doc/share/security/patches/SA-13:10/sctp.patch
Xin LI b735a9d213 Add two latest advisories:
Fix an integer overflow in computing the size of a temporary buffer
can result in a buffer which is too small for the requested
operation. [13:09]

Fix a bug that could lead to kernel memory disclosure with
SCTP state cookie. [13:10]

Add latest errata notices:

Fix a data corruption problem with mfi(4) operating on > 2TB
disks in a JBOD. [EN-13:03]
2013-08-22 01:12:09 +00:00

19 lines
645 B
Diff

Index: sys/netinet/sctp_output.c
===================================================================
--- sys/netinet/sctp_output.c (revision 254337)
+++ sys/netinet/sctp_output.c (revision 254338)
@@ -5406,6 +5406,14 @@
}
SCTP_BUF_LEN(m) = sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk);
+ /*
+ * We might not overwrite the identification[] completely and on
+ * some platforms time_entered will contain some padding. Therefore
+ * zero out the cookie to avoid putting uninitialized memory on the
+ * wire.
+ */
+ memset(&stc, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_state_cookie));
+
/* the time I built cookie */
(void)SCTP_GETTIME_TIMEVAL(&stc.time_entered);