Add latest security advisories:
Fix Denial of Service vulnerability in named(8) with DNS64. [13:01] Fix Denial of Service vulnerability in libc's glob(3) functionality. [13:02] Security: CVE-2012-5688 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind Security: CVE-2010-2632 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc
This commit is contained in:
Bjoern A. Zeeb
parent
97cfdd6ed0
commit
fef748c3be
Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=41014
7 changed files with 503 additions and 0 deletions
122
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc
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122
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc
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@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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Hash: SHA1
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=============================================================================
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FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind Security Advisory
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The FreeBSD Project
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Topic: BIND remote DoS with deliberately crafted DNS64 query
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Category: contrib
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Module: bind
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Announced: 2013-02-19
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Affects: FreeBSD 9.x and later
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Corrected: 2013-01-08 09:05:09 UTC (stable/9, 9.1-STABLE)
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2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.0, 9.0-RELEASE-p6)
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2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p1)
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CVE Name: CVE-2012-5688
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For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
|
||||||
|
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
|
||||||
|
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
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I. Background
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BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols.
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The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server.
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DNS64 is an IPv6 transition mechanism that will return a synthesized
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AAAA response even if there is only an A record available.
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II. Problem Description
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Due to a software defect a crafted query can cause named(8) to crash
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with an assertion failure.
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III. Impact
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If named(8) is configured to use DNS64, an attacker who can send it a
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query can cause named(8) to crash, resulting in a denial of service.
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IV. Workaround
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No workaround is available, but systems not configured to use DNS64
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using the "dns64" configuration statement are not vulnerable. DNS64
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is not enabled in the default configuration on FreeBSD.
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V. Solution
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Perform one of the following:
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1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
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release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
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Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system.
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2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
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The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
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|
FreeBSD release branches.
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|
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a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
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|
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc
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# gpg --verify bind.patch.asc
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b) Execute the following commands as root:
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# cd /usr/src
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# patch < /path/to/patch
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Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
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described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
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Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system.
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3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
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Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
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|
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
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# freebsd-update fetch
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# freebsd-update install
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Restart the named(8) daemon, or reboot your system.
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4) Alternatively, install and run BIND from the Ports Collection after
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the correction date. The following versions and newer versions of
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BIND installed from the Ports Collection are not affected by this
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vulnerability:
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bind98-9.8.4.1
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bind99-9.9.2.1
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VI. Correction details
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The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
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|
corrected in FreeBSD.
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Branch/path Revision
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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stable/9/ r245163
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releng/9.0/ r246989
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releng/9.1/ r246989
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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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VII. References
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https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00828
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http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-5688
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The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind.asc
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD)
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iEYEARECAAYFAlEjf8MACgkQFdaIBMps37JUigCeIvjGL59H2froSeFqfPvlzM7L
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XpAAni7nW5GZt4AE3eSDQwE4ivCne6SK
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=Rxq4
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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114
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc
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114
share/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc
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@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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Hash: SHA1
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=============================================================================
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FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc Security Advisory
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The FreeBSD Project
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Topic: glob(3) related resource exhaustion
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Category: core
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Module: libc
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Announced: 2013-02-19
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Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD.
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Corrected: 2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/7, 7.4-STABLE)
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2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/7.4, 7.4-RELEASE-p12)
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2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/8, 8.3-STABLE)
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2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/8.3, 8.3-RELEASE-p6)
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2013-02-05 09:53:32 UTC (stable/9, 9.1-STABLE)
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2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.0, 9.0-RELEASE-p6)
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2013-02-19 13:27:20 UTC (releng/9.1, 9.1-RELEASE-p1)
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CVE Name: CVE-2010-2632
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|
|
||||||
|
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
|
||||||
|
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
|
||||||
|
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
|
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|
|
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|
I. Background
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The glob(3) function is a pathname generator that implements the rules for
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file name pattern matching used by the shell.
