVE-2012-5688
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols.
The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server.
DNS64 is an IPv6 transition mechanism that will return a synthesized
AAAA response even if there is only an A record available.
II. Problem Description
Due to a software defect a crafted query can cause named(8) to crash
with an assertion failure.
III. Impact
If named(8) is configured to use DNS64, an attacker who can send it a
query can cause named(8) to crash, resulting in a denial of service.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available, but systems not configured to use DNS64
using the "dns64" configuration statement are not vulnerable. DNS64
is not enabled in the default configuration on FreeBSD.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc
# gpg --verify bind.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system.
4) Alternatively, install and run BIND from the Ports Collection after
the correction date. The following versions and newer versions of
BIND installed from the Ports Collection are not affected by this
vulnerability:
bind98-9.8.4.1
bind99-9.9.2.1
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/9/ r245163
releng/9.0/ r246989
releng/9.1/ r246989
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00828
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-5688
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD)
iEYEARECAAYFAlEjf8MACgkQFdaIBMps37JUigCeIvjGL59H2froSeFqfPvlzM7L
XpAAni7nW5GZt4AE3eSDQwE4ivCne6SK
=Rxq4
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

View file

@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: glob(3) related resource exhaustion
Category: core
Module: libc
Announced: 2013-02-19
Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
Corrected: 2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/7, 7.4-STABLE)
2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/7.4, 7.4-RELEASE-p12)
2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/8, 8.3-STABLE)
2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p6)
2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/9, 9.1-STABLE)
2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.0, 9.0-RELEASE-p6)
2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p1)
CVE Name: CVE-2010-2632
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The glob(3) function is a pathname generator that implements the rules for
file name pattern matching used by the shell.
II. Problem Description
GLOB_LIMIT is supposed to limit the number of paths to prevent against
memory or CPU attacks. The implementation however is insufficient.
III. Impact
An attacker that is able to exploit this vulnerability could cause excessive
memory or CPU usage, resulting in a Denial of Service. A common target for
a remote attacker could be ftpd(8).
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
FreeBSD release branches.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc
# gpg --verify libc.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
Restart all daemons, or reboot the system.
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
# freebsd-update fetch
# freebsd-update install
Restart all daemons, or reboot the system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch/path Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
stable/7/ r246357
releng/7.4/ r246989
stable/8/ r246357
releng/8.3/ r246989
stable/9/ r246357
releng/9.0/ r246989
releng/9.1/ r246989
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-2632
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD)
iEYEARECAAYFAlEjf80ACgkQFdaIBMps37JFUgCfUrw8Ky4U19COja6fna49Calv
z/YAn1JSGxzHCo8vLj4XhtXqrQt68or4
=mCPv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----