- Replace /XML/{doc,www}/ with /XML/ in SysId.
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XML catalog instead.
- Change the L10N layer in freebsd-*.xsl not to use localized XSLT
stylesheets directly.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
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<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//FreeBSD//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional-Based Extension//EN"
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"http://www.FreeBSD.org/XML/share/xml/xhtml10-freebsd.dtd" [
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<!ENTITY title "FreeBSD.org intrusion announced November 17th 2012">
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]>
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<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
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<head>
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<title>&title;</title>
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<cvs:keyword xmlns:cvs="http://www.FreeBSD.org/XML/CVS">$FreeBSD$</cvs:keyword>
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</head>
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<body class="navinclude.about">
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<table class="tblbasic">
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td><h2 align="center"><a name="announce">Security Incident on
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FreeBSD Infrastructure</a></h2>
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<b>From:</b> FreeBSD Security Officer <security-officer@FreeBSD.org><br />
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<b>To:</b> FreeBSD Security <FreeBSD-security@FreeBSD.org><br />
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<b>Bcc:</b> freebsd-announce@freebsd.org, freebsd-security-notifications@FreeBSD.org<br />
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<b>Reply-To:</b> secteam@FreeBSD.org<br />
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<b>Subject:</b> Security Incident on FreeBSD Infrastructure<br />
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<p>On Sunday 11th of November, an intrusion was detected on two
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machines within the FreeBSD.org cluster. The affected machines
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were taken offline for analysis. Additionally, a large portion
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of the remaining infrastructure machines were also taken offline
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as a precaution.</p>
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<p>We have found no evidence of any modifications that would put
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any end user at risk. However, we do urge all users to read the
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report available at
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<a href="/news/2012-compromise.html">http://www.freebsd.org/news/2012-compromise.html</a>
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and decide on any required actions themselves. We will continue
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to update that page as further information becomes known. We do
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not currently believe users have been affected given current
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forensic analysis, but we will provide updated information if
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this changes.</p>
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<p>As a result of this event, a number of operational security
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changes are being made at the FreeBSD Project, in order to
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further improve our resilience to potential attacks. We plan,
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therefore, to more rapidly deprecate a number of legacy services,
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such as cvsup distribution of FreeBSD source, in favour of our
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more robust Subversion, freebsd-update, and portsnap models.</p>
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<p>More information is available at
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<a href="/news/2012-compromise.html">http://www.freebsd.org/news/2012-compromise.html</a></p>
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<p>Saturday November 17th, 2012</p>
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</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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<br />
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<h2><a name="toc">Table of Contents</a></h2>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#announce">Announcement</a></li>
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<li><a href="#update20130430">Update: 30th April 2013</a></li>
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<li><a href="#update20130323">Update: 23rd March 2013</a></li>
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<li><a href="#update20130303">Update: 3rd March 2013</a></li>
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<li><a href="#update20121229">Update: 29th December 2012</a></li>
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<li><a href="#update20121127">Update: 27th November 2012</a></li>
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<li><a href="#update20121122">Update: 22nd November 2012</a></li>
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<li><a href="#update20121118">Update: 18th November 2012</a></li>
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<li><a href="#details">Initial Details: 17th November 2012</a></li>
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<li><a href="#impact">What is the Impact?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#done">What has FreeBSD.org done about this?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#recommend">Recommendations</a></li>
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</ul>
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<h1><a name="update20130430">Update: April 30th, 2013</a></h1>
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<p>Port managers and cluster administrators have completed the
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restoration of binary package building in the last few weeks.
