Fix bogus mkstemp() reference.
Spotted by: Jun Kuriyama <kuriyama@sky.rim.or.jp>
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parent
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Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-08 03:00:23 +00:00
svn path=/www/; revision=5557
3 changed files with 15 additions and 15 deletions
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@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN" [
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<!ENTITY base CDATA "..">
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<!ENTITY date "$FreeBSD$">
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<!ENTITY date "$FreeBSD: www/en/security/security.sgml,v 1.13 1999/09/06 07:02:58 peter Exp $">
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<!ENTITY title "FreeBSD Security Information">
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<!ENTITY % includes SYSTEM "