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doc/share/security/patches/SA-14:06/openssl-10.patch
Xin LI dd97bfc0fc Add two latest security advisories: 
Fix NFS server deadlock vulnerability. [SA-14:05]

Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities. [SA-14:06]
2014-04-08 23:27:31 +00:00

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Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h (revision 264251)
+++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn.h (working copy)
@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
/* Deprecated versions */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -774,11 +776,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
#define bn_fix_top(a) bn_check_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+ do { \
+ const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+ assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+ } while(0)
+
#else /* !BN_DEBUG */
#define bn_pollute(a)
#define bn_check_top(a)
#define bn_fix_top(a) bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
#endif
Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c (revision 264251)
+++ crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c (working copy)
@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_
}
return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
}
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0. The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap. The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+ {
+ BN_ULONG t;
+ int i;
+
+ bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+ bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+ assert(a != b);
+ assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+ assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+ condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+ t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+ a->top ^= t;
+ b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+ do { \
+ t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+ a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+ b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+ } while (0)
+
+
+ switch (nwords) {
+ default:
+ for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++)
+ BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+ case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+ }
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}
Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c (revision 264251)
+++ crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c (working copy)
@@ -208,11 +208,15 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const B
return ret;
}
+
/* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
* point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
* Lopez, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over
* GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap,
+ * avoiding conditional branches.
*/
static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -246,6 +250,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const
x2 = &r->X;
z2 = &r->Y;
+ bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+ bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -270,16 +279,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const
word = scalar->d[i];
while (mask)
{
- if (word & mask)
- {
- if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
- if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
- }
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+ if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+ BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
mask >>= 1;
}
mask = BN_TBIT;
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (revision 264251)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c (working copy)
@@ -1458,26 +1458,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
/* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
pl = p;
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
+ 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
+ payload + padding;
int r;
+ if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+
/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
* message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
* payload, plus padding
*/
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
@@ -1488,11 +1498,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Random padding */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+ buffer, write_length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c (revision 264251)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c (working copy)
@@ -2486,16 +2486,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
/* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
pl = p;
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
- s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
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