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This has brought us back the continuous updates for the old-style
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binary packages on the 8.x and 9.x -STABLE branches. Note that,
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as beneficial consequences, Release Candidate builds for the 8.4
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release cycle can now include binary packages on the install
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media, and the Project was able to add the missing binary packages
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retroactively for 9.1-RELEASE on i386 and amd64 platforms.</p>
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<p>Port managers are currently working on introducing new-style (as
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known as <q>pkgng</q>) binary packages in the coming months,
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please check the <a
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href="http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-ports-announce/">
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&os; ports announcements list</a> for further gradual status
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updates.</p>
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<p>This is planned to be the last status update to this page. An
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official announcement will be sent to the <a
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href="http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-announce/">
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&os; announcements mailing list</a> with the further details
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soon.</p>
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<h1><a name="update20130323">Update: March 23rd, 2013</a></h1>
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<p>Port managers have successfully restored some of the Project's
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binary package building capacity. There are some issues left
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still to resolve, e.g. how to publish the resulting package sets
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in a secure manner or how to build packages seamlessly for 8.x and
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9.x systems on a recent 10.x system that the head node
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("pointyhat") is running, but we are very close to finish with the
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preparations required for providing binary packages for the
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upcoming 8.4 and further releases.</p>
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<h1><a name="update20130302">Update: March 3rd, 2013</a></h1>
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<p>Redports underwent a full security audit, and as a result could
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be brought back on line. This took place on the 5th February, and
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since then more backend hardware has been added to bring it back
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up to full strength. On 11th February, sanity checks for ports
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have been turned back on, reenabling generation and update of the
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INDEX files used. The portsnap(8) service has been switched from
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CVS to SVN on 25th February. The binary package building
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infrastructure has undergone a major security review, and as a
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result many changes have been made to the code. The review
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completed on the 16th February and we are now in the process of
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bringing it up on new hardware. At this point, we expect new
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binary packages to be available in 2-4 weeks.</p>
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<h1><a name="update20121229">Update: December 29th, 2012</a></h1>
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<p>With the exception of systems relating to the building and testing
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of packages, all FreeBSD.org infrastructure has now been brought
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back online. A full audit of the third party package build
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infrastructure code ("pointyhat") and package testing infrastructure
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("redports") continues, and neither system will be brought back
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online until audits are complete.</p>
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<p>As a result, FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE will be published with only
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minimal i386 and amd64 (x86_64) precompiled package sets available,
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and with no packages available for other architectures. This
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package set will be available on the DVD image, and are sufficient
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to install either the GNOME or the KDE desktop environment. For any
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other uses, or for any packages not included on the CD, either
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using the most recently available -stable package collection or
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compiling ports from the ports tree are recommended. Packages
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for 9.1-RELEASE will be made available at a later date. Instructions
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for obtaining and updating the ports tree can be found in the
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<a href="/doc/handbook/ports-using.html">
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FreeBSD Handbook</a>.</p>
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<h1><a name="update20121127">Update: November 27th, 2012</a></h1>
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<p>Due to the legacy third-party package build controller head
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nodes being offlined pending reinstall, we have been unable to
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build new package sets over the last two weeks. As a result,
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FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE has been delayed as it was felt that we
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should not ship the release without at least a minimal package
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set available. We are now in a position where we are once
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again able to build third-party packages for both of our
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<a href="/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/articles/committers-guide/archs.html">
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Tier-1 architectures</a> (i386 and amd64), and are planning on
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releasing it within the next few days with only a slightly
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limited set of packages. Please note that historically we have
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also provided packages on a best-effort basis for some of our
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Tier-2 architectures such as sparc64, ia64 and powerpc. We are
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not currently expecting to be in a position to build any Tier-2
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packages before FreeBSD 9.1 ships, so initially no precompiled
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packages will be available for these platforms. We
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may be in a position to provide some packages for these
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architectures shortly after the release.</p>
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<p>A few reports covering this incident on external tech news
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websites have confused details relating to how this incident
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was discovered. Over the last few weeks, many of our primary
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cluster servers have been either physically relocated and/or
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replaced with new hardware as part of work planned several
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months in advance. The discovery of this incident was
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unrelated to this ongoing cluster maintenance. Several
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service outages in the days surrounding the incident were
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correctly attributed to ongoing cluster work, and were not
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related in any way to the compromise. In parallel with the
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physical upgrades and relocation of servers, we are also
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reworking the network layout in order to provide better
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functionality, security, resilience, and to reduce any impact
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from incidents such as this. Due in a large part to the
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progress already made here, we were able to have full
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confidence in many systems and services so quickly after the
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compromised hosts on the legacy network segment were
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discovered.</p>
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<h1><a name="update20121122">Update: November 22nd, 2012</a></h1>
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<p>Although not mentioned in the original report,
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<a href="/doc/handbook/ctm.html">CTM</a> (another mechanism for
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retrieving FreeBSD source) uses the master trusted Subversion
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repository as the source of its data. Additionally, verification of
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CTM-sourced trees has been completed against the Subversion tree,
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confirming that there are no differences between the two. Our
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experimental Git repository has been similarly verified.</p>
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<p>Work continues on rebuilding internal infrastructure and reinstating
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services taken down during the incident. Web interfaces to the old
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CVS repositories (CVSweb), and to GNATS (our bug-tracking database)
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have been restored amongst other services, and other internal hosts
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are being examined and rebuilt where necessary. A full audit of the
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package building infrastructure is ongoing.</p>
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<p>The FreeBSD Project is investing significant effort into looking
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into both medium and long term infrastructure improvements to increase
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security of the FreeBSD cluster.</p>
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<h1><a name="update20121118">Update: November 18th, 2012</a></h1>
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<p>Newer portsnap(8) snapshots are once again available. The
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generation of these had been suspended as part of the infrastructure
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lockdown, however all machines involved have either been audited or
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reinstalled and so we are now confident that these can be made
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available once more.</p>
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<p>The Subversion to CVS exporter is now up and running again.
