doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/captions/2009/asiabsdcon/allman-internetmail.sbv

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so its time to move on to the next talk

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this talk has the keynote speech 

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by Eric Allman

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Chief Science Officer

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of Sendmail

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and I think that internet mail past present and bit of future

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I will introduce

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his biography

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Eric Allman is the original author of Sendmail and
longtime contributor to partial index

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he also wrote ending lock roads C-twelve lock identification 

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beside external Sendmail he has worked with database management

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systems and

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and neural

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network based speech recognition

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system administration and networking

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he is chief science officer and co-founder of 

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Sendmail

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incorporated

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before joining Sendmail

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he served as CEO  

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for Swift

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inc. which is now part of 247 Media Inc. 

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he was with the lovern 

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and provided the whole scale research software infrastructure
for most of the projects at University of Berkeley

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he has contributed as senior 

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at the international computer science institute

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to neural network systems and

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ihe was also part

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of Ingress 

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invasion of system

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and only co-authored the advisor for

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Unix magazine and was a member of

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the board of directors at Unix association

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he has currently program chair

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for the conference on e-mail and spam and
member of ACM Queue editorial board

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and the board of

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trustee of call performances

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he holds a Master of science degree in
computer science from University of California Berkeley

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so please

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make sure, can everyone hear me clearly?

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okay. I'm going to give you a little bit of

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well actually quite a bit of history about

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 e-mail and related technologies starting
really from

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before the internet existed

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this talk that I gave a couple of years
ago and although there's a lot of slides I'm going to

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try and go through it fairly quickly because the
more interesting

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current stuff is

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towards the end. The current stuff will be

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some observations about spam

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 and e-mail security in general

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and the authentication and reputation which is
what I've been working on most recently

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then I'm going to give you some everyone always
wants to know what I think  will be the future

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of e-mail and I always tell them I don't know
any better than they do but they insist on

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having me tell them so I'll come up with a few
things there

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I've thrown in some stuff by the way about

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 some other things that people have asked me
about here so I'm 

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trying to adjust the talk to be

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of 

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interest to 

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what people seem to want to hear

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so first I want to talk about the
prehistory of

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of the internet really this is the Arpanet 

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starting from zero hosts

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on the network to two hundred and thirteen which
is where the Arpanet

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peaked out it couldn't go much larger than
two hundred thirteen because

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there was only an eight bit

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host address

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I

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I'm going to talk, plotting things on this kind of graph

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this is date down at the bottom and the number of
hosts on the side

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this is a one year scale. I'll keep readjusting the
scale as we move up

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otherwise this is just a flat line down at the bottom

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so yes you can

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so this is kind of one thing to start of
the history of e-mail

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but it turns out this is

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about an awful lot of things I just want to
read you a quote

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that describes this event in December

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well

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on December 9, 1968 Dirk Engelbar

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who by the way who invented the computer mouse

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and with a group of seventeen researchers
working with him in the augmentation

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research center at Stanford research institute
in Menlo Park, California

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presented a ninety-minute live public demonstration
of the on-line system nls

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that they'd been working on since 1962

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the public presentation was a session of the
fall short of computer conference hall at

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the convention center in San Francisco

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and was attended by about one thousand computer
professionals

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this was the public 

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debut of the computer mouse

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but the mouse of the only one of many innovations
demonstrated that day including hypertext, object

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address and dynamic file linking

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as well as shared screen collaboration involving
two persons of different sites

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communicating over a network with audio and
video interface

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Okay imagine that day

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no network exists

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at all

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and they're doing a remote demo with

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audio and video

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they're interacting doing screen sharing
over the internet, they're showing off the mouse for

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the first time that nobody's ever seen

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and he throws in stuff like hypertext and what not

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I can only wish I was there that must have been amazing

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the point I made of course is that

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back in 1968

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they were demoing stuff that we only
recently got on the internet

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we havent really come that far

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so in September 1969

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the first Arpanet

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was

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brought up, September second nineteen sixty nine to be
precise which happens to be my birthday

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that was a single host at UCLA

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which is a little odd because you think of most
networks as having at least two hosts on them

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but

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for a while there was actually only one host on the Arpanet 

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this is a very smudged map of the original Arpanet


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they had this thing called the IMP the
Internet Message Processor

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which was essentially the routers that

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but they 

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gather the data around the

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Arpanet which wasn't particularly difficult
in this case but

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it became so later and then a

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single host which was a Sigma 7. this is obviously
by the way somebody's hand drawn

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slide that was done with those ink that gets
easily smudged when you

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put your inside of your hand on it

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so  fortunately

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that one host 
a month added at SRI

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university of California Santa barbara and
the university of Utah

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which gave us a map like this

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so you can see 

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the round things here are the IMPs there's
four of them

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and each one of them has exactly one host  

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hanging off of it

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you could have up to four hosts connected to a single IMP

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so kind of a mini star topology.

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this is actually very important look at this
because it's already

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an arbitrary

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networks topology. its not a star configuration
its not a ring configuration

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its essentially arbitrary

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hookup

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and that actually

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is something that we had  

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that industry had to rediscover as well

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the other thing

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that knows is that there is

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Magnium three sixteen 

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a Sigma 7, an XDS nine fourteen

0:07:55.669,0:07:57.969
and a PDP ten  there were no

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two identical architectures on the first
Arpanet

0:08:01.449,0:08:05.309
it was designed right from the start to
be headed off tramps

0:08:05.309,0:08:07.229
this was untrue of

0:08:07.229,0:08:09.449
any network that you saw

0:08:09.449,0:08:11.259
 up until

0:08:11.259,0:08:13.100
 any other network

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for example

0:08:14.770,0:08:17.749
Microsoft networks always assume you're running
windows

0:08:17.749,0:08:19.220
on the program

0:08:19.220,0:08:19.939
hardware

0:08:19.939,0:08:23.659
the Arpanet had a totally different view

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now here's just kind of a humor

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picture did

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this is John Pasto sorry it's not very good  

0:08:32.269,0:08:33.699
Steve Carcker

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and Vint Cert

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I have no idea what the pickles are
about

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but I do think it's interesting that here
are probably the three people who were

0:08:44.500,0:08:46.470
but fathers of the internet

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and they couldn't even get it right

0:08:48.690,0:08:55.690
they've got  outputs connected to outputs and inputs to inputs

0:08:58.030,0:08:59.510
so wasn't

0:08:59.510,0:09:02.270
all that long

0:09:02.270,0:09:07.740
before the network was quite a bit bigger
this has gone cross country now

0:09:07.740,0:09:09.560
we should point out

0:09:09.560,0:09:11.350
these links

0:09:11.350,0:09:14.620
were really really fast data links

0:09:14.620,0:09:18.830
fifty six kilobytes per second 

0:09:18.830,0:09:22.230
and they cost a fortune

0:09:22.230,0:09:23.620
so fact

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that they started off in one little cluster
together on the west coast was just to 

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save costs as much as anything

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but by September they had spread out

0:09:32.310,0:09:34.000
quite a bit now

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the Arpanet was designed

0:09:35.430,0:09:36.510
to

0:09:36.510,0:09:38.880
share expensive resources

0:09:38.880,0:09:40.040
so

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lots of universities wanted to have their
own computer

0:09:43.450,0:09:45.990
but computers were too expensive

0:09:45.990,0:09:47.580
so they could put in

0:09:47.580,0:09:49.830
 small machines

0:09:49.830,0:09:51.050
that could

0:09:51.050,0:09:54.149
you could connect to the larger machines with
over the net

0:09:54.149,0:09:59.130
and so the two primary protocols of the time
were Telnet and FTP

0:09:59.130,0:10:00.660
e-mail was not

0:10:00.660,0:10:01.960
even considered

0:10:01.960,0:10:06.960
in the original design of the Arpanet

0:10:06.960,0:10:10.110
what do the

0:10:10.110,0:10:11.030
teams

0:10:11.030,0:10:13.450
mean the teams in minor. those were

0:10:13.450,0:10:16.580
they're  called tips they were

0:10:16.580,0:10:17.860
essentially

0:10:17.860,0:10:19.760
access

0:10:19.760,0:10:22.800
if you will smart

0:10:22.800,0:10:23.650


0:10:23.650,0:10:27.550
well not very smart notes. they weren't actually
computers they were places you could log in

0:10:27.550,0:10:30.610
be it just a terminal if you will

0:10:30.610,0:10:32.370
so you know being an IMP

0:10:32.370,0:10:33.590
they had no

0:10:33.590,0:10:37.710
computer there on the network that they could
log into the other places

0:10:37.710,0:10:40.950
that's fundamentally it

0:10:40.950,0:10:42.360
okay

0:10:42.360,0:10:46.620
so in late nineteen seventy one was one of
the first network e-mail

0:10:46.620,0:10:50.450
was sent if you're going to tell first ever
in all of history

0:10:50.450,0:10:55.340
it was sent by this guy Ray Thompson who
was indeed the real father of e-mail

0:10:55.340,0:10:59.850
people sometimes try and make me out to be
that but it just isn't true

0:10:59.850,0:11:00.970
 he really is

0:11:00.970,0:11:01.999
he was working

0:11:01.999,0:11:03.830
at 

0:11:03.830,0:11:07.630
Bolt Beranek and Newman which was one of the
contractors on the Arpanet

0:11:07.630,0:11:10.869
 the original version was just

0:11:10.869,0:11:15.110
part of FTP. he did a file transfer
and the

0:11:15.110,0:11:16.010
special semantics were

0:11:16.010,0:11:20.050
it would just depend whatever you had out of 
the end of some fixed file so each person

0:11:20.050,0:11:21.220
would have an Inbox 

0:11:21.220,0:11:23.260
and it would go splat

0:11:23.260,0:11:26.580
and add your text to the end of their

0:11:26.580,0:11:29.520
mailbox I don't think it had headers at the top

0:11:29.520,0:11:33.750
it was in late 1971 and it
linked two machines that were creatively named

0:11:33.750,0:11:36.630
the BBNA and BBNB

0:11:36.630,0:11:41.060
there they are the first two e-mail notice 
that they're sitting right next to each

0:11:41.060,0:11:41.690
other

0:11:41.690,0:11:46.900
the first e-mail was not sent around the world
or anything like that. it stayed within a single

0:11:46.900,0:11:48.220
room

0:11:48.220,0:11:53.230
these are PEP temps by the way

0:11:53.230,0:11:58.820
just as an aside now really eleven seventy
one Unix one dot oh came out

0:11:58.820,0:12:02.560
that was done by these folks Ken Thompson
and Dennis Richie

0:12:02.560,0:12:06.910
Unix 1.0 wasn't particularly interesting
from network point of view but

0:12:06.910,0:12:08.399
we all know what

0:12:08.399,0:12:10.860
eventually happened to

0:12:10.860,0:12:15.480
Unix I'm kind of putting this into a historic
context

0:12:15.480,0:12:20.190
so let's go to 1973 it was
the beginning of a really really exciting

0:12:20.190,0:12:22.390
time at Berkeley, not

0:12:22.390,0:12:23.540


0:12:23.540,0:12:27.360
not entirely because that was the year I entered
Berkeley but

0:12:27.360,0:12:29.590
that was one of the reasons

0:12:29.590,0:12:32.120
and at the same time there were people

0:12:32.120,0:12:36.499
running around like this guy Bill Joy who had a lot to do with

0:12:36.499,0:12:37.980
Berkeley NX

0:12:37.980,0:12:41.930
and this guy who's out there somewhere

0:12:41.930,0:12:44.780
you cannot have a better picture

0:12:44.780,0:12:50.460
If I had a picture of him from that your era
he's actually leaning down next to a truck

0:12:50.460,0:12:51.420
that said

0:12:51.420,0:12:54.740
that said weak detection unit on it

0:12:54.740,0:13:00.059
but it was only a little tiny then so I didn't take that.
This was another guy

0:13:00.059,0:13:01.620
another grad student

0:13:01.620,0:13:05.070
we always thought he was kind of arrogant because 

0:13:05.070,0:13:07.549
he said his goal was to be

0:13:07.549,0:13:10.600
the CEO of a major corporation which we thought was

0:13:10.600,0:13:11.769
not something we could

0:13:11.769,0:13:14.260
plan for.  He is now CEO Google

0:13:14.260,0:13:18.190
after being CEO Novell on

0:13:18.190,0:13:19.100
well I'm

0:13:19.100,0:13:20.500
Chee had I only

0:13:20.500,0:13:25.120
gone to his school

0:13:25.120,0:13:27.990
so as a result of these and a lot of other

0:13:27.990,0:13:32.310
very creative people that were just a huge number
of people that ended up at Berkeley all at the

0:13:32.310,0:13:33.119
same time

0:13:33.119,0:13:36.610
you seemed to be really excited about this Unix stuff

0:13:36.610,0:13:38.900
they came up with

0:13:38.900,0:13:40.000

0:13:40.000,0:13:42.310
what's now known as Berkeley NX

0:13:42.310,0:13:47.350
so first Bill who did the Berkeley software distributions that were quite literally

0:13:47.350,0:13:49.470
just a mad tape

0:13:49.470,0:13:50.129
and

0:13:50.129,0:13:54.030
because of various licensing reasons the
best he could do

0:13:54.030,0:13:56.830
couldn't really even legally label the tape 

0:13:56.830,0:14:01.470
he put a label out that said this is a tape of this

0:14:01.470,0:14:03.070
and turned it in

0:14:03.070,0:14:08.800
this is the  first Beastie mascot
drawing. this is out of order. this dint

0:14:08.800,0:14:10.660
actually come until later

0:14:10.660,0:14:11.660
this was

0:14:11.660,0:14:16.610
done by a guy who worked with Sam Lefller
who was also one of the Berkeley guys

0:14:16.610,0:14:18.730
at Pixar

0:14:18.730,0:14:20.630
his name is John Lassiter

0:14:20.630,0:14:24.320
and as you know he now runs Disney corporation

0:14:24.320,0:14:30.240
so he owns the original art which is probably
worth a fortune then