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II. Problem Description
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GLOB_LIMIT is supposed to limit the number of paths to prevent against
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memory or CPU attacks. The implementation however is insufficient.
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III. Impact
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An attacker that is able to exploit this vulnerability could cause excessive
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memory or CPU usage, resulting in a Denial of Service. A common target for
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a remote attacker could be ftpd(8).
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IV. Workaround
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|
No workaround is available.
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|
V. Solution
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Perform one of the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or
|
||||||
|
release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable
|
||||||
|
FreeBSD release branches.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
|
||||||
|
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch
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# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc
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# gpg --verify libc.patch.asc
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|
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b) Execute the following commands as root:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# cd /usr/src
|
||||||
|
# patch < /path/to/patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as
|
||||||
|
described in <URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/makeworld.html>.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Restart all daemons, or reboot the system.
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|
|
||||||
|
3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64
|
||||||
|
platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# freebsd-update fetch
|
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|
# freebsd-update install
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|
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Restart all daemons, or reboot the system.
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|
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||||||
|
VI. Correction details
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||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
|
||||||
|
corrected in FreeBSD.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Branch/path Revision
|
||||||
|
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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|
stable/7/ r246357
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releng/7.4/ r246989
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stable/8/ r246357
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releng/8.3/ r246989
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stable/9/ r246357
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|
releng/9.0/ r246989
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|
releng/9.1/ r246989
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|
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
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VII. References
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http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-2632
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The latest revision of this advisory is available at
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http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc.asc
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD)
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iEYEARECAAYFAlEjf80ACgkQFdaIBMps37JFUgCfUrw8Ky4U19COja6fna49Calv
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z/YAn1JSGxzHCo8vLj4XhtXqrQt68or4
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=mCPv
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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18
share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch
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18
share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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Index: contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c
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===================================================================
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--- contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c
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+++ contrib/bind9/bin/named/query.c
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@@ -5183,10 +5183,12 @@
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isc_result_t result;
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isc_uint32_t ttl = ISC_UINT32_MAX;
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+ dns_rdataset_init(&rdataset);
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+
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result = dns_db_getoriginnode(db, &node);
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if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
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goto cleanup;
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- dns_rdataset_init(&rdataset);
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+
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result = dns_db_findrdataset(db, node, version, dns_rdatatype_soa,
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0, 0, &rdataset, NULL);
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if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
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7
share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc
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7
share/security/patches/SA-13:01/bind.patch.asc
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD)
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iEYEABECAAYFAlEjf/cACgkQFdaIBMps37LjHwCfQ0g0m9lvCY/AZmzYq6NfupNU
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cjQAn1ovam14yAE0+WT3FAhOM0lr7INw
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=gwXh
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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215
share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch
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215
share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
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Index: lib/libc/gen/glob.c
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===================================================================
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--- lib/libc/gen/glob.c (revision 246357)
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+++ lib/libc/gen/glob.c (working copy)
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@@ -94,6 +94,25 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include "collate.h"
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+/*
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+ * glob(3) expansion limits. Stop the expansion if any of these limits
|
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+ * is reached. This caps the runtime in the face of DoS attacks. See
|
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+ * also CVE-2010-2632
|
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|
+ */
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+#define GLOB_LIMIT_BRACE 128 /* number of brace calls */
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+#define GLOB_LIMIT_PATH 65536 /* number of path elements */
|
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+#define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384 /* number of readdirs */
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+#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 1024 /* number of stat system calls */
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+#define GLOB_LIMIT_STRING ARG_MAX /* maximum total size for paths */
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+
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+struct glob_limit {
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+ size_t l_brace_cnt;
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+ size_t l_path_lim;
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+ size_t l_readdir_cnt;
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|
+ size_t l_stat_cnt;
|
||||||
|
+ size_t l_string_cnt;
|
||||||
|
+};
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|
+
|
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|
#define DOLLAR '$'
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#define DOT '.'