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Updates made to the Subversion repository will once again appear in
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repositories available via csup/CVSup. Please note that the use of
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these exports are still deprecated, and users are urged to move to
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one of the supported methods (for example, freebsd-update(8),
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portsnap(8), or Subversion) in order to obtain updates. Note also
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that we are still currently unable to guarantee the integrity of
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past history within the CVS repository, but are confident in the
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integrity of checkouts from the top-of-tree of each branch.</p>
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<p>Please note that due to infrastructure changes, the first update
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through either portsnap(8) or csup(1) is likely to show changes to
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a large number of files. This is nothing to worry about.</p>
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<p>As mentioned in the original announcement, a package set uploaded in
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preparation for the upcoming FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE could not be verified,
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and so was removed. In order to allow system integrators and end
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users to verify that packages they may have downloaded are not from
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this set, we have provided files containing both
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<a href="/news/2012-compromise/sha256.sums.20121118.txt">sha256</a> and
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<a href="/news/2012-compromise/md5.sums.20121118.txt">md5</a> checksums
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for all removed packages.</p>
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<h1><a name="details">November 17th, 2012</a></h1>
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<h2>Initial details</h2>
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<p>On Sunday 11th November 2012, two machines within the FreeBSD.org
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infrastructure were found to have been compromised. These machines
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were head nodes for the legacy third-party package building
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infrastructure. It is believed that the compromise may have occurred
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as early as the 19th September 2012.</p>
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<p>The compromise is believed to have occurred due to the leak of an
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SSH key from a developer who legitimately had access to the machines
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in question, and was not due to any vulnerability or code exploit
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within FreeBSD.</p>
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<p>To understand the impact of this compromise, you must first
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understand that the FreeBSD operating system is divided into two
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parts: the "base" maintained by the FreeBSD community, and a large
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collection of third-party "packages" distributed by the Project.
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The kernel, system libraries, compiler, core command-line tools
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(e.g., SSH client), and daemons (e.g., sshd(8)) are all in the
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"base". Most information in this advisory refers only to
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third-party packages distributed by the Project.</p>
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<p>No part of the base FreeBSD system has been put at risk. At no
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point has the intruder modified any part of the FreeBSD base system
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software in any way. However, the attacker had access sufficient
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to potentially allow the compromise of third-party packages. No
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evidence of this has been found during in-depth analysis, however
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the FreeBSD Project is taking an extremely conservative view on this
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and is working on the assumption that third-party packages generated
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and distributed within a specific window could theoretically have
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been modified.</p>
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<h2><a name="impact">What is the Impact?</a></h2>
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<p>If you are running a system that has had no third-party packages
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installed or updated on it between the 19th September and 11th
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November 2012, you have no reason to worry.</p>
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<p>The Source, Ports and Documentation Subversion repositories have been
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audited, and we are confident that no changes have been made to them.
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Any users relying on them for updates have no reason to worry.</p>
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<p>We have verified the state of FreeBSD packages and releases currently
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available on ftp.FreeBSD.org. All package sets for existing versions
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of FreeBSD and all available releases have been validated and we can
|
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confirm that the currently available packages and releases have not
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been modified in any way.</p>
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<p>A package set for the upcoming FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE had been uploaded
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to the FTP distribution sites in preparation for 9.1-RELEASE. We are
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unable to verify the integrity of this package set, and therefore it
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has been removed and will be rebuilt. Please note that as these
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packages were for a future release, the standard <q>pkg_add -r</q>
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tools to install packages could not have downloaded these packages
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unless they were requested explicitly.</p>
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<p>We unfortunately cannot guarantee the integrity of any packages
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available for installation between 19th September 2012 and 11th
|
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November 2012, or of any ports compiled from trees obtained via any
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means other than through svn.freebsd.org or one of its mirrors.
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Although we have no evidence to suggest any tampering took place
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and believe such interference is unlikely, we have to recommend you
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consider reinstalling any machine from scratch, using trusted
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sources.</p>
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<p>We can confirm that the freebsd-update(8) binary upgrade mechanism is
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unaffected, as it uses an entirely separate infrastructure. We have
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also verified that the most recently-available portsnap(8) snapshot
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matches the ports Subversion repository, and so can be fully trusted.
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Please note that as a precaution, newer portsnap(8) snapshots are
|
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currently not being generated.</p>
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<h2><a name="done">What has FreeBSD.org done about this?</a></h2>
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<p>As soon as the incident came to light, the FreeBSD Cluster
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Administration team took the following actions:</p>
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<ul>
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<li>Power down the compromised machines.</li>
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<li>Power down all machines on which the attacker may have had
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access.</li>
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<li>Audit the SVN and Perforce repositories to:
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<ul>
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<li>Verify that there had been no server intrusion.</li>
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<li>Verify that no malicious commits had been made to the
|
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repository.</li>
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<li>Verify that the SVN repository exactly matched a known-clean
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off-site copy.</li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li>Verify that all FreeBSD base release media and install files on
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the master FTP distribution sites are clean.</li>
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<li>Verify all package sets available have checksums that match
|
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known-good copies stored off-site.</li>
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<li>The package set built for the upcoming 9.1-RELEASE did not have
|
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an offsite backup to verify against. These have been deleted, and
|
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will be rebuilt before 9.1 is released.</li>
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<li>All suspect machines are being either reinstalled, retired, or
|
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thoroughly audited before being brought back online.</li>
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</ul>
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<h2><a name="recommend">At this time, we recommend:</a></h2>
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<ul>
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<li>If you use the already-deprecated cvsup/csup distribution
|
|
mechanisms, you should stop now.</li>
|
|
<li>If you were using cvsup/csup for ports, you should switch to
|
|
portsnap(8) right away. Ports developers should be using
|
|
Subversion already. Further information on preferred mechanisms
|
|
for obtaining and updating the ports tree can be found at
|
|
<a href="/doc/handbook/ports-using.html">
|
|
http://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/ports-using.html</a></li>
|
|
<li>If you were using cvs/anoncvs/cvsup/csup for src, you should
|
|
consider either freebsd-update(8) for signed binary distribution
|
|
or Subversion for source. Please see the chapter on <a
|
|
href="/doc/handbook/updating-upgrading.html">updating
|
|
FreeBSD from source</a> in the handbook. Further details on
|
|
using Subversion and a list of official mirrors can be found
|
|
at <a href="/doc/handbook/svn.html">
|
|
http://www.freebsd.org/doc/handbook/svn.html</a></li>
|
|
<li>If you use portsnap(8), you should <tt>portsnap fetch &&
|
|
portsnap extract</tt> to the most recent snapshot. The most recent
|
|
portsnap(8) snapshot has been verified to exactly match the audited
|
|
Subversion repository. Please note that as a precaution, portsnap(8)
|
|
updates have been suspended temporarily.</li>
|
|
<li>Follow best practice security policies to determine how your
|
|
organization may be affected.</li>
|
|
<li>Conduct an audit of your system that uses FreeBSD.org provided
|
|
binary packages. Anything that may have been installed during the
|
|
affected period should be considered suspect. Although we have no
|
|
evidence of any tampering of any packages, you may wish to consider
|
|
rebuilding any affected machine from scratch, or if that is not
|
|
possible, rebuild your ports/packages.</li>
|
|
</ul>
|
|
|
|
<p>If you have any further questions about this announcement, please
|
|
contact the <a href="mailto:FreeBSD-security@FreeBSD.org">
|
|
FreeBSD-security@FreeBSD.org</a> mailing list, or for questions
|
|
where public mailing list distribution is inappropriate,
|
|
please contact the <a href="mailto:secteam@FreeBSD.org">FreeBSD
|
|
Security Team</a>.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>This page will be updated as further information is known.</p>
|
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</body>
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</html>
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