0:14:30.240,0:14:32.430
so moving along

0:14:32.430,0:14:34.340
Merkle puzzles

0:14:34.340,0:14:36.270
now Merkle puzzles 

0:14:36.270,0:14:37.390
probably most of you

0:14:37.390,0:14:40.500
have never even heard of

0:14:40.500,0:14:42.050
a guy named Ralph Merkle

0:14:42.050,0:14:44.160
graduate student at Berkeley

0:14:44.160,0:14:46.070
submitted a proposal

0:14:46.070,0:14:49.600
for a paper for CS two forty four

0:14:49.600,0:14:51.910
which was rejected

0:14:51.910,0:14:53.190
because it was

0:14:53.190,0:14:55.110
an obviously absurd idea

0:14:55.110,0:15:00.020
it was in fact the basis for public key encryption

0:15:00.020,0:15:00.860
and

0:15:00.860,0:15:02.590
without public key encryption

0:15:02.590,0:15:08.590
any kind of authentication and global encryption
was completely impractical because before

0:15:08.590,0:15:10.710
that all we had was symmetric keys

0:15:10.710,0:15:13.540
so if there were

0:15:13.540,0:15:15.239
in people on the

0:15:15.239,0:15:17.140
network

0:15:17.140,0:15:20.780
and you need to exchange with them you needed n squared

0:15:20.780,0:15:22.930
copies of keys all over the place and that

0:15:22.930,0:15:25.460
you just couldn't deal with that as n got

0:15:25.460,0:15:29.510
you know to really large numbers like a
hundred

0:15:29.510,0:15:32.919
so the other thing was encryption was still

0:15:32.919,0:15:35.690
classified by the US government as a munition

0:15:35.690,0:15:36.900
which means it wasn't legal

0:15:36.900,0:15:39.810
to export it to other countries

0:15:39.810,0:15:44.320
and even back then there were starting to
be is substantial amount of international

0:15:44.320,0:15:46.000
involvement with

0:15:46.000,0:15:49.220
Unix and other such systems

0:15:49.220,0:15:50.020
so

0:15:50.020,0:15:52.100
in

0:15:52.100,0:15:56.600
April of 1977 the RSA algorithm was finally
published. this of course is the

0:15:56.600,0:15:58.670
one that everyone knows about as the work

0:15:58.670,0:15:59.640
is directly

0:15:59.640,0:16:04.440
based on Merkle's work

0:16:04.440,0:16:06.890
so I think 1977

0:16:06.890,0:16:10.440
as we see that the networks gotten quite
a bit larger

0:16:10.440,0:16:12.280
 this was

0:16:12.280,0:16:15.490
pretty close to its peak I think

0:16:15.490,0:16:16.839
 actually still its bigger

0:16:16.839,0:16:21.030
the pink loans and pink sounds

0:16:21.030,0:16:21.980
by the way

0:16:21.980,0:16:24.179
when i say different architectures

0:16:24.179,0:16:26.030
16 bit words

0:16:26.030,0:16:30.190
36 bit words 60 bit words

0:16:30.190,0:16:31.149


0:16:31.149,0:16:33.040
what else do I have

0:16:33.040,0:16:37.209
up here? just all kinds of things are even some machines
that have

0:16:37.209,0:16:39.970
twenty bit words ten bit bytes

0:16:39.970,0:16:42.690
and somehow they've managed to make that work

0:16:42.690,0:16:45.290
there's a couple of interesting things on here they have

0:16:45.290,0:16:48.679
so satellite links to Hawaii and to

0:16:48.679,0:16:51.030
Norway

0:16:51.030,0:16:54.589
and so the network had gone international

0:16:54.589,0:16:55.450
sort of

0:16:55.450,0:16:57.010
I say sort of because

0:16:57.010,0:16:59.610
 it was going to a US

0:16:59.610,0:17:02.160
 air force base I think in

0:17:02.160,0:17:04.220
Norway so

0:17:04.220,0:17:06.949
was still considered a military thing at that
point

0:17:06.949,0:17:08.070
so 

0:17:08.070,0:17:14.450
the non-US citizens weren't supposed to have
access to it

0:17:14.450,0:17:16.919
UUCP got published

0:17:16.919,0:17:19.589
in 1978

0:17:19.589,0:17:20.939
it brought

0:17:20.939,0:17:25.539
network access of the sort to universities
that didn't have to darker contracts which were

0:17:25.539,0:17:27.000
I've hard to get

0:17:27.000,0:17:30.990
and by the way getting an Arpanet link was
very expensive so you pretty much

0:17:30.990,0:17:37.190
needed to have a darker sponsor which
is to be able to afford it

0:17:37.190,0:17:43.340
in May of 1978 the
first ever spent was sent on the

0:17:43.340,0:17:46.489
Arpanet. at the time it was a DEC salesman
and

0:17:46.489,0:17:49.300
I'll tell you more about what he did

0:17:49.300,0:17:51.809
 shortly

0:17:51.809,0:17:54.000
late 1979

0:17:54.000,0:17:56.090
was the appearance of Usenet

0:17:56.090,0:17:58.980
which was based originally on UUCP although

0:17:58.980,0:18:00.890
could easily work over the Arpanet

0:18:00.890,0:18:05.520
this made it was the predecessor of 
what we would now call forums and blogs and

0:18:05.520,0:18:06.570
things like that

0:18:06.570,0:18:12.440
but most importantly it made flame words possible

0:18:12.440,0:18:14.240
and then

0:18:14.240,0:18:15.200
finally

0:18:15.200,0:18:21.140
in September 1979 UCB 
got an Arpanet nose. they actually had the one before

0:18:21.140,0:18:24.190
but it had then shut down because the 

0:18:24.190,0:18:26.410
the guy who ran it

0:18:26.410,0:18:30.170
was told that he had failed to demonstrate
that his

0:18:30.170,0:18:34.380
 research was going to enable them to build
smarter bombs

0:18:34.380,0:18:36.240
literally i saw the letter

0:18:36.240,0:18:38.049
but by

0:18:38.049,0:18:38.909
this point

0:18:38.909,0:18:41.600
the group I was working on INGREs

0:18:41.600,0:18:43.990
got that link

0:18:43.990,0:18:46.250
we were database management

0:18:46.250,0:18:50.500
system and of course the government was very
interested in data bases

0:18:50.500,0:18:54.500
and in particular distributed databases

0:18:54.500,0:18:56.760
we didn't have a very big

0:18:56.760,0:19:00.360
grasp so we had a whopping 9600 baud 

0:19:00.360,0:19:05.960
link to the Arpanet. this is for all of campus

0:19:05.960,0:19:07.029
actually it was for

0:19:07.029,0:19:09.309
CS division

0:19:09.309,0:19:11.550
which was not all of campus but

0:19:11.550,0:19:13.659
you know the folks some of the departments

0:19:13.659,0:19:15.640
didn't have a clue what a network was

0:19:15.640,0:19:18.880
but everyone in the CS division wanted

0:19:18.880,0:19:20.000


0:19:20.000,0:19:21.700
access to the Arpanet

0:19:21.700,0:19:26.750
of course because it was the newest shiny bling thing
to have and everyone

0:19:26.750,0:19:27.719
had to get there

0:19:27.719,0:19:29.880
well we had a PDP-11

0:19:29.880,0:19:34.570
that really could handle that many simultaneous
logins much less

0:19:34.570,0:19:38.150
the ports that were expensive at the time

0:19:38.150,0:19:42.390
to put this into perspective we had a PDP-11 seventy
that had a one point five micro

0:19:42.390,0:19:46.660
second cycle time so substantially less than one minute

0:19:46.660,0:19:48.990
the 16-bit word and we have

0:19:48.990,0:19:52.669
a lot of memory we had a 196K of memory

0:19:52.669,0:19:54.780
on the system

0:19:54.780,0:19:55.910
we would have to put

0:19:55.910,0:19:58.990
a DH-11 ports

0:19:58.990,0:19:59.730
another

0:19:59.730,0:20:05.200
this is a port multiplex where you get 16 words
cost about 4700 dollars so

0:20:05.200,0:20:06.960
about 300 dollars

0:20:06.960,0:20:10.410
per port which doesn't sound like much
but remember

0:20:10.410,0:20:14.340
that's like 1,000 dollars per port today

0:20:14.340,0:20:15.590
so

0:20:15.590,0:20:16.840
well I have to show off

0:20:16.840,0:20:20.890
some things this is a PDP 11 seventy.this
is what computers are supposed to look like

0:20:20.890,0:20:22.880
 unlike what they are today

0:20:22.880,0:20:25.610
they had switches and lights and

0:20:25.610,0:20:32.610
all kinds of cool things and dials.  Ah it was great so

0:20:33.300,0:20:34.670
we had

0:20:34.670,0:20:37.120
 we were what we're able to do was

0:20:37.120,0:20:41.040
release two TT white ports three hundred
baud TT white ports 

0:20:41.040,0:20:44.790
to be shared among everyone in the computer
science division

0:20:44.790,0:20:47.140
at Berkeley

0:20:47.140,0:20:49.950
 probably about

0:20:49.950,0:20:51.920
fifty people well

0:20:51.920,0:20:54.149
 forty professors. there were

0:20:54.149,0:20:57.280
other students but we just said no you know 

0:20:57.280,0:20:58.250
still 

0:20:58.250,0:21:00.640
can't handle it can't possibly do that

0:21:00.640,0:21:03.440
 but professors could have their

0:21:03.440,0:21:05.400
computer 

0:21:05.400,0:21:08.010
terminal sorry in their office

0:21:08.010,0:21:11.470
and they had a line that ran into the-mail room
and there was a plug board

0:21:11.470,0:21:12.140
he could

0:21:12.140,0:21:16.170
put in the patch code between your office
and whatever computer you want to have access

0:21:16.170,0:21:18.370
to and there were two those

0:21:18.370,0:21:22.040
for the Arpanet machine which was the
machine I was

0:21:22.040,0:21:23.040
working on then

0:21:23.040,0:21:26.770
and of course people would come along
they want access to the Arpanet. they just 

0:21:26.770,0:21:27.289
unplug

0:21:27.289,0:21:31.020
one of the cables that was in there and plug in theirs

0:21:31.020,0:21:35.010
there were professors having screaming matches
at each other in the hallways and it

0:21:35.010,0:21:37.960
probably came to fisticuffs at some point

0:21:37.960,0:21:42.340
and of course they all came to me and wanted
me to fix the problem

0:21:42.340,0:21:47.029
I wasn't it and I don't know how they thought
I was going to fix the problem

0:21:47.029,0:21:51.960
which I was an undergraduate then I don't know how they
thought I was gonna fix the problem. What I did however was
observe what they really wanted was not access to the

0:21:51.960,0:21:53.490
Arpanet like FTP and  

0:21:53.490,0:21:54.880
Telnet

0:21:54.880,0:21:55.920
what they want

0:21:55.920,0:21:58.970
was e-mail.Email was the killer rap

0:21:58.970,0:22:00.750
even back then

0:22:00.750,0:22:05.270
we had something called Berknet that linked our
internal machines

0:22:05.270,0:22:09.300
using RS 232 lines of 
9600 baud this is written by 

0:22:09.300,0:22:13.860
a guy named Eric Schmidt yes the very same Eric Schmidt
who is now CEO of Google and he's a better

0:22:13.860,0:22:17.500
CEO than he is a coder

0:22:17.500,0:22:20.640
but it worked

0:22:20.640,0:22:25.440
as it turns out we also had a UUCP connection
which ran from the main department machine

0:22:25.440,0:22:25.690
which

0:22:25.690,0:22:30.680
was a VAX OM 780 call Ernie CoVAX

0:22:30.680,0:22:32.860
and so I wrote something called deliver mail

0:22:32.860,0:22:34.380
deliver mail was just

0:22:34.380,0:22:37.000
a quick hack to forward

0:22:37.000,0:22:41.610
messages between networks it dint have time to
anything like fixing headers or 

0:22:41.610,0:22:42.900
anything like that

0:22:42.900,0:22:45.740
so it was a disaster in some sense waiting to happen

0:22:45.740,0:22:51.290
well it got the professors off of my back
so as far as I was concerned it was a success

0:22:51.290,0:22:53.359
It got released in four  

0:22:53.359,0:22:54.520
point zero what

0:22:54.520,0:22:58.140
is now four zero BSD which is four BSD at the time

0:22:58.140,0:23:03.230
in 1980 and much to my shock it turned out to be
very popular Berkeley

0:23:03.230,0:23:06.190
was not unique lots and lots of places

0:23:06.190,0:23:11.150
have this problem

0:23:11.150,0:23:15.700
and so there is deliver mail on the chart
now you can see this is

0:23:15.700,0:23:16.870
pretty much

0:23:16.870,0:23:20.880
toward the end of the Arpanet era

0:23:20.880,0:23:22.520
the Arpanet

0:23:22.520,0:23:23.680
geographically now looks

0:23:23.680,0:23:24.620
like this

0:23:24.620,0:23:28.240
the circles by the way were exploded in the other

0:23:28.240,0:23:31.110
material that I had but I dint want to

0:23:31.110,0:23:32.500
give you all of that but

0:23:32.500,0:23:35.190
there is several satellite link now

0:23:35.190,0:23:36.269


0:23:36.269,0:23:40.279
there's a direct satellite link to London that's
still at Hawaii link

0:23:40.279,0:23:41.300
and so forth

0:23:41.300,0:23:43.429
if you look carefully you will see the

0:23:43.429,0:23:45.120
main

0:23:45.120,0:23:46.840
university

0:23:46.840,0:23:53.840
military and military contractors sites

0:23:58.450,0:24:03.810
that's all of them.  Sizemo I don't
know if Sizemo had an Arpanet link I don't think

0:24:03.810,0:24:07.990
they did although they could have

0:24:07.990,0:24:10.880
it would have been in here somewhere so

0:24:10.880,0:24:13.899

0:24:13.899,0:24:16.410
I think that came later

0:24:16.410,0:24:17.760
let's put it this way

0:24:17.760,0:24:22.800
we Berkeley ended up being the gateway between
the UUCP and the Arpanet

0:24:22.800,0:24:27.080
cos it didn't take people long to figure out
a route-mail

0:24:27.080,0:24:30.770
you're there you had to do it manually but
it could be done

