Fix an integer overflow in computing the size of a temporary buffer can result in a buffer which is too small for the requested operation. [13:09] Fix a bug that could lead to kernel memory disclosure with SCTP state cookie. [13:10] Add latest errata notices: Fix a data corruption problem with mfi(4) operating on > 2TB disks in a JBOD. [EN-13:03]
		
			
				
	
	
		
			19 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			645 B
		
	
	
	
		
			Diff
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			19 lines
		
	
	
	
		
			645 B
		
	
	
	
		
			Diff
		
	
	
	
	
	
| Index: sys/netinet/sctp_output.c
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| ===================================================================
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| --- sys/netinet/sctp_output.c	(revision 254337)
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| +++ sys/netinet/sctp_output.c	(revision 254338)
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| @@ -5406,6 +5406,14 @@
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|  	}
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|  	SCTP_BUF_LEN(m) = sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk);
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|  
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| +	/*
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| +	 * We might not overwrite the identification[] completely and on
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| +	 * some platforms time_entered will contain some padding. Therefore
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| +	 * zero out the cookie to avoid putting uninitialized memory on the
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| +	 * wire.
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| +	 */
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| +	memset(&stc, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_state_cookie));
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| +
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|  	/* the time I built cookie */
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|  	(void)SCTP_GETTIME_TIMEVAL(&stc.time_entered);
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|  
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