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#define EOS '\0'
|
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@@ -153,15 +172,18 @@ static const Char *g_strchr(const Char *, wchar_t)
|
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static Char *g_strcat(Char *, const Char *);
|
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|
#endif
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|
static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
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|
-static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
|
||||||
|
-static int glob1(Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
|
||||||
|
-static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
|
||||||
|
-static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
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|
-static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
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-static const Char *
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+static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_limit *);
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+static int glob1(Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_limit *);
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|
+static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *,
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+ struct glob_limit *);
|
||||||
|
+static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, glob_t *,
|
||||||
|
+ struct glob_limit *);
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||||||
|
+static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_limit *);
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||||||
|
+static const Char *
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|
globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *);
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-static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, size_t *);
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|
-static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *, size_t *);
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||||||
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+static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_limit *);
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|
+static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, int *,
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+ struct glob_limit *);
|
||||||
|
static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *);
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#ifdef DEBUG
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|
static void qprintf(const char *, Char *);
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@@ -171,8 +193,8 @@ int
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||||||
|
glob(const char * __restrict pattern, int flags,
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||||||
|
int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t * __restrict pglob)
|
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|
{
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||||||
|
+ struct glob_limit limit = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
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|
const char *patnext;
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|
- size_t limit;
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||||||
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Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN], prot;
|
||||||
|
mbstate_t mbs;
|
||||||
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wchar_t wc;
|
||||||
|
@@ -186,11 +208,10 @@ glob(const char * __restrict pattern, int flags,
|
||||||
|
pglob->gl_offs = 0;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if (flags & GLOB_LIMIT) {
|
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|
- limit = pglob->gl_matchc;
|
||||||
|
- if (limit == 0)
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||||||
|
- limit = ARG_MAX;
|
||||||
|
- } else
|
||||||
|
- limit = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ limit.l_path_lim = pglob->gl_matchc;
|
||||||
|
+ if (limit.l_path_lim == 0)
|
||||||
|
+ limit.l_path_lim = GLOB_LIMIT_PATH;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
|
||||||
|
pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
|
||||||
|
pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
|
||||||
|
@@ -243,11 +264,17 @@ glob(const char * __restrict pattern, int flags,
|
||||||
|
* characters
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
static int
|
||||||
|
-globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit)
|
||||||
|
+globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
const Char* ptr = pattern;
|
||||||
|
int rv;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
|
||||||
|
+ limit->l_brace_cnt++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_BRACE) {
|
||||||
|
+ errno = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ return (GLOB_NOSPACE);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
|
||||||
|
if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
|
||||||
|
return glob0(pattern, pglob, limit);
|
||||||
|
@@ -266,7 +293,8 @@ static int
|
||||||
|
* If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
static int
|
||||||
|
-globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, int *rv, size_t *limit)
|
||||||
|
+globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, int *rv,
|
||||||
|
+ struct glob_limit *limit)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
int i;
|
||||||
|
Char *lm, *ls;
|
||||||
|
