3571e53040
patches for easier mirroring, to eliminate a special copy, to make www.freebsd.org/security a full copy of security.freebsd.org and be eventually be the same. For now files are just sitting there. The symlinks are missing. Discussed on: www (repository location) Discussed with: simon (so)
100 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
100 lines
2.8 KiB
Diff
Index: sys/filedesc.h
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===================================================================
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RCS file: /base/FreeBSD-CVS/src/sys/sys/filedesc.h,v
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retrieving revision 1.15.2.1
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diff -u -r1.15.2.1 filedesc.h
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--- filedesc.h 1999/08/29 16:32:22 1.15.2.1
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+++ filedesc.h 2000/01/20 21:39:29
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@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
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int fsetown __P((pid_t, struct sigio **));
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void funsetown __P((struct sigio *));
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void funsetownlst __P((struct sigiolst *));
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+void setugidsafety __P((struct proc *p));
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#endif
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#endif
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Index: kern/kern_descrip.c
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===================================================================
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RCS file: /base/FreeBSD-CVS/src/sys/kern/kern_descrip.c,v
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retrieving revision 1.58.2.3
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diff -u -r1.58.2.3 kern_descrip.c
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--- kern_descrip.c 1999/11/18 08:09:08 1.58.2.3
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+++ kern_descrip.c 2000/01/20 21:40:00
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@@ -984,6 +984,62 @@
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}
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/*
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+ * For setuid/setgid programs we don't want to people to use that setuidness
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+ * to generate error messages which write to a file which otherwise would
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+ * otherwise be off limits to the proces.
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+ *
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+ * This is a gross hack to plug the hole. A better solution would involve
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+ * a special vop or other form of generalized access control mechanism. We
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+ * go ahead and just reject all procfs file systems accesses as dangerous.
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+ *
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+ * Since setugidsafety calls this only for fd 0, 1 and 2, this check is
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+ * sufficient. We also don't for setugidness since we know we are.
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+ */
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+static int
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+is_unsafe(struct file *fp)
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+{
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+ if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_VNODE &&
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+ ((struct vnode *)(fp->f_data))->v_tag == VT_PROCFS)
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+ return (1);
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+ return (0);
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Make this setguid thing safe, if at all possible.
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+ */
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+void
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+setugidsafety(p)
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+ struct proc *p;
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+{
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+ struct filedesc *fdp = p->p_fd;
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+ struct file **fpp;
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+ char *fdfp;
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+ register int i;
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+
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+ /* Certain daemons might not have file descriptors. */
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+ if (fdp == NULL)
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+ return;
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+
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+ fpp = fdp->fd_ofiles;
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+ fdfp = fdp->fd_ofileflags;
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+ for (i = 0; i <= fdp->fd_lastfile; i++, fpp++, fdfp++) {
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+ if (i > 2)
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+ break;
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+ if (*fpp != NULL && is_unsafe(*fpp)) {
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+ if (*fdfp & UF_MAPPED)
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+ (void) munmapfd(p, i);
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+ (void) closef(*fpp, p);
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+ *fpp = NULL;
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+ *fdfp = 0;
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+ if (i < fdp->fd_freefile)
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+ fdp->fd_freefile = i;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ while (fdp->fd_lastfile > 0 && fdp->fd_ofiles[fdp->fd_lastfile] == NULL)
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+ fdp->fd_lastfile--;
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+}
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+
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+/*
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* Close any files on exec?
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*/
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void
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Index: kern/kern_exec.c
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===================================================================
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RCS file: /base/FreeBSD-CVS/src/sys/kern/kern_exec.c,v
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retrieving revision 1.93.2.3
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diff -u -r1.93.2.3 kern_exec.c
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--- kern_exec.c 1999/08/29 16:25:58 1.93.2.3
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+++ kern_exec.c 2000/01/20 21:39:29
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@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@
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if (attr.va_mode & VSGID)
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p->p_ucred->cr_gid = attr.va_gid;
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setsugid(p);
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+ setugidsafety(p);
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} else {
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if (p->p_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_cred->p_ruid &&
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p->p_ucred->cr_gid == p->p_cred->p_rgid)
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