0:24:30.770,0:24:34.300
I will have a comment about that later

0:24:34.300,0:24:36.640
so let's continue on to the next phase

0:24:36.640,0:24:40.090
by 1981 through 1988

0:24:40.090,0:24:43.790
this goes from 213 hosts
that were on

0:24:43.790,0:24:48.320
the Arpanet to 3300
hosts in seven years

0:24:48.320,0:24:53.460
so we'll start with our usual graph

0:24:53.460,0:24:58.180
this was when I started first putting SMTP on a Sendmail

0:24:58.180,0:25:02.590
worked on Sendmail before because things
like header writing

0:25:02.590,0:25:06.810
was becoming a real problem. you couldn't reply to addresses.
everyone you had to be 

0:25:06.810,0:25:09.000
to be a guru in order to

0:25:09.000,0:25:14.330
figure out how to address things there
was even an entire book

0:25:14.330,0:25:15.590
put up

0:25:15.590,0:25:16.910
that described

0:25:16.910,0:25:19.570
how to do addressing 

0:25:19.570,0:25:21.070
but 

0:25:21.070,0:25:22.769
Berkeley got a contract

0:25:22.769,0:25:25.140
to do the

0:25:25.140,0:25:26.390
base

0:25:26.390,0:25:31.090
platform operating system platform to support darker
research they had all of these

0:25:31.090,0:25:33.720
diverse machines

0:25:33.720,0:25:37.700
but they discovered that that made it really
hard for research projects to share work with

0:25:37.700,0:25:41.920
each other so they decided that there would
be a standard platform it would be the VAX

0:25:41.920,0:25:43.259
1178

0:25:43.259,0:25:45.260
running Berkeley Unix

0:25:45.260,0:25:48.039
and one of things they needed was an SMTP server

0:25:48.039,0:25:50.780
is by the way I haven't said anything about

0:25:50.780,0:25:56.350
SMTP being published it wasn't published
and I was working on up very early drafts

0:25:56.350,0:26:02.100
 and what happened was Bill Joy asked me
random data base not Sendmail

0:26:02.100,0:26:03.990
Bill Joy came up to me and said

0:26:03.990,0:26:06.470
you know would you do this

0:26:06.470,0:26:07.630
and 

0:26:07.630,0:26:14.300
in a moment of weakness said sure how hard
can it be 

0:26:14.300,0:26:17.840
25 years later I'm telling you who
it is

0:26:17.840,0:26:20.570
harder than it looks

0:26:20.570,0:26:21.900
and

0:26:21.900,0:26:23.340
few months later

0:26:23.340,0:26:28.149
4.1a which was technically test
release

0:26:28.149,0:26:30.290
came out with Sendmail

0:26:30.290,0:26:31.849
SMTP which also have

0:26:31.849,0:26:33.770
the first networks that

0:26:33.770,0:26:35.160
so

0:26:35.160,0:26:37.130
this is

0:26:37.130,0:26:39.570
Berkeley Unix on the internet

0:26:39.570,0:26:42.230
except the internet doesn't exist yet

0:26:42.230,0:26:47.620
sort of exists. there is this test platform but the
world still using Arpanet

0:26:47.620,0:26:53.120
finally about a year after I started implementing
SMTP the specs were

0:26:53.120,0:26:53.940
published

0:26:53.940,0:26:55.650
after

0:26:55.650,0:26:57.220
it's been shipped

0:26:57.220,0:27:01.940
its an internet tradition
by the way

0:27:01.940,0:27:04.290
January 1st 1983

0:27:04.290,0:27:08.530
was the flag day it was just called the flag day

0:27:08.530,0:27:10.470
that was the day that

0:27:10.470,0:27:12.800
the government said we're going to turn off

0:27:12.800,0:27:14.580
the Arpanet

0:27:14.580,0:27:17.200
and they literally just said

0:27:17.200,0:27:19.620
we're going to send out a message into all the IMPs

0:27:19.620,0:27:21.940
to stop forwarding packets

0:27:21.940,0:27:24.809
and if you're not on the internet by then

0:27:24.809,0:27:27.480
you're going to lose your network connectivity

0:27:27.480,0:27:31.470
and there were a whole bunch of people who
said yeah yeah they're bluffing and guess what

0:27:31.470,0:27:34.180
they lost their network connectivity

0:27:34.180,0:27:36.460
but Berkeley was there we didn't

0:27:36.460,0:27:37.269
so

0:27:37.269,0:27:39.520
that was cool

0:27:39.520,0:27:44.659
in September of 1983 the same year
a 4.2 BSD shipped

0:27:44.659,0:27:47.190
this was kind of the basis for

0:27:47.190,0:27:50.030
at least from the user interface

0:27:50.030,0:27:53.390
was the basis for

0:27:53.390,0:27:55.420
Unix as we know it today

0:27:55.420,0:27:57.910
so it had all the network and

0:27:57.910,0:27:59.190
stuff and 

0:27:59.190,0:28:00.370
at that point

0:28:00.370,0:28:04.910
we were able to track down John Lasetter and 
have him do an update

0:28:04.910,0:28:08.830
and does it seem much more important at the
time so

0:28:08.830,0:28:11.910
here's Beastie in color with the attractive green

0:28:11.910,0:28:17.890
tennis shoes and so forth

0:28:17.890,0:28:20.890
once again for historic context I have to

0:28:20.890,0:28:22.400
run in some things

0:28:22.400,0:28:26.670
in 1985 there was a company actually
did some more research it was originally called

0:28:26.670,0:28:31.300
control video corporation changed his name
to quantum computer services

0:28:31.300,0:28:36.980
an year later that changed its name to
America Online

0:28:36.980,0:28:40.210
they had the walled garden they had an e-mail

0:28:40.210,0:28:44.470
only among other AOL subscribers they
weren't connected to the internet

0:28:44.470,0:28:45.720
in any

0:28:45.720,0:28:49.030
any sense

0:28:49.030,0:28:50.810
this is really important

0:28:50.810,0:28:55.720
may 1987 a guy named Rick
Adams who worked in Sizemo

0:28:55.720,0:28:59.440
went off and started the first commercialized PE

0:28:59.440,0:29:05.500
there was apparently another one that started
on exactly the same day so the two people

0:29:05.500,0:29:07.830
get to fight each other over who was first

0:29:07.830,0:29:11.500
the difference is that UUNET turned into one of
the largest pieces

0:29:11.500,0:29:15.100
in the world and the other one didn't

0:29:15.100,0:29:16.549
so

0:29:16.549,0:29:18.669
this was the first time that you could

0:29:18.669,0:29:21.470
get access to the internet without being

0:29:21.470,0:29:24.490
a government

0:29:24.490,0:29:25.610
government-sponsored

0:29:25.610,0:29:29.860
so that's a big deal

0:29:29.860,0:29:34.460
so of next chunk of history we'll take from
1988 to 1993 at this point

0:29:34.460,0:29:35.940
I'm going in about

0:29:35.940,0:29:37.340
ten x

0:29:37.340,0:29:40.320
both on the internet just in progress graphs

0:29:40.320,0:29:42.130
pretty clear

0:29:42.130,0:29:43.570
so 

0:29:43.570,0:29:48.549
this was kind of the first security incidents
on the internet the internet worm

0:29:48.549,0:29:52.140
It was written by Grampston in a Harvard and who

0:29:52.140,0:29:56.620
probably should have flunked out because he
didn't understand commentary growth

0:29:56.620,0:29:59.670
and he really thought that this thing would run

0:29:59.670,0:30:03.390
quietly on the internet and first of
all there was a bug in his

0:30:03.390,0:30:04.380
program

0:30:04.380,0:30:07.410
so it didn't kill itself off as it was supposed
to and

0:30:07.410,0:30:11.900
he didn't understand that if each machine infects 4 machines

0:30:11.900,0:30:13.580
that's a really large

0:30:13.580,0:30:15.200
power

0:30:15.200,0:30:17.680
not a small one

0:30:17.680,0:30:23.470
but it did make people start to think for
the first time about

0:30:23.470,0:30:30.000
security on the internet up until the internet had
been kind of

0:30:30.000,0:30:31.739
a very collegiate

0:30:31.739,0:30:32.420
atmosphere

0:30:32.420,0:30:37.360
you had to be to be on the internet you had to
be a researcher to get on it

0:30:37.360,0:30:41.409
if you wanted an account on somebody else's
machine to be good all you do is they can

0:30:41.409,0:30:45.070
I had an account and go sure give you an
account

0:30:45.070,0:30:48.529
so security dint seem all that important but

0:30:48.529,0:30:49.669
this made it clear that

0:30:49.669,0:30:53.890
it was

0:30:53.890,0:30:59.690
March 1989 in fact exactly
30 years ago this past Friday two days

0:30:59.690,0:31:01.070
ago

0:31:01.070,0:31:03.510
Tim Berners-Lee proposed what

0:31:03.510,0:31:06.030
we now know as the world wide web

0:31:06.030,0:31:10.740
he did a prototype browser that was published
in October

0:31:10.740,0:31:12.799
of 1990

0:31:12.799,0:31:17.649
and but that one kind of disappeared it
was more concerned 

0:31:17.649,0:31:18.779
research

0:31:18.779,0:31:21.440
organization in Switzerland

0:31:21.440,0:31:23.330
so there's Tim

0:31:23.330,0:31:27.299
I think that was not 

0:31:27.299,0:31:33.820
contemporary. I  think he had more hair when he
proposed it

0:31:33.820,0:31:36.720
okay

0:31:36.720,0:31:39.320
we had the internet

0:31:39.320,0:31:41.100
and that allowed

0:31:41.100,0:31:41.840
non

0:31:41.840,0:31:44.630
government people to get access to the net

0:31:44.630,0:31:49.780 
but the backbone of the internet was still run
by the national science foundation getting transferred

0:31:49.780,0:31:50.480
from

0:31:50.480,0:31:52.310
 the military

0:31:52.310,0:31:54.460
over to

0:31:54.460,0:31:58.200
non military government funding but it
was still

0:31:58.200,0:31:59.530
funded

0:31:59.530,0:32:06.530
and their rules that an acceptable use policy
that said no commercial traffic

0:32:07.160,0:32:09.370
so UUNET customers could

0:32:09.370,0:32:13.660
run commercial traffic to each other but they
could write to other people. there wasn't any chance

0:32:13.660,0:32:17.800
that would run over these wires

0:32:17.800,0:32:18.670
that effectively said

0:32:18.670,0:32:23.830
you can't use the internet for commercial
purposes at all

0:32:23.830,0:32:24.649
CIX

0:32:24.649,0:32:30.430
which then stood for commercial internet
exchange was where the various

0:32:30.430,0:32:34.690
largish ISP were started to be regional.
there was one on the west coast and one

0:32:34.690,0:32:37.760
on the east coast and one of the southeast
and

0:32:37.760,0:32:38.890
so forth said

0:32:38.890,0:32:42.300
we're all going to run wires together into one room 

0:32:42.300,0:32:46.070
we're going to put a big router there and we're
going to be able to exchange traffic with us

0:32:46.070,0:32:48.960
without ever going over an SF net

0:32:48.960,0:32:52.769
because we're not allowed commercial traffic
and they essentially said cut the government

0:32:52.769,0:32:57.539
out of the equation which was great as that's what
the government wanted anyway

0:32:57.539,0:32:58.250
so

0:32:58.250,0:33:03.450
 1991 July was the first
time he could really use the internet for

0:33:03.450,0:33:07.340
anything commercial

0:33:07.340,0:33:13.529
1992 a multipurpose internet
mail extensions was published a USENET

0:33:13.529,0:33:14.300
conference

0:33:14.300,0:33:16.470


0:33:16.470,0:33:21.110
and this allowed embedding something other
than plain text

0:33:21.110,0:33:21.850
into

0:33:21.850,0:33:25.310
e-mail messages notably at the time it was
used for

0:33:25.310,0:33:27.700
 pictures or graphs and

0:33:27.700,0:33:30.130
things like that there was discussion about
maybe

0:33:30.130,0:33:31.690
maybe some day we could

0:33:31.690,0:33:36.960
do sound and possibly way way way in the distant future
we may be able to think about video but

0:33:36.960,0:33:41.450
it was really just pictures

0:33:41.450,0:33:46.300
okay 1993 through 1996 is
taking us from one point three million to

0:33:46.300,0:33:49.639
to almost thirteen million

0:33:49.639,0:33:51.420

0:33:51.420,0:33:55.549
February of 1993 NCSA mosaic was released
this is the national center

0:33:55.549,0:33:59.350
for super computer applications at the university
of Illinois

0:33:59.350,0:34:00.620
Champane Urbana

0:34:00.620,0:34:02.800
it's the first broadly used

0:34:02.800,0:34:05.429
browser and in fact

0:34:05.429,0:34:07.360
was the direct descendant

0:34:07.360,0:34:08.960
sorry the

0:34:08.960,0:34:10.440
direct parent of

0:34:10.440,0:34:12.099
Netscape

0:34:12.099,0:34:19.099
and Mozilla and so forth all kind
of goes back to NCSA mosaic

0:34:19.739,0:34:21.450
now Sendmail had been 

0:34:21.450,0:34:26.149
I had abandoned Sendmail for a number
of years because I've gone to work for start-up

0:34:26.149,0:34:26.659
and

0:34:26.659,0:34:30.719
they seem to want action work on what I was
being paid for

0:34:30.719,0:34:32.369
and

0:34:32.369,0:34:34.109
Sendmail had diverged

0:34:34.109,0:34:38.489
and so there were many versions of it. some of them
had some good ideas some of them some not

0:34:38.489,0:34:39.519
so good

0:34:39.519,0:34:40.869
ideas

0:34:40.869,0:34:43.219
every vendor

0:34:43.219,0:34:47.449
like DEC and HP and IBM and so forthhad their own 

0:34:47.449,0:34:49.449
proprietary version of Sendmail

0:34:49.449,0:34:53.509
and you couldn't really share things between them and
I came along and I came

0:34:53.509,0:34:55.809
back to the university

0:34:55.809,0:34:59.249
first a lot of these things and that a lot
of other things all of these things is the

0:34:59.249,0:35:00.599
Sendmail 8 which is

0:35:00.599,0:35:01.980
the Sendmail which

0:35:01.980,0:35:05.319
pretty much still exists to this day

0:35:05.319,0:35:06.719


0:35:06.719,0:35:07.699
that was

0:35:07.699,0:35:10.289
way more successful than I had

0:35:10.289,0:35:10.989
anticipated

0:35:10.989,0:35:12.439
and 

0:35:12.439,0:35:14.450
 that turned into a problem

0:35:14.450,0:35:16.249
later as we'll see

0:35:16.249,0:35:17.539
Netscape was founded

0:35:17.539,0:35:19.209
in 1994

0:35:19.209,0:35:24.680
 Mark Reasen was one of the principles
in that and he essentially left

0:35:24.680,0:35:31.539
NCSA took the source code with him and co
founded the company

0:35:31.539,0:35:38.539
the green code spam anyone remember the greencode spam?