@@ -436,7 +464,7 @@ globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_
|
||||||
|
* if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
static int
|
||||||
|
-glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit)
|
||||||
|
+glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
const Char *qpatnext;
|
||||||
|
int err;
|
||||||
|
@@ -529,7 +557,7 @@ compare(const void *p, const void *q)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
static int
|
||||||
|
-glob1(Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit)
|
||||||
|
+glob1(Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@@ -547,7 +575,7 @@ static int
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
static int
|
||||||
|
glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, Char *pattern,
|
||||||
|
- glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit)
|
||||||
|
+ glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
struct stat sb;
|
||||||
|
Char *p, *q;
|
||||||
|
@@ -563,6 +591,15 @@ glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_
|
||||||
|
if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
|
||||||
|
return(0);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
|
||||||
|
+ limit->l_stat_cnt++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) {
|
||||||
|
+ errno = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ if (pathend + 1 > pathend_last)
|
||||||
|
+ return (GLOB_ABORTED);
|
||||||
|
+ *pathend++ = SEP;
|
||||||
|
+ *pathend = EOS;
|
||||||
|
+ return (GLOB_NOSPACE);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
|
||||||
|
pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)
|
||||||
|
|| (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
|
||||||
|
@@ -606,7 +643,7 @@ glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_
|
||||||
|
static int
|
||||||
|
glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
|
||||||
|
Char *pattern, Char *restpattern,
|
||||||
|
- glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit)
|
||||||
|
+ glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
struct dirent *dp;
|
||||||
|
DIR *dirp;
|
||||||
|
@@ -652,6 +689,19 @@ glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_
|
||||||
|
size_t clen;
|
||||||
|
mbstate_t mbs;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
|
||||||
|
+ limit->l_readdir_cnt++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) {
|
||||||
|
+ errno = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ if (pathend + 1 > pathend_last)
|
||||||
|
+ err = GLOB_ABORTED;
|
||||||
|
+ else {
|
||||||
|
+ *pathend++ = SEP;
|
||||||
|
+ *pathend = EOS;
|
||||||
|
+ err = GLOB_NOSPACE;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+ break;
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
+
|
||||||
|
/* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
|
||||||
|
if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
|
||||||
|
continue;
|
||||||
|
@@ -702,14 +752,15 @@ glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_
|
||||||
|
* gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
|
||||||
|
*/
|
||||||
|
static int
|
||||||
|
-globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, size_t *limit)
|
||||||
|
+globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_limit *limit)
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
char **pathv;
|
||||||
|
size_t i, newsize, len;
|
||||||
|
char *copy;
|
||||||
|
const Char *p;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- if (*limit && pglob->gl_pathc > *limit) {
|
||||||
|
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
|
||||||
|
+ pglob->gl_matchc > limit->l_path_lim) {
|
||||||
|
errno = 0;
|
||||||
|
return (GLOB_NOSPACE);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
@@ -737,6 +788,12 @@ static int
|
||||||
|
for (p = path; *p++;)
|
||||||
|
continue;
|
||||||
|
len = MB_CUR_MAX * (size_t)(p - path); /* XXX overallocation */
|
||||||
|
+ limit->l_string_cnt += len;
|
||||||
|
+ if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
|
||||||
|
+ limit->l_string_cnt >= GLOB_LIMIT_STRING) {
|
||||||
|
+ errno = 0;
|
||||||
|
+ return (GLOB_NOSPACE);
|
||||||
|
+ }
|
||||||
|
if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
|
||||||
|
if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
|
||||||
|
free(copy);
|
||||||
7
share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc
Normal file
7
share/security/patches/SA-13:02/libc.patch.asc
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||||
|
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||||
|
Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (FreeBSD)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
iEYEABECAAYFAlEjf/0ACgkQFdaIBMps37Kw1ACfX+M73KQtFkdrAhFWVyVm2G44
|
||||||
|
DLYAn2SoJT4c98Frj75ttappPsvFDgVk
|
||||||
|
=H9Gv
|
||||||
|
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
||||||
|
|
@ -4,6 +4,26 @@
|
||||||
$FreeBSD$
|
$FreeBSD$
|
||||||
</cvs:keyword>
|
</cvs:keyword>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<year>
|
||||||
|
<name>2013</name>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<month>
|
||||||
|
<name>2</name>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<day>
|
||||||
|
<name>19</name>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<advisory>
|
||||||
|
<name>FreeBSD-SA-13:02.libc</name>
|
||||||
|
</advisory>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<advisory>
|
||||||
|
<name>FreeBSD-SA-13:01.bind</name>
|
||||||
|
</advisory>
|
||||||
|
</day>
|
||||||
|
</month>
|
||||||
|
</year>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<year>
|
<year>
|
||||||
<name>2012</name>
|
<name>2012</name>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue