patches for easier mirroring, to eliminate a special copy, to make www.freebsd.org/security a full copy of security.freebsd.org and be eventually be the same. For now files are just sitting there. The symlinks are missing. Discussed on: www (repository location) Discussed with: simon (so)
		
			
				
	
	
		
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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=============================================================================
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FreeBSD-SA-96:11					    Security Advisory
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Revised: Wed May 22 00:11:46 PDT 1996		        	FreeBSD, Inc.
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Topic:		security compromise from man page utility
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Category:	core
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Module:		man
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Announced:	1996-05-21
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Affects:	FreeBSD 2.0, 2.0.5, 2.1, 2.1-stable, and 2.2-current
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Corrected:	2.1-stable and 2.2-current as of 1996-05-21
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FreeBSD only:	yes
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Patches:	ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-96:11/
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=============================================================================
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I.   Background    
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     FreeBSD replaced the standard BSD manual page reader with
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     code developed by a third party to support compressed manual
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     pages.  A bug was found in the manual page reader which can
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     allow an unprivileged local user to compromise system security
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     in a limited fashion.  This problem is present in all source
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     code and binary distributions of FreeBSD version 2.x released
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     before 1996-05-21.
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II.  Problem Description
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     The man program is setuid to the "man" user.  By executing a
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     particular sequence of commands, an unprivileged local user
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     may gain the access privileges of the "man" user.  However,
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     root access could be obtained with further work.
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III. Impact
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     The "man" user has no particular special privileges, it is
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     the owner of the /usr/share/man/cat[0-9] directory hierarchy.
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     Unformatted system manual pages are owned by the "bin" user.
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     However, further exploits once "man" is obtained could
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     possibly allow a local user to obtain unlimited access via
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     a trojan horse.
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     This vulnerability can only be exploited by users with a valid
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     account on the local system.
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IV. Workaround
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     One may simply disable the setuid bit on the /usr/bin/man file.
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     This will disable caching of formatted manual pages, no system
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     functionality will be lost.  This workaround will suffice for
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     all versions of FreeBSD affected by this problem.
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     As root, execute the command:
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	 # chmod u-s /usr/bin/man
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     then verify that the setuid permissions of the files have been
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     removed.  The permissions array should read "-r-xr-xr-x" as
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     shown here:
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	 # ls -l /usr/bin/man
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	 -r-xr-xr-x  1 man  bin  28672 May 19 20:38 /usr/bin/man
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     We also suggest applying the following patch to the source
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     distribution so that the man program will not be installed
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     setuid man should you rebuild from sources:
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    *** /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/man/man/Makefile	Sun Feb 25 13:39:52 1996
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    --- /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/man/man/Makefile	Wed May 22 00:13:05 1996
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    ***************
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    *** 1,7 ****
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      PROG=	man
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      SRCS=	man.c manpath.c glob.c
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    - BINMODE=4555
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    - BINOWN=	man
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      .if exists(${.CURDIR}/../lib/obj)
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      LDADD=  -L${.CURDIR}/../lib/obj -lman
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    --- 1,5 ----
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V. Solution
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     The FreeBSD team is in the process of rewriting portions of
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     the manual program to avoid this and similar vulnerabilities.
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     This security advisory will be updated when a complete solution
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     is available.
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=============================================================================
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FreeBSD, Inc.
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Web Site:			http://www.freebsd.org/
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Confidential contacts:		security-officer@freebsd.org
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PGP Key:			ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/public_key.asc
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Security notifications:		security-notifications@freebsd.org
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Security public discussion:	security@freebsd.org
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Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to
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        modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software.
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        Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document
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        for original copies of all patches if necessary.
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=============================================================================
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