0:35:38.630,0:35:39.700
now I mentioned 

0:35:39.700,0:35:41.829
there was the first spam

0:35:41.829,0:35:43.429
earlier

0:35:43.429,0:35:46.859
but it wasn't really a spam

0:35:46.859,0:35:50.299
as i said the network previously largely cooperative 

0:35:50.299,0:35:53.039
you know had flame wars but they were

0:35:53.039,0:35:54.259
mostly innocent

0:35:54.259,0:35:55.779
could be dealt with

0:35:55.779,0:36:00.379
turns out that spam was not new. the first electronically

0:36:00.379,0:36:01.210
transmitted

0:36:01.210,0:36:03.239
commercial

0:36:03.239,0:36:04.049
message

0:36:04.049,0:36:07.959
was in September 13th 1904

0:36:07.959,0:36:10.309
using the telegraph

0:36:10.309,0:36:15.699
so advertisers had figured out this new
technology was going to be someplace they

0:36:15.699,0:36:18.569
could thrive

0:36:18.569,0:36:19.789
the first

0:36:19.789,0:36:22.869
e-mail spam was this DEC salesman

0:36:22.869,0:36:25.700
who DEC had released a new

0:36:25.700,0:36:27.979
part of the computer and decided that

0:36:27.979,0:36:31.109
he really want all of its customers to know
about this

0:36:31.109,0:36:31.929
so he sent

0:36:31.929,0:36:33.619
an e-mail message

0:36:33.619,0:36:36.059
with copying every single customer

0:36:36.059,0:36:37.230
did he had

0:36:37.230,0:36:41.259
well it turns out the-mail programs of the
time they thought about having

0:36:41.259,0:36:45.309
you know three or four may be ten  recipients
on a message

0:36:45.309,0:36:47.409
not a thousand

0:36:47.409,0:36:50.170
and so it broke the-mail system broke

0:36:50.170,0:36:51.859
all kinds of things

0:36:51.859,0:36:53.769
but I don't really cannot this is the first

0:36:53.769,0:36:57.109
spam because he said gee I didn't know

0:36:57.109,0:36:58.749
he apologized

0:36:58.749,0:37:02.630
well he wasn't trying to do anything malicious.
he genuinely thought that

0:37:02.630,0:37:05.939
his customers would want to know about this
new machine

0:37:05.939,0:37:09.359
there is also a 1988 a chain letter

0:37:09.359,0:37:11.589
called make money fast it was

0:37:11.589,0:37:13.619
a pyramid scheme

0:37:13.619,0:37:14.760
But it wasn't

0:37:14.760,0:37:17.219
really technically a spam either

0:37:17.219,0:37:21.109
but we're definitely seeing the greed
is good attitude coming to

0:37:21.109,0:37:22.900
the internet much to do

0:37:22.900,0:37:24.829
disgust of a lot of us

0:37:24.829,0:37:29.219
and they call a nation was two lawyers and
from Texas Canter and Siegel

0:37:29.219,0:37:31.070
who

0:37:31.070,0:37:34.369
advertise in technically Usenet

0:37:34.369,0:37:35.389
not e-mail

0:37:35.389,0:37:37.309
they sent every single

0:37:37.309,0:37:38.319
news group

0:37:38.319,0:37:40.469
the same posting 

0:37:40.469,0:37:46.009
offering to sign people up for a price for
the green card lottery which was so people

0:37:46.009,0:37:48.109
non-residents could work in the US

0:37:48.109,0:37:52.249
they didn't tell you that you could sign yourself
up for free

0:37:52.249,0:37:57.890
but if you gave them money they'd be happy to
do for you what you could do for free

0:37:57.890,0:38:02.590
and they were completely unapologetic about
this they said wait a minute here we have

0:38:02.590,0:38:03.279
the right

0:38:03.279,0:38:04.240
to do this

0:38:04.240,0:38:06.339
they even published a book

0:38:06.339,0:38:08.959
on how to spam

0:38:08.959,0:38:11.689
and they made a ton of money off of that book too

0:38:11.689,0:38:15.979
 I believe that brought them this far by
the way and have

0:38:15.979,0:38:19.639
gone into

0:38:19.639,0:38:21.419
you know

0:38:21.419,0:38:24.259
very long

0:38:24.259,0:38:27.209


0:38:27.209,0:38:31.559
April 1994 Webcaller was the
first full text

0:38:31.559,0:38:33.069
Webcaller

0:38:33.069,0:38:38.929
and was the beginning of search engines as
we know them today

0:38:38.929,0:38:40.579
the first

0:38:40.579,0:38:44.929
well this is pseudo liar as good a time as
virus was an e-mail message that went around

0:38:44.929,0:38:46.109
saying

0:38:46.109,0:38:47.409
it's 

0:38:47.409,0:38:50.300
the subject was good times it said

0:38:50.300,0:38:52.759
there's a virus running around the network

0:38:52.759,0:38:56.439
if you even open that message

0:38:56.439,0:39:02.119
it will trash your machine you know the message because
it has the subject good times

0:39:02.119,0:39:05.589
forward this to everyone you know

0:39:05.589,0:39:08.080
the warning was itself

0:39:08.080,0:39:09.150
the virus

0:39:09.150,0:39:12.329
and it was tremendously effective I had to
spend

0:39:12.329,0:39:15.299
about two days calming down people about this

0:39:15.299,0:39:16.629
just saying no

0:39:16.629,0:39:21.259
don't forward it

0:39:21.259,0:39:23.359
the

0:39:23.359,0:39:25.089
as I have said so

0:39:25.089,0:39:27.359
earlier Sendmail 8 was very very

0:39:27.359,0:39:28.550
successful

0:39:28.550,0:39:32.799
so successful that I really couldn't support
it myself anymore

0:39:32.799,0:39:34.679
just because untenable so

0:39:34.679,0:39:41.639
I formed a Sendmail consortium was which was
a group of volunteers that helped do this in 1995

0:39:41.639,0:39:47.029
and later 1995 SMIME was published
this was the first attempt to do

0:39:47.029,0:39:49.879
but it actually wasn't the first it was the

0:39:49.879,0:39:52.869
best known to this day attempt to do

0:39:52.869,0:39:54.729
encryption and authentication in e-mail

0:39:54.729,0:39:57.450
 that

0:39:57.450,0:39:59.249
back book was published

0:39:59.249,0:40:02.420
I don't remember

0:40:02.420,0:40:07.499
exactly when but it was in 1994

0:40:07.499,0:40:11.549
right in this time frame

0:40:11.549,0:40:17.160
this is 1996 to 2000 
from about thirty million two hundred nine

0:40:17.160,0:40:19.779
million hosts

0:40:19.779,0:40:24.979
Hotmail was founded. I thought this was insane
at the time which is why I don't

0:40:24.979,0:40:27.209
you know I'm not filthy rich right now

0:40:27.209,0:40:28.519
Hotmail

0:40:28.519,0:40:33.950
it had access to the internet so I said well
of course you've already got a mailbox they

0:40:33.950,0:40:36.089
gave you free-mail boxes

0:40:36.089,0:40:37.269
and it took off

0:40:37.269,0:40:41.159
like mad it was crazy

0:40:41.159,0:40:42.569
in 

0:40:42.569,0:40:44.329
1997

0:40:44.329,0:40:48.369
Microsoft said hey wait a minute maybe this
internet thing isn't going to go away after

0:40:48.369,0:40:49.079
all

0:40:49.079,0:40:50.809
and we should get in on it 

0:40:50.809,0:40:53.609
and so they put a very bad

0:40:53.609,0:40:55.799
SMTP gateway into exchange

0:40:55.799,0:40:59.260
they slapped the network onto their existing

0:40:59.260,0:41:01.049
worker tools which 

0:41:01.049,0:41:04.070
were not designed for a hostile environment
at all

0:41:04.070,0:41:07.689
they did no consideration whatsoever of securing

0:41:07.689,0:41:12.349
and just dropped a huge number of people on
the internet

0:41:12.349,0:41:14.779
essentially naked and unprotected

0:41:14.779,0:41:16.010
and we're still

0:41:16.010,0:41:18.160
dealing with this to this day

0:41:18.160,0:41:19.780
 the only thing that was

0:41:19.780,0:41:24.079
impressive about this was Microsoft
in a very short period of time was able to

0:41:24.079,0:41:26.209
completely redefine the company

0:41:26.209,0:41:28.410
as an internet company and

0:41:28.410,0:41:32.059
much faster than anyone had thought possible

0:41:32.059,0:41:33.799
Yahoo was founded in

0:41:33.799,0:41:36.409
October ninety seven

0:41:36.409,0:41:37.869
we all know about that

0:41:37.869,0:41:40.549
a Microsoft acquired hot mail

0:41:40.549,0:41:45.289
they were able to do it as fast as they wanted
the rumor

0:41:45.289,0:41:48.609
unconfirmed is that they paid 400
million dollars

0:41:48.609,0:41:55.609
for this company that was barely over a year
old and had something like ten employees

0:41:59.089,0:42:00.689
quite a coop 

0:42:00.689,0:42:05.299
in March of 1998 I and a friend of mine
co-founded Sendmail Inc.

0:42:05.299,0:42:06.420
Sendmail

0:42:06.420,0:42:08.759
even with the help of the consortium

0:42:08.759,0:42:13.179
was still stuck with research problems and
so we said we can commercialize this

0:42:13.179,0:42:15.649
here's a very well read picture of the

0:42:15.649,0:42:17.160
 initial

0:42:17.160,0:42:24.160
 people in the company and two of us
are still there

0:42:24.630,0:42:30.329
now into the virus era March of 1999
Melissa there was an Outlook

0:42:30.329,0:42:31.809
macrovirus

0:42:31.809,0:42:34.740
was a hypersoft
was really kind of

0:42:34.740,0:42:38.929
a worm as much as it was a virus

0:42:38.929,0:42:44.699
in January  2000 the
government finally relaxed the encryption policy

0:42:44.699,0:42:45.630
finally admitted it

0:42:45.630,0:42:49.710
that everyone outside the US had encryption
anyway

0:42:49.710,0:42:53.439
and so we might as well be able to play in
the game

0:42:53.439,0:42:54.859
with the rest of the world

0:42:54.859,0:42:57.079
we immediately put

0:42:57.079,0:43:02.449
encryption TLS encryption into Sendmail
all in fact we've already had it implemented

0:43:02.449,0:43:04.239
but we couldn't release it

0:43:04.239,0:43:05.420
and so

0:43:05.420,0:43:07.419
this came out we

0:43:07.419,0:43:13.909
pushed out the version that already had
TLS

0:43:13.909,0:43:19.489
what we wanted to do was had the government
changed its mind we had to be too late

0:43:19.489,0:43:24.150
so we dot to that really fast but they didn't change their
minds but the they may have changed

0:43:24.150,0:43:27.329
not change their mind because they've realized
it was

0:43:27.329,0:43:31.069
two weeks later it's too late

0:43:31.069,0:43:33.920
in March of 2000 we

0:43:33.920,0:43:35.570
released an interface called Milter

0:43:35.570,0:43:36.919
this is

0:43:36.919,0:43:39.110
a way to do

0:43:39.110,0:43:42.429
plugins into Sendmail that allow you to do email filtering

0:43:42.429,0:43:45.279
was specifically designed for anti-spam

0:43:45.279,0:43:52.199
the MTA market changed a lot back then or
essentially not the market

0:43:52.199,0:43:55.819
the world had been about reliability and

0:43:55.819,0:43:56.450
getting

0:43:56.450,0:43:59.279
mail from A to B without losing it

0:43:59.279,0:44:04.399
and around here was when spam was getting
so bad people said no we need to do is not

0:44:04.399,0:44:05.209
forward

0:44:05.209,0:44:06.119
anything that

0:44:06.119,0:44:07.779
might be 

0:44:07.779,0:44:10.319
problematic

0:44:10.319,0:44:11.469
and 

0:44:11.469,0:44:12.339
April

0:44:12.339,0:44:18.019
2000 the I love you virus this is a
Visual Basic virus he had to

0:44:18.019,0:44:22.659
click on it but it's turns out that people
couldn't resist clicking on

0:44:22.659,0:44:27.209
a text that's called I love you

0:44:27.209,0:44:31.069
they were sad what can I say

0:44:31.069,0:44:33.260
2001 to the Present

0:44:33.260,0:44:35.699
well we've gone from that

0:44:35.699,0:44:38.229
hundred ten thousand roughly up to

0:44:38.229,0:44:40.299
about four hundred forty million

0:44:40.299,0:44:45.709
well as of the last survey I could find

0:44:45.709,0:44:49.239


0:44:49.239,0:44:55.019
well let's see let's start off with an unequivocal
the virus it was kind of one of the symbols

0:44:55.019,0:44:57.760
up Postfix which was a competitor to

0:44:57.760,0:45:00.359
Sendmail was released 

0:45:00.359,0:45:03.819
Postfix was actually really good

0:45:03.819,0:45:09.249
alternative and Lisa and I when he was writing
Postfix we would exchange a lot of email

0:45:09.249,0:45:12.979
talking but I talked with him at one point
before it was released

0:45:12.979,0:45:17.829
 and taken surely say much longer than
he expected

0:45:17.829,0:45:20.929
I said i asked him how the-mail was going and
he said

0:45:20.929,0:45:24.590
well its taken longer than I thought that's
that's harder than it looks isn't it

0:45:24.590,0:45:28.869
the it's been an exercise in humility

0:45:28.869,0:45:32.219
so you think that I hate him because he's

0:45:32.219,0:45:33.589
competitor of Sendmail but

0:45:33.589,0:45:36.349
no hes one of the good guys

0:45:36.349,0:45:41.899
the SPR project which was one of the first
attempt to do e-mail authentification

0:45:41.899,0:45:44.819
in one sense or another start up

0:45:44.819,0:45:45.560
in

0:45:45.560,0:45:48.159
2003

0:45:48.159,0:45:53.130
also you know oh three was the Sobig.F virus.
It was the largest

0:45:53.130,0:45:53.930
attack

0:45:53.930,0:45:58.279
on today using something called .div files
program information files

0:45:58.279,0:46:00.549
as attachment

0:46:00.549,0:46:04.509
it was significant because it contained 
it's own SMTP engine

0:46:04.509,0:46:05.909
up until then

0:46:05.909,0:46:06.869
things have been

0:46:06.869,0:46:12.769
piggybacking on exchange so submitting
mail as though you were users submitting from

0:46:12.769,0:46:13.280
Outlook

0:46:13.280,0:46:14.399
this one

0:46:14.399,0:46:15.290
had

0:46:15.290,0:46:18.479
SMTP engine optimized for

0:46:18.479,0:46:20.239
sending out trash

0:46:20.239,0:46:27.239
It had adaptive context so it kept changing itself
so it was harder to find fingerprints and self-destructed

0:46:27.459,0:46:30.159
on a particular day. so something

0:46:30.159,0:46:32.509
automated to just kind of disappear

0:46:32.509,0:46:33.579
on one day

0:46:33.579,0:46:36.379
I don't think anybody knows why

0:46:36.379,0:46:40.910
all sort working on domain keys which is a another

0:46:40.910,0:46:45.920
technology for the authentication.I'll talk
about  that SPF later

0:46:45.920,0:46:51.239
the MyDoom virus came out it was even
 spread faster was even bigger than

0:46:51.239,0:46:52.329
sobig

0:46:52.329,0:46:53.539


0:46:53.539,0:46:57.479
it's big innovation was that it used network as

0:46:57.479,0:46:59.139
well as e-mail

0:46:59.139,0:47:03.979
and it was specifically designed to infect
machines to use them as spam engine so arguably

0:47:03.979,0:47:08.709
this was the beginning of Zombie farms

0:47:08.709,0:47:10.959
In February 2004

0:47:10.959,0:47:14.490
Microsoft announces sender id which was

0:47:14.490,0:47:17.249
really kind of SPF with

0:47:17.249,0:47:19.379
synthetic sure

0:47:19.379,0:47:24.239
and in December of four DKIM work began. DKIM was 

0:47:24.239,0:47:26.330
an extension of the domain keys

0:47:26.330,0:47:30.130
there were some experience with domain keys
we realize that there were some things that

0:47:30.130,0:47:31.640
needed too
0:47:31.640,0:47:35.079
have improved and so far I was very much involved
in the DKIM work

0:47:35.079,0:47:37.059
 so that's

0:47:37.059,0:47:41.219
unfortunately the five years I've been working
on this stuff now

0:47:41.219,0:47:43.059
and

0:47:43.059,0:47:44.270
2007

0:47:44.270,0:47:47.969
the actual DKIM based sign in spec was

0:47:47.969,0:47:50.900
released much to our relief

0:47:50.900,0:47:52.109
different tack

0:47:52.109,0:47:55.830
 some of the early RCs for EAI were published

0:47:55.830,0:47:58.239
 and

0:47:58.239,0:48:02.389
toward the end of last year EAI's email
address

0:48:02.389,0:48:04.939
e-mail address

0:48:04.939,0:48:06.319
internationalization

0:48:06.319,0:48:09.759
and the idea is you been able to send around

0:48:09.759,0:48:14.779
text in Japanese and so forth there
were hacks even have domain names in Japanese

0:48:14.779,0:48:17.160
but you couldn't have an e-mail

0:48:17.160,0:48:17.919
address

0:48:17.919,0:48:19.009
in Japanese

0:48:19.009,0:48:20.149
the EAI says

0:48:20.149,0:48:21.880
we want it to be

0:48:21.880,0:48:24.259
completely 100% international as
a whole

0:48:24.259,0:48:26.249
all through e-mail

0:48:26.249,0:48:28.380
a good thing

0:48:28.380,0:48:33.439
 a lot of people don't realize
that the venerable RC twenty twenty

0:48:33.439,0:48:35.619
one and twenty two which

0:48:35.619,0:48:39.899
were the other internal specs for years were
actually just recently

0:48:39.899,0:48:40.409
updated

0:48:40.409,0:48:44.709
so the new numbers you have to memorize are
fifty three twenty one in fifty three twenty

0:48:44.709,0:48:47.640
two

0:48:47.640,0:48:48.319
this

0:48:48.319,0:48:51.310
I was the latest map that I could find so
this

0:48:51.310,0:48:54.300
pretty old back in 1999 Bill
Cheswick

0:48:54.300,0:48:55.589
produced this

0:48:55.589,0:48:57.999
this does not show the hosts

0:48:57.999,0:49:00.769
on the internet this shows the ISPs

0:49:00.769,0:49:03.489
on the internet

0:49:03.489,0:49:06.779
and I won't go into any more detail

0:49:06.779,0:49:09.079
and I don't recall what the

0:49:09.079,0:49:10.409
calling yes

0:49:10.409,0:49:11.719
so

0:49:11.719,0:49:13.339
let me get into this this year

0:49:13.339,0:49:14.590


0:49:14.590,0:49:18.529
probably messaging spam security and authentication

0:49:18.529,0:49:23.519
so lets talk about spamming a little.
I wasn't going to talk about spamming but

0:49:23.519,0:49:28.629
ever since I got here people in asking
me about it so there's still a lot of interest about it

0:49:28.629,0:49:29.979
obviously

0:49:29.979,0:49:33.599
the stand is arguably an economic issue the cost

0:49:33.599,0:49:34.899
to send

0:49:34.899,0:49:40.429
a message is far lower than the cost to receive
it

0:49:40.429,0:49:42.160
if this were true of

0:49:42.160,0:49:44.759
physical junk mail

0:49:44.759,0:49:49.100
then a dump mail truck would come up to my house every
day and just dump all the junk mail

0:49:49.100,0:49:51.269
off on my lawn

0:49:51.269,0:49:53.559
but it's not fortunately

0:49:53.559,0:49:57.150
notice that that possible misuse isn't  necessarily
about

0:49:57.150,0:49:59.819
dollars or yen  or anything like that

0:49:59.819,0:50:04.199
it's not currency it can be things like CPU time memory usage

0:50:04.199,0:50:06.519
human time etc

0:50:06.519,0:50:09.530
notice that every single thing we try to do

0:50:09.530,0:50:12.440
to protect ourselves from spam until this
point

0:50:12.440,0:50:16.049
has increased the cost to the receiver

0:50:16.049,0:50:20.239
so as we put in more and more antispam security what actually

0:50:20.239,0:50:21.479
move this function

0:50:21.479,0:50:24.479
to be more advantageous for the spammer

0:50:24.479,0:50:27.839
its a little strange

0:50:27.839,0:50:29.690
now there are a bunch of

0:50:29.690,0:50:30.570
possible approaches

0:50:30.570,0:50:32.989
there is of course

0:50:32.989,0:50:35.519
content filtering which is what

0:50:35.519,0:50:40.129
people normally do for example ninety days
and filters and so forth this is getting

0:50:40.129,0:50:44.299
pretty close to its limits and it doesn't
fix the crossfire

0:50:44.299,0:50:49.060
epostage which is what you really do  
use some kind of money you can

0:50:49.060,0:50:52.449
attach it to each message

0:50:52.449,0:50:53.919
unfortunately needed any

0:50:53.919,0:50:58.559
pretty huge infrastructure to do all that
payment processing and

0:50:58.559,0:51:01.169
that's there's a lot of bickering on how to
do that

0:51:01.169,0:51:04.099
and acceptance problems. people don't

0:51:04.099,0:51:08.649
but it's always been afraid i refuse to pay anything
to send a message that

0:51:08.649,0:51:10.909
we're going to ask you to do

0:51:10.909,0:51:12.400
a tenth of a cent

0:51:12.400,0:51:18.709
hundredth of the cent promotes per message.
no no its too expensive.  I can't afford it

0:51:18.709,0:51:23.479
that's a legitimate concerns about some elements
that sort of thing they're work around

0:51:23.479,0:51:24.999
challenge response is

0:51:24.999,0:51:26.350
popular

0:51:26.350,0:51:31.020
when you get mail from someone the never talked
to before you send them back challenge if they

0:51:31.020,0:51:35.739
would respond there's a human
being on the other hand what the bill through

0:51:35.739,0:51:37.039
unfortunately a lot of

0:51:37.039,0:51:37.650
people

0:51:37.650,0:51:41.319
get the challenges are spam and never replied

0:51:41.319,0:51:47.049
five thousand scale well it's particularly
bad for

0:51:47.049,0:51:50.350
automated systems that are trying to send out mail
like your bank

0:51:50.350,0:51:52.430
sending your bank statements

0:51:52.430,0:51:54.599
just don't respond well to that

0:51:54.599,0:51:56.239
challenge response

0:51:56.239,0:51:58.230
havshcash is 

0:51:58.230,0:52:01.179
technique to do CPU 

0:52:01.179,0:52:02.270
using time

0:52:02.270,0:52:04.469
CPU time memory

0:52:04.469,0:52:05.199
whatever

0:52:05.199,0:52:10.180
it's completely useless for Zombie farms because
they're not burning their own resources they're

0:52:10.180,0:52:10.680
burning

0:52:10.680,0:52:14.099
some victims resources so what's the point

0:52:14.099,0:52:18.829
gray listing is where you get a message from
somebody that you never seen before you

0:52:18.829,0:52:21.559
do a temporary failure on it

0:52:21.559,0:52:26.249
and wait for them to come back is there is
generally don't have a cue as a cue is

0:52:26.249,0:52:27.259
expensive

0:52:27.259,0:52:30.469
but it turns out they don't actually have
to have a cue because they don't change

0:52:30.469,0:52:33.079
the message very much that isn't it

0:52:33.079,0:52:36.989
he trying these things multiple times are
going back to keep track of what happened

0:52:36.989,0:52:41.549
before you just try multiple times if three
copies of their message gets through all the better

0:52:41.549,0:52:44.779
that

0:52:44.779,0:52:48.130
and on of course authentication that this
is the

0:52:48.130,0:52:51.379
if we know who actually sent the message

0:52:51.379,0:52:54.099
maybe we can hunt down and kill them

0:52:54.099,0:52:54.750
the

0:52:54.750,0:52:56.539


0:52:56.539,0:52:58.019
maybe not kill them

0:52:58.019,0:53:00.049
there's something a little less

0:53:00.049,0:53:05.600
that is insufficient by itself people go how
well what authenticated that's good right

0:53:05.600,0:53:09.499
well spammer can authenticate
as themselves

0:53:09.499,0:53:16.499
so you're saying it's authenticate it doesn't
mean it's still something you don't want to read

0:53:16.529,0:53:17.519
so

0:53:17.519,0:53:19.749
let me just talk about fish in the little
bit

0:53:19.749,0:53:22.750
fishing and spamming are not quite the same
thing although there's often

0:53:22.750,0:53:24.459
a lot of overlap

0:53:24.459,0:53:28.679
fishing is trying to track some money into
giving up some cards had a private information

0:53:28.679,0:53:33.939
too often to get a bank account information
or older than he needed to identity theft

0:53:33.939,0:53:37.599
it's not limited to do e-mail and it's not

0:53:37.599,0:53:42.220
the Nigerian or four nineteen spam was working
in physical mail

0:53:42.220,0:53:45.699
long before it hit the-mail I have personally
receive

0:53:45.699,0:53:47.859
those badly typed

0:53:47.859,0:53:48.849
letters

0:53:48.849,0:53:54.720
that were exactly of four elections than I
am and Nigerian dictator in these to get

0:53:54.720,0:54:01.099
a hundred million dollars out and you've been
identified as the trustworthy dot dot dot

0:54:01.099,0:54:05.430
pranksters have been preying  on the elderly
as long as there have been elderly

0:54:05.430,0:54:09.029
 so for none of this is new

0:54:09.029,0:54:10.170
that's true

0:54:10.170,0:54:14.859
basic forms of vision was one call your shop
and fishing which is really just

0:54:14.859,0:54:19.759
send out these things to enough people I hope
in some ways to promote the body

0:54:19.759,0:54:22.669
which works by the way unfortunately

0:54:22.669,0:54:27.589
are there still people think you can get something
for nothing

0:54:27.589,0:54:30.079
well what's being called spear fishing

0:54:30.079,0:54:31.890
he is actually pretty bad

0:54:31.890,0:54:37.259
this is where they actually spend a fair amount
of time researching an individual

0:54:37.259,0:54:39.889
they do a custom-made

0:54:39.889,0:54:40.939
message

0:54:40.939,0:54:47.120
I have received some of these things that
for example claim to be from the IRS saying that

0:54:47.120,0:54:48.369
so no I didn't

0:54:48.369,0:54:52.130
something earlier about this them

0:54:52.130,0:54:53.339
some of them

0:54:53.339,0:54:58.469
with some of our forms somewhere and it has
leader urgent that we contact some so immediately

0:54:58.469,0:54:59.230
or else

0:54:59.230,0:55:00.859
then the forced

0:55:00.859,0:55:01.979
we're actually were

0:55:01.979,0:55:04.479
forced to freeze all of our bank accounts

0:55:04.479,0:55:09.670
and so forth they know who I am and also with the company

0:55:09.670,0:55:12.959
not a thing that people will do it is %uh

0:55:12.959,0:55:14.649
people throw away

0:55:14.649,0:55:18.269
but bank saying some things that have the
last four digits of your account number on

0:55:18.269,0:55:18.759
it

0:55:18.759,0:55:22.189
which is perfectly safe because they don't
have a whole credit card number

0:55:22.189,0:55:23.900
well I'm wrong that right

0:55:23.900,0:55:26.060
all that out dumpster no I didn't

0:55:26.060,0:55:29.189
they send you a letter claiming to be from
your

0:55:29.189,0:55:30.980
%uh credit card prior

0:55:30.980,0:55:35.570
they have the last four digits of your account
number to give you exactly the same information

0:55:35.570,0:55:36.770
that you're legitimate

0:55:36.770,0:55:40.389
credit card company would

0:55:40.389,0:55:41.239
and

0:55:41.239,0:55:43.159
that's a lot easier to trick people

0:55:43.159,0:55:46.819
they can't stand significant money

0:55:46.819,0:55:49.329
talking to someone

0:55:49.329,0:55:51.849
so up

0:55:51.849,0:55:54.549
one other thing about the fishing know which
is

0:55:54.549,0:55:58.690
but the cracker what I just described attackers
lot of Harvard be

0:55:58.690,0:56:00.480
pretend to be someone you trust

0:56:00.480,0:56:05.160
an authentication can actually help with that
if it claims to be from one bank and would

0:56:05.160,0:56:06.799
not from my bank

0:56:06.799,0:56:11.089
and we're done

0:56:11.089,0:56:11.900


0:56:11.900,0:56:15.399
there's really two forms of authentication

0:56:15.399,0:56:16.859
and the standards

0:56:16.859,0:56:20.839
I'm not stand ready an FBI forms of half days

0:56:20.839,0:56:22.620
plus which is where where you look

0:56:22.620,0:56:25.539
our message across to you whose sending

0:56:25.539,0:56:29.579
they're sending the message to you and is
it possible that they would be sending a message

0:56:29.579,0:56:31.799
claiming to be from my bank

0:56:31.799,0:56:34.420
they were signature base which is where you
do

0:56:34.420,0:56:38.599
he's public encryption to do put digital signature
on the message

0:56:38.599,0:56:41.380
I mean there are these

0:56:41.380,0:56:46.129
authenticate users a lot of the key domains
because of the key management problems

0:56:46.129,0:56:49.950
and both of them can authenticate malicious 
messages so this

0:56:49.950,0:56:52.549
not perfect

0:56:52.549,0:56:56.200
it did him in

0:56:56.200,0:56:57.970
potentially the cold war

0:56:57.970,0:56:59.869
consistently if we could get

0:56:59.869,0:57:01.319
Bob the entire network

0:57:01.319,0:57:03.449
to never mind your message

0:57:03.449,0:57:09.049
I wish probably can happen in hundred years
or so

0:57:09.049,0:57:13.589
I didn't get a talk show on this you know
who wants to be the first person sons message

0:57:13.589,0:57:14.389
well

0:57:14.389,0:57:16.969
we expected the recipients would want that

0:57:16.969,0:57:21.100
because they want to protect themselves but
it turns out has been descenders like the banks

0:57:21.100,0:57:24.069
they have really really been pushing us

0:57:24.069,0:57:27.529
plus some of the forward looking

0:57:27.529,0:57:28.670
places like Google

0:57:28.670,0:57:34.499
have been using DKIMand of the SP
up for some time

0:57:34.499,0:57:35.800
one important thing

0:57:35.800,0:57:37.359
for a transition period

0:57:37.359,0:57:39.169
you have to

0:57:39.169,0:57:41.859
allow unsigned mail to come in

0:57:41.859,0:57:43.790
because that's the way it's always been

0:57:43.790,0:57:46.520
and he can't just bring the world that we've
moved in

0:57:46.520,0:57:48.070
we will never have

0:57:48.070,0:57:52.769
another flag day on the internet like that
and just can't happen at this point

0:57:52.769,0:57:58.709
so what you'd like is for a the banks and
to be able to somehow tell you I signed all

0:57:58.709,0:58:00.939
my message is so if you

0:58:00.939,0:58:05.889
but if you get an unsigned message that claims
to be for me it's not for me

0:58:05.889,0:58:10.229
interior up argument signed in Paris is eight
the SP

0:58:10.229,0:58:12.890
and this is very controversial and still

0:58:12.890,0:58:16.199
stuck in the working group

0:58:16.199,0:58:19.880
I want to emphasize that

0:58:19.880,0:58:21.799
evacuations is not

0:58:21.799,0:58:24.639
because members can authenticate

0:58:24.639,0:58:30.609
and we can't leave it to humans either because
of things like cousin domains

0:58:30.609,0:58:34.989
but he had a Ebay billing was a famous one
that was not associate with

0:58:34.989,0:58:36.699
the bay in any way

0:58:36.699,0:58:39.689
and was trying to frighten people

0:58:39.689,0:58:42.299
so let me talk a little bit about the camera

0:58:42.299,0:58:45.149
which is what I've been working on mostly

0:58:45.149,0:58:47.959
I just wanted to specifications

0:58:47.959,0:58:48.980
one is the

0:58:48.980,0:58:54.929
the signature at the base standards which tells
how to sign and verified message

0:58:54.929,0:58:56.840
I've heard a lot of work and the other one

0:58:56.840,0:59:02.090
no one is the sign in practices which is how
to interpret on science messages on that one

0:59:02.090,0:59:04.989
has gotten laid down in the works

0:59:04.989,0:59:06.529
and at this point on

0:59:06.529,0:59:08.939
I walked away from it because

0:59:08.939,0:59:10.129
that's amazing

0:59:10.129,0:59:13.049
how many hours people can spend arguing about

0:59:13.049,0:59:14.719
the meaning of

0:59:14.719,0:59:19.359
relatively simple words

0:59:19.359,0:59:21.439
the way you can get away with it

0:59:21.439,0:59:28.299
is to use other DMS to destroy your
public he's since policies can indeed be public

0:59:28.299,0:59:31.599
you are rich off of this exist in the world
war

0:59:31.599,0:59:34.479
distributed database to get the keys out

0:59:34.479,0:59:37.490
this is a little unusual because normally

0:59:37.490,0:59:40.349
you don't have something that is so simple
to this

0:59:40.349,0:59:45.430
we do not by the way he serves we don't have
a assigning tree or anything like that it's

0:59:45.430,0:59:47.469
just to keep pair

0:59:47.469,0:59:49.119
because if you're asking

0:59:49.119,0:59:53.269
the purported Sendmail to give you the republican
or

0:59:53.269,0:59:54.639
reported sender

0:59:54.639,0:59:56.199
to give them

0:59:56.199,1:00:00.109
their home and he give you their publication

1:00:00.109,1:00:01.309
I mean

1:00:01.309,1:00:03.299
presumably contrast that

1:00:03.299,1:00:04.369
presumably

1:00:04.369,1:00:05.809
now there are people who

1:00:05.809,1:00:07.709
would like to put search

1:00:07.709,1:00:11.749
and investigators social security that probably
will go through some point

1:00:11.749,1:00:14.339
but it probably won't be necessary

1:00:14.339,1:00:17.729
with the the

1:00:17.729,1:00:18.729
I'm

1:00:18.729,1:00:23.079
possibility of theft of keys is one of the
nice ones is

1:00:23.079,1:00:25.799
if you get mail

1:00:25.799,1:00:30.900
they signed from a domain you don't know about
how do you know that that's a good omen were

1:00:30.900,1:00:33.940
not while reputation which I've got to

1:00:33.940,1:00:37.079
is the major approach but if you had

1:00:37.079,1:00:42.549
it's signed by someone that has served so
the key itself was signed by someone else

1:00:42.549,1:00:45.799
you could ask is that

1:00:45.799,1:00:49.890
and that gives you some of the reputation
is called of

1:00:49.890,1:00:52.640
%uh accreditation

1:00:52.640,1:00:56.269
and it sort of gives you the poor man's her
accreditation

1:00:56.269,1:00:59.619
%uh they're also of course the places that
wants to

1:00:59.619,1:01:04.219
I was moved towards first because they can't
make a living so on

1:01:04.219,1:01:07.979
as they think this is a fine idea is building

1:01:07.979,1:01:11.319
what was the

1:01:11.319,1:01:16.079
it really did do it obviously would

1:01:16.079,1:01:19.109
that's that's

1:01:19.109,1:01:21.219
what's the response

1:01:21.219,1:01:23.069
there is nobody there

1:01:23.069,1:01:24.739
yes

1:01:24.739,1:01:27.230
the you have built into your browser

1:01:27.230,1:01:30.910
Obama assures jurors that are prosperous should
say

1:01:30.910,1:01:33.779
Sonya forties that are trusted

1:01:33.779,1:01:39.469
it because you believe that they're not going
to start really signing one ski

1:01:39.469,1:01:40.640
exactly the same thing

1:01:40.640,1:01:43.479
think for a minute

1:01:43.479,1:01:46.130
the quality the city

1:01:46.130,1:01:49.159
yeah

1:01:49.159,1:01:50.469
the

1:01:50.469,1:01:56.160
you can first of all a matter of places that
would actually

1:01:56.160,1:02:00.349
make sure that you are legitimate but you
at least have a mailing address that really

1:02:00.349,1:02:01.529
works

1:02:01.529,1:02:06.219
that the people who claimed on the company
actually exists

1:02:06.219,1:02:09.799
simple things like that and somebody could
make a fair amount of money

1:02:09.799,1:02:13.069
the in certifying agency that

1:02:13.069,1:02:14.429
this is your views

1:02:14.429,1:02:19.169
to sign anything where they had check you
out for

1:02:19.169,1:02:22.599
they and there are places that do that for
the world as well but you're right some of

1:02:22.599,1:02:23.449
them are

1:02:23.449,1:02:27.459
in a tent lots of course inside turkey

1:02:27.459,1:02:30.619
sometimes it's not that expensive

1:02:30.619,1:02:33.099
%um

1:02:33.099,1:02:37.799
an hour to talk about signing practices unfortunately
it's got water down to the point where our

1:02:37.799,1:02:44.039
in my opinion it's not terribly useful in
or

1:02:44.039,1:02:49.049
so we're at the station is the usual way you
deal with that

1:02:49.049,1:02:50.130
the message too

1:02:50.130,1:02:54.059
I threw it out of the message comes from the
bagel in Dakar

1:02:54.059,1:02:59.069
okay because I've gotten their public he is
verify is so important step in mathematics

1:02:59.069,1:03:00.370
and cruel

1:03:00.370,1:03:01.709
provable

1:03:01.709,1:03:08.359
Joe I want to talk to he made a one dot com
don't believe them go on record on that one

1:03:08.359,1:03:13.869
and the usual approach his reputation what
we know about you being the one dot com

1:03:13.869,1:03:15.029
that reputation

1:03:15.029,1:03:17.179
it's been around for a long time

1:03:17.179,1:03:19.689
in the form of Diana's black homeless

1:03:19.689,1:03:26.249
as only negative reputation can say but it
remains good of the comoros a that

1:03:26.249,1:03:28.049
and of course

1:03:28.049,1:03:32.639
bad guys are switching around like he addresses
all time so

1:03:32.639,1:03:35.429
those lists are always tell

1:03:35.429,1:03:37.959
so in fact

1:03:37.959,1:03:38.599
helpful

1:03:38.599,1:03:42.480
but it's not actually all that great the main
event he gives you his

1:03:42.480,1:03:45.109
they a black hole

1:03:45.109,1:03:47.170
huge address bases that are

1:03:47.170,1:03:48.729
%um

1:03:48.729,1:03:51.519
for example dialogue but he

1:03:51.519,1:03:52.459
don't love

1:03:52.459,1:03:56.430
like the address this thing know nobody should
ever be sending

1:03:56.430,1:04:00.280
mail from those demands that don't go through
their providers mail services and that action

1:04:00.280,1:04:02.599
does help a lot

1:04:02.599,1:04:06.380
positive reputation on the other hand is really
hard to do

1:04:06.380,1:04:11.149
our because it breaks the world as we know
it

1:04:11.149,1:04:16.049
so right now there has been some sense a presumption
of innocence

1:04:16.049,1:04:20.239
when you receive email from so that you've
never seen it before well it might be would

1:04:20.239,1:04:21.829
you let me go

1:04:21.829,1:04:22.889
Spanish actor

1:04:22.889,1:04:26.159
so for but it might be legitimate

1:04:26.159,1:04:30.729
if you go to a world where you looked out
and say well if they have no

1:04:30.729,1:04:32.579
known reputation

1:04:32.579,1:04:36.549
there is probably bad think it's probably
a stammer as the jury

1:04:36.549,1:04:37.849
you know thousand

1:04:37.849,1:04:40.359
I can remember what the

1:04:40.359,1:04:42.409
number is ours

1:04:42.409,1:04:44.569
thousands of new domain stumble

1:04:44.569,1:04:46.199
online every day

1:04:46.199,1:04:49.749
first anniversary exists only for a day or
so and then they go away

1:04:49.749,1:04:53.369
to send a lot of the middle of the day

1:04:53.369,1:04:54.289
so

1:04:54.289,1:04:58.099
how does does a small player join the club

1:04:58.099,1:05:04.229
without having a positive reputation to begin
with the legitimate small player

1:05:04.229,1:05:05.829
this is

1:05:05.829,1:05:08.989
still a months old pro

1:05:08.989,1:05:11.849
we may end up going to a closed society

1:05:11.849,1:05:14.920
if you don't have somebody to introduce to
you

1:05:14.920,1:05:15.529
then

1:05:15.529,1:05:17.599
you can't get your mail for

1:05:17.599,1:05:22.619
%uh this is actually been true in human society
for a long long time so it's not the end of

1:05:22.619,1:05:26.279
the world but it does have some

1:05:26.279,1:05:28.199
unfortunate

1:05:28.199,1:05:31.480
implications and there's going to have to
be exceptions sales tax

1:05:31.480,1:05:38.480
anything that Tom Foley is going to want to
reject mail from people that heard of before

1:05:38.749,1:05:42.300
about I will point out challenge responses
of a chance to

1:05:42.300,1:05:45.019
this is to create a closed society

1:05:45.019,1:05:46.679
we have

1:05:46.679,1:05:48.519
attacks in their house

1:05:48.519,1:05:52.359
if you will a proven true test to try and
see if there's a human being on the other

1:05:52.359,1:05:54.199
end of the line

1:05:54.199,1:05:57.229
as a lot of places that would love to do it
credit nation

1:05:57.229,1:05:58.889
which is where they'll say

1:05:58.889,1:06:01.039
how about for you

1:06:01.039,1:06:02.949
for a fee

1:06:02.949,1:06:04.850
even having the base of money

1:06:04.850,1:06:08.339
does have value because they have to give
it credit card number

1:06:08.339,1:06:11.270
and it has to go through the crack of service
in your

1:06:11.270,1:06:12.339
essentially

1:06:12.339,1:06:13.880
one emerging off the

1:06:13.880,1:06:16.309
credit cards

1:06:16.309,1:06:18.609
companies work on reputation

1:06:18.609,1:06:19.869
well I don't know

1:06:19.869,1:06:21.399
the possibility

1:06:21.399,1:06:23.439
the likelihood of

1:06:23.439,1:06:29.269
stolen credit cards

1:06:29.269,1:06:32.189
what a lot of people say it as well you know
we

1:06:32.189,1:06:33.989
why don't we just

1:06:33.989,1:06:37.919
here's another media messages

1:06:37.919,1:06:43.209
yes well as a messenger who doesn't have spent
all that's why I did it get

1:06:43.209,1:06:48.619
message is pretty much every day from so and
so sexy teenage foxy girls

1:06:48.619,1:06:51.369
morning to get it wrong with me

1:06:51.369,1:06:53.409
Collins then as it's called

1:06:53.409,1:06:56.640
on is has been a problem for a while it is
doing that

1:06:56.640,1:06:58.939
yeah

1:06:58.939,1:07:00.280
authentication helps

1:07:00.280,1:07:04.279
but it's just too easy to get

1:07:04.279,1:07:08.169
all social networking storage tank was the
problem will just use

1:07:08.169,1:07:09.499
social networking

1:07:09.499,1:07:11.619
and use that for all or up

1:07:11.619,1:07:15.299
e-mail and in so you've got to be a friend
of mine

1:07:15.299,1:07:19.829
well it turns out has recently there's been
a lot of publicity

1:07:19.829,1:07:22.209
of worms in virus is that going to

1:07:22.209,1:07:24.939
%uh my face and Facebook and

1:07:24.939,1:07:28.609
what not an issue

1:07:28.609,1:07:31.649
you are you will accidentally

1:07:31.649,1:07:33.929
sanders down to your friends

1:07:33.929,1:07:36.599
it would generally come from you

1:07:36.599,1:07:37.529
and so they

1:07:37.529,1:07:41.479
are more likely to trust you so what is actually
almost

1:07:41.479,1:07:43.099
works

1:07:43.099,1:07:43.790
them

1:07:43.790,1:07:46.219
the male staffer

1:07:46.219,1:07:48.519
and it's this

1:07:48.519,1:07:51.109
on internet telephony spam spam over internet

1:07:51.109,1:07:52.339
it taught me

1:07:52.339,1:07:55.469
on his was just placed a growth industry

1:07:55.469,1:07:57.919
I wish is going to get

1:07:57.919,1:07:59.139
unbelievably bad

1:07:59.139,1:08:00.449
sometime soon

1:08:00.449,1:08:05.529
so some speculations on the future here that
these are speculations my opinion

1:08:05.529,1:08:09.819
I can't justify the runway

1:08:09.819,1:08:11.149
miss first term

1:08:11.149,1:08:12.839
I think we will get

1:08:12.839,1:08:14.739
some authenticated mail out there

1:08:14.739,1:08:18.789
%uh there will be some center reputation and
we'll roll

1:08:18.789,1:08:22.079
with time it will grow as quickly as i'd like

1:08:22.079,1:08:23.509
they've done it will

1:08:23.509,1:08:25.439
happen and it will start to grow

1:08:25.439,1:08:27.859
and it will be useful in only

1:08:27.859,1:08:31.710
because when you can get of not people

1:08:31.710,1:08:34.119
authenticated and they have good reputation

1:08:34.119,1:08:39.489
the probability that the other male is then
goes us the and actually

1:08:39.489,1:08:41.960
Tarnoff use them filters sensitivity

1:08:41.960,1:08:44.079
so if you will it will be a

1:08:44.079,1:08:46.759
well why didn't he was around

1:08:46.759,1:08:50.770
existence of them soldiers not something that
is this by itself

1:08:50.770,1:08:55.000
all we will see movement toward e-mail address
internationalization once again is going to

1:08:55.000,1:08:56.529
be relatively slow

1:08:56.529,1:09:01.689
the reason for that is because there's a part
of our problem not which is downgrading

1:09:01.689,1:09:02.880
a message for men

1:09:02.880,1:09:04.659
in our national life

1:09:04.659,1:09:05.900
Mel which by the way

1:09:05.900,1:09:08.849
what they're looking at it saying we're going
to use you Sheila Tate

1:09:08.849,1:09:12.000
for everything we're talking to declare the
characters that we just

1:09:12.000,1:09:13.730
he issued yesterday

1:09:13.730,1:09:16.619
with low vision done years ago

1:09:16.619,1:09:17.819
Bob that

1:09:17.819,1:09:22.809
taking AZT a great message and downgrading
them soon ask the message it is

1:09:22.809,1:09:24.420
almost impossible

1:09:24.420,1:09:25.690
and I did

1:09:25.690,1:09:27.099
and that's important

1:09:27.099,1:09:32.889
the daylights tensions in to send them all
and release them yet

1:09:32.889,1:09:37.249
try to do the downgrading and finally came
to the conclusion that there's certain things

1:09:37.249,1:09:39.139
we just have to guess

1:09:39.139,1:09:41.989
and you might not guess right all the time

1:09:41.989,1:09:43.830
so my inclination to say

1:09:43.830,1:09:47.589
I will not allow downgrading

1:09:47.589,1:09:52.139
the FAA on the message will bounce back me
up set down great message to begin with that

1:09:52.139,1:09:56.360
will slow adoption

1:09:56.360,1:10:00.719
the people young people in particular are
moving off of us and to keep this now we're

1:10:00.719,1:10:05.199
going into things like playing on people's
walls and Facebook

1:10:05.199,1:10:07.250
polymarker warnings investigating

1:10:07.250,1:10:12.659
so forth that is going to continue

1:10:12.659,1:10:15.679
take pot

1:10:15.679,1:10:17.340
a lot of people say

1:10:17.340,1:10:19.250
partially because people them

1:10:19.250,1:10:22.510
moving on to these things that are said to
be is that

1:10:22.510,1:10:24.340
but I think that indeed he is dead

1:10:24.340,1:10:26.010
what would that send to AP

1:10:26.010,1:10:28.280
as and he's not going away

1:10:28.280,1:10:30.860
a lot of reasons

1:10:30.860,1:10:34.860
are some things that could be dealt with this
one of the big proposals is to switch from

1:10:34.860,1:10:37.059
a portion or all of the-mail where

1:10:37.059,1:10:38.380
the center

1:10:38.380,1:10:39.830
connects to the recipient

1:10:39.830,1:10:41.420
this year's the male take it

1:10:41.420,1:10:43.159
to uphold

1:10:43.159,1:10:47.649
model where the recipient just sends a short
message to have male for you here and then

1:10:47.649,1:10:48.789
the

1:10:48.789,1:10:49.880
recipient

1:10:49.880,1:10:51.159
polls back for it

1:10:51.159,1:10:53.219
when it's convenient for them to do so

1:10:53.219,1:10:55.909
that does show that the cost function

1:10:55.909,1:10:57.699
so the %uh

1:10:57.699,1:11:00.020
the center actually has to

1:11:00.020,1:11:01.210
have some of

1:11:01.210,1:11:04.900
infrastructure there they have to be prepared
to use the word was mail

1:11:04.900,1:11:09.110
that's not true

1:11:09.110,1:11:12.399
he's still going to be in the essence the
structure I think

1:11:12.399,1:11:16.869
the essentially is a sensible and can do almost
anything with the exceptions it's going to

1:11:16.869,1:11:17.890
be good enough

1:11:17.890,1:11:19.780
for a long time

1:11:19.780,1:11:20.789
I think

1:11:20.789,1:11:26.360
in the medium term we will succeed in getting
the GSA absolutely everywhere

1:11:26.360,1:11:30.689
that's about the only people who have to ask
the e-mail will be

1:11:30.689,1:11:34.979
the people who listen to peace are rich and
other pressures and they can't go out and

1:11:34.979,1:11:36.620
upgrade the

1:11:36.620,1:11:40.760
of so I I'm pretty optimistic on that

1:11:40.760,1:11:41.920
and

1:11:41.920,1:11:44.900
most e-mail is going to end up being opposed
to the providers

1:11:44.900,1:11:48.039
it's gotten so much harder to run in this
juror

1:11:48.039,1:11:51.440
now than it was twenty years ago or ten years
ago were you

1:11:51.440,1:11:53.760
five years ago for a lot of reasons

1:11:53.760,1:11:56.419
the gallery reasons for example

1:11:56.419,1:12:01.670
there's a lot of new laws that apply to the
mail and retention and so forth

1:12:01.670,1:12:06.440
you really don't want to push that off onto
somebody else who can worry about it so

1:12:06.440,1:12:09.790
lots of companies for example who used to
run the Romanov's jurors

1:12:09.790,1:12:12.089
are moving to Jeanette

1:12:12.089,1:12:13.230
and I think you'll see

1:12:13.230,1:12:15.239
more of that I think you'll see a lot

1:12:15.239,1:12:16.169
more of that

1:12:16.169,1:12:17.989
I don't think we'll get to the

1:12:17.989,1:12:21.489
place where there are three companies in the
entire world that

1:12:21.489,1:12:23.400
have-mailboxes

1:12:23.400,1:12:26.920
although there would actually be certain advantages
to that

1:12:26.920,1:12:29.270
they won't get any more like that but

1:12:29.270,1:12:32.459
of small companies

1:12:32.459,1:12:37.729
don't want to deal with that

1:12:37.729,1:12:39.639
so some larger thoughts

1:12:39.639,1:12:45.449
%uh casual messaging well and he continued
to move away from essence few days now

1:12:45.449,1:12:48.440
you see more and more start going through
this book

1:12:48.440,1:12:50.300
%um %um

1:12:50.300,1:12:52.969
more and more self-government arrangements
again

1:12:52.969,1:12:55.129
people forty eight

1:12:55.129,1:12:57.189
instant gratification

1:12:57.189,1:13:00.440
and I am give somebody a man told us

1:13:00.440,1:13:03.869
he also sits there with mobile usage and

1:13:03.869,1:13:07.770
is there anyone in this room who is not secure
and one of these

1:13:07.770,1:13:12.189
anyone who wants to admit that their letter
I didn't think so

1:13:12.189,1:13:15.360
I e-mail is not going to die

1:13:15.360,1:13:16.329
on this

1:13:16.329,1:13:18.610
been predicted that that's just not true

1:13:18.610,1:13:20.420
it's to us into business

1:13:20.420,1:13:24.980
it's to a lawsuit in places where you can
really yes and water message

1:13:24.980,1:13:27.760
you have to think about what you're saying

1:13:27.760,1:13:29.149
for the standard

1:13:29.149,1:13:31.949
%uh it's the if you got

1:13:31.949,1:13:34.709
security and regulatory issues up

1:13:34.709,1:13:37.949
there are real problems with instant message
in

1:13:37.949,1:13:43.110
one of the things is it totally artificial
is that tax to have some us

1:13:43.110,1:13:47.349
I saw a lot of money in a light two cents
attacks

1:13:47.349,1:13:49.360
constant so companies as euro

1:13:49.360,1:13:54.329
to do that effectively zero when they put
this cost on it and they're making

1:13:54.329,1:13:55.230
fortune

1:13:55.230,1:13:56.400
off of that

1:13:56.400,1:14:00.320
and that will be enough people say I don't
want to pay a tenth of a cent for e-mail but

1:14:00.320,1:14:01.549
there will end soon

1:14:01.549,1:14:04.000
the two sides for anathema us

1:14:04.000,1:14:05.820
this is crazy

1:14:05.820,1:14:07.489
I'm hoping that won't go away

1:14:07.489,1:14:11.260
the other thing is that as you get into the
business world were more you're dealing with

1:14:11.260,1:14:12.909
people across time zones

1:14:12.909,1:14:14.510
%uh when you're a hacker

1:14:14.510,1:14:16.810
and you're up around the clock ticking away

1:14:16.810,1:14:21.410
that's not such a big deal but when we start
to get into the more conventional world actually

1:14:21.410,1:14:22.489
kind of the monarchy

1:14:22.489,1:14:24.190
and you get married you have kids

1:14:24.190,1:14:25.239
he started

1:14:25.239,1:14:28.679
go on to a more conventional schedule

1:14:28.679,1:14:30.079
that distinction

1:14:30.079,1:14:31.370
that's what you know

1:14:31.370,1:14:32.760
he's investigating

1:14:32.760,1:14:38.780
and even voice he's going to be were it's
already boring as it were and more than that

1:14:38.780,1:14:41.270
I actually were talking about that

1:14:41.270,1:14:44.019
of little bit in the last one

1:14:44.019,1:14:48.900
and I think there's a lot of very interesting
work to be done again the computer human interface

1:14:48.900,1:14:49.949
of the-mail

1:14:49.949,1:14:51.589
right now the-mail

1:14:51.589,1:14:54.479
but e-mails started off as a in box here

1:14:54.479,1:14:56.489
Carol Millhouse you go through them

1:14:56.489,1:15:00.639
it's gotten to the point where it's sort of
like it down secretary him to sort out the

1:15:00.639,1:15:01.550
junk mail

1:15:01.550,1:15:02.959
and give you the rest of it

1:15:02.959,1:15:06.670
e-mails should be news of New York should
say he messaging

1:15:06.670,1:15:08.380
is there any light eight

1:15:08.380,1:15:10.409
really the executive and then

1:15:10.409,1:15:13.810
who knows what it is you're doing can deal
with

1:15:13.810,1:15:18.030
and that is so rotten that stuff that you
actually cancer this stuff

1:15:18.030,1:15:18.849
where is not

1:15:18.849,1:15:20.400
a difficult time

1:15:20.400,1:15:24.840
who can sort of the things into an order and
say this is the most important thing for you

1:15:24.840,1:15:27.300
to deal with right now

1:15:27.300,1:15:30.880
your mind you know when someone for meeting
is coming up

1:15:30.880,1:15:31.980
who will

1:15:31.980,1:15:33.020
you know when

1:15:33.020,1:15:37.319
you call a meeting and people have responded
will go off and and

1:15:37.319,1:15:38.340
do you know about it

1:15:38.340,1:15:40.260
etc, etc.

1:15:40.260,1:15:45.389
there's a huge amount of work that can happen
here

1:15:45.389,1:15:49.479
what scares me is unified message in almost
a month or

1:15:49.479,1:15:52.969
too many messaging services in applications
out there

1:15:52.969,1:15:55.919
well I think there's too much

1:15:55.919,1:15:58.330
overlap and there's not enough compatibility

1:15:58.330,1:16:00.989
I want to show you a little chart that I made
up

1:16:00.989,1:16:02.560
just lost couple days

1:16:02.560,1:16:09.560
all of the services in applications on the
stars are ones by personal use

1:16:10.520,1:16:15.219
just run through this week or two

1:16:15.219,1:16:17.110
we start with Haiti and it

1:16:17.110,1:16:20.599
originally started out as an ally and application

1:16:20.599,1:16:26.719
it does I am really does that somehow some
lawyers Roosevelt for Israel

1:16:26.719,1:16:32.040
bosses from the board life where I think also
for him or whatever it does have its own address

1:16:32.040,1:16:33.800
book

1:16:33.800,1:16:35.409
the hum

1:16:35.409,1:16:36.729
right

1:16:36.729,1:16:40.110
on or is it was designed originally as a up

1:16:40.110,1:16:41.739
of course acquisitions

1:16:41.739,1:16:43.630
but it's not a all right and wrong headed

1:16:43.630,1:16:45.509
it's kind of a deal now

1:16:45.509,1:16:50.729
it will called for him

1:16:50.729,1:16:52.169
%um

1:16:52.169,1:16:54.489
for additional money

1:16:54.489,1:16:56.460
you can't do that by definition is that

1:16:56.460,1:16:59.199
for additional monies was time for a little

1:16:59.199,1:17:00.540
in the case

1:17:00.540,1:17:02.339
money changes hands

1:17:02.339,1:17:07.219
you know that's a nice for income in or outgoing
calls so I am

1:17:07.219,1:17:09.460
outgoing start flying but no in coming

1:17:09.460,1:17:11.840
strike one

1:17:11.840,1:17:17.899
well lawyers which was up from Seoul a couple
of days ago was called grand central

1:17:17.899,1:17:21.169
%uh Harris

1:17:21.169,1:17:22.420
mister President

1:17:22.420,1:17:27.710
for its part is not but the no three there
is that there are other this who was talk

1:17:27.710,1:17:29.070
as well

1:17:29.070,1:17:33.210
and so in some sense is closely related so
that's kind of the US

1:17:33.210,1:17:35.570
because unless the masses those two boys

1:17:35.570,1:17:39.340
it doesn't invade year old yes

1:17:39.340,1:17:40.409
Bobbie

1:17:40.409,1:17:44.269
that's a incoming calls

1:17:44.269,1:17:46.680
in fact that's the whole point

1:17:46.680,1:17:48.999
who was

1:17:48.999,1:17:50.870
you can do and how going

1:17:50.870,1:17:57.239
calls in the US yet to take action if you
want to do international outgoing calls

1:17:57.239,1:18:02.139
%um

1:18:02.139,1:18:04.469
he did not have a call for him

1:18:04.469,1:18:09.530
no that's what it was designed to do and recently
he can actually called for not just to of

1:18:09.530,1:18:13.089
regular phone number on what's called a PSA
and

1:18:13.089,1:18:15.709
up

1:18:15.709,1:18:18.769
public's something telephone network

1:18:18.769,1:18:20.020
%um

1:18:20.020,1:18:22.329
sorry I should know that

1:18:22.329,1:18:24.020
so that's what you have

1:18:24.020,1:18:27.879
that kind of remark you're no longer couldn't
find it

1:18:27.879,1:18:32.469
it can also go to Portland numbers in Texas
I don't want to count and there's no way to

1:18:32.469,1:18:34.709
call him from a regular telephone

1:18:34.709,1:18:38.040
but in fact when some told him for it to you
so

1:18:38.040,1:18:39.119
%uh which is

1:18:39.119,1:18:40.639
what I'm using

1:18:40.639,1:18:42.929
well let me get to

1:18:42.929,1:18:47.960
brought Boris is a service of had for a while
it's just the four okay

1:18:47.960,1:18:48.989
sir I was

1:18:48.989,1:18:50.090
I did

1:18:50.090,1:18:51.889
only those boys

1:18:51.889,1:18:56.260
okay does have an incoming calls

1:18:56.260,1:19:00.619
and of course you always get more on that
and also I said that number of local number

1:19:00.619,1:19:04.369
in the UK which were inspired Tony Birtley

1:19:04.369,1:19:07.419
on for a very serious sewers some for anything

1:19:07.419,1:19:11.099
you can see there

1:19:11.099,1:19:12.520
and it does

1:19:12.520,1:19:15.090
coming up phone calls

1:19:15.090,1:19:19.900
yes well I just heard plan was recently if
they saw

1:19:19.900,1:19:23.190
I'm I have it on this mission here

1:19:23.190,1:19:25.769
it's got I am still has some thoughts

1:19:25.769,1:19:27.239
it's not for us

1:19:27.239,1:19:30.000
but it does have video

1:19:30.000,1:19:33.429
for additional not even to incoming and outgoing
calls

1:19:33.429,1:19:36.480
but those are three

1:19:36.480,1:19:39.969
except for incoming board calls

1:19:39.969,1:19:43.789
so that's kind of another thing he can do
Cole Porter N

1:19:43.789,1:19:45.599
it does have a voice-mail

1:19:45.599,1:19:49.479
the and why everything here is that it's all
a matter of book

1:19:49.479,1:19:54.020
which by the way are in general not integrated
with one another so you have to have

1:19:54.020,1:19:56.590
one address

1:19:56.590,1:19:58.849
contacted you want to have happen

1:19:58.849,1:20:01.849
five or six for a and return address book

1:20:01.849,1:20:06.360
and of course I shall I use primarily because
then you scream saying

1:20:06.360,1:20:08.280
to know about my mom

1:20:08.280,1:20:12.000
when she has a problem and I don't want to
drive up your house

1:20:12.000,1:20:16.300
%uh on by will go into all of these details
is the know

1:20:16.300,1:20:19.810
there's almost no immigration on adverse book
which is a disaster

1:20:19.810,1:20:22.869
these things overlap in major ways

1:20:22.869,1:20:23.909
I've got it

1:20:23.909,1:20:27.479
a Google voice number now that came forward

1:20:27.479,1:20:31.599
sue my laptop live on the road but it also
brings it home

1:20:31.599,1:20:35.299
 but I don't have a way to get that UK
number

1:20:35.299,1:20:38.269
to follow me around even though I'd like to

1:20:38.269,1:20:41.500
it's like a person getting immigration going

1:20:41.500,1:20:42.719
properly out

1:20:42.719,1:20:44.720
and what you have today is

1:20:44.720,1:20:46.700
in the mind message in

1:20:46.700,1:20:48.229
you have any clothes

1:20:48.229,1:20:49.669
of this

1:20:49.669,1:20:52.889
where they were were around in the day

1:20:52.889,1:20:53.879
don't know

1:20:53.879,1:20:55.250
that's where you know

1:20:55.250,1:20:58.319
Peres would look like that was an original
e-mail

1:20:58.319,1:21:00.650
are a real legitimate email address

1:21:00.650,1:21:02.399
yeah

1:21:02.399,1:21:07.110
I didn't forget percent couldn't figure out how to
put that in there

1:21:07.110,1:21:08.860
 that

1:21:08.860,1:21:10.880
it could be from Texas

1:21:10.880,1:21:14.279


1:21:14.279,1:21:17.330
I I'm going to talk him into it

1:21:17.330,1:21:21.670
some groups who is advertising here if you're
interested in the e-mail message in

1:21:21.670,1:21:26.000
the conference on the melody spam is coming
up in July and mountain view

1:21:26.000,1:21:29.480
take a look at the web site

1:21:29.480,1:21:36.480
thank you very much and are there any questions

1:21:37.139,1:21:38.820
I answered everything

1:21:38.820,1:21:40.329
a lot of so-called

1:21:40.329,1:21:46.760
you're so long

1:21:46.760,1:21:48.090
okay what is without doubt

1:21:48.090,1:21:51.320
a little early for policy then I will be around

1:21:51.320,1:21:52.599
on the rest of the day

1:21:52.599,1:21:54.960
a few

1:21:54.960,1:22:01.960
what they're asking thing also

1:22:05.650,1:22:06.760
the IRS

1:22:06.760,1:22:11.679
I was not something I was doing I started
off with the initial design

1:22:11.679,1:22:12.979
of parents

1:22:12.979,1:22:15.010
how close are slim

1:22:15.010,1:22:16.280
was working on it

1:22:16.280,1:22:18.280
 we concluded

1:22:18.280,1:22:19.840
at the company

1:22:19.840,1:22:24.079
that sent a text was not going to be

1:22:24.079,1:22:28.349
significantly better than Postfix and it
certainly wasn't going to be ready anytime

1:22:28.349,1:22:29.789
since close as eight

1:22:29.789,1:22:31.520
great voter

1:22:31.520,1:22:33.059
 but hes  very

1:22:33.059,1:22:35.020
careful

1:22:35.020,1:22:36.219
that means he's not

1:22:36.219,1:22:38.199
really all that clear

1:22:38.199,1:22:41.090
and so we look at it and said

1:22:41.090,1:22:45.840
worth it to us to do this he is remanded 

1:22:45.840,1:22:48.300
and there on the line

1:22:48.300,1:22:52.210
I think it's insider and she a one-dot or
her

1:22:52.210,1:22:52.980
the

1:22:52.980,1:22:55.820
and ETA one dot org I don't remember

1:22:55.820,1:22:58.610
which and so you can download it but I don't
know about

1:22:58.610,1:23:02.510
certainly he's working on that now

1:23:02.510,1:23:06.989
as I just said by the way I'm working on some
stuff in Sendmail eight mostly stuff like

1:23:06.989,1:23:11.739
the IRS tensions what I don't know when or
if that's going to get released

1:23:11.739,1:23:15.179
why is not a priority for the company right
now

1:23:15.179,1:23:16.139
and

1:23:16.139,1:23:20.189
all of them so I'm hoping to do is to a private
release outflow

1:23:20.189,1:23:23.230
do not use this under any circumstances

1:23:23.230,1:23:24.869
etc kind of

1:23:24.869,1:23:25.840
release

1:23:25.840,1:23:32.840
but we'll see

1:23:36.409,1:23:43.409
so the question is who owns the market

1:23:54.820,1:23:57.309
that so there's two things there one it is

1:23:57.309,1:23:59.830
don't have any steps on all what

1:23:59.830,1:24:02.109
it's often e-mail servers are using

1:24:02.109,1:24:05.860
that information there used to be some
places that

1:24:05.860,1:24:08.079
did and publish it for free

1:24:08.079,1:24:09.460
but they have started

1:24:09.460,1:24:10.320
charging money for it

1:24:10.320,1:24:12.670
a lot of money for

1:24:12.670,1:24:13.650
and I'm so

1:24:13.650,1:24:19.800
so I don't have anything really recent but
from what I can determine piecing together

1:24:19.800,1:24:22.750
on Sendmail is still the largest

1:24:22.750,1:24:25.690
and she a in terms of America

1:24:25.690,1:24:28.449
numbers out there are leave of

1:24:28.449,1:24:30.460
Microsoft number two

1:24:30.460,1:24:32.239
what is

1:24:32.239,1:24:33.980
senate although it is a problem

1:24:33.980,1:24:35.210
thirty percent

1:24:35.210,1:24:39.219
something like that in my interest also around

1:24:39.219,1:24:39.720
of

1:24:39.720,1:24:42.739
maybe twenty percent of that everyone else
breaks up the

1:24:42.739,1:24:45.029
fifty percent so

1:24:45.029,1:24:47.070
on the other hand but

1:24:47.070,1:24:48.919
I'm afraid that's

1:24:48.919,1:24:52.350
speculative speculation and tribulations

1:24:52.350,1:24:53.350
%um

1:24:53.350,1:24:56.599
the second question is can we use in essence
you're doing

1:24:56.599,1:24:59.729
well we're just MTV's to improve the situation

1:24:59.729,1:25:02.709
yes I'd love to do that

1:25:02.709,1:25:07.319
there was a time when that would have been
easier for me when

1:25:07.319,1:25:12.029
when really seventy percent of the network
according to send mail and they mostly upgraded

1:25:12.029,1:25:13.840
fairly quickly

1:25:13.840,1:25:17.860
I no longer have that kind of leverage

1:25:17.860,1:25:22.530
people have gotten much more reluctant to
upgrade the rail sir

1:25:22.530,1:25:26.099
now I can't talk the visa into doing it
too

1:25:26.099,1:25:28.380
then we might actually have something

1:25:28.380,1:25:35.380
we were in a state like Utah Microsoft int doing it 
 yeah that's likely

1:25:37.010,1:25:39.489
the window of opportunity could be close

1:25:39.489,1:25:41.889
and once again I would love to do that

1:25:41.889,1:25:44.050
but he is just not

1:25:44.050,1:25:47.739
I I I do work for commercial companies not

1:25:47.739,1:25:51.949
reasonable for them to pay me to do that right
now it's not a priority

1:25:51.949,1:25:54.260
and so I can't do it on my own

1:25:54.260,1:25:56.190
that would like

1:25:56.190,1:26:00.500
I am doing some stuff on my own but there
are limits to what I can do a very old and

1:26:00.500,1:26:02.709
I was twenty five years ago

1:26:02.709,1:26:05.829
so that and can no longer pull those all nighters

1:26:05.829,1:26:09.109
every night for a week

1:26:09.109,1:26:16.109
any other questions

1:26:16.859,1:26:20.900
silence all right

1:26:20.900,1:26:21.480
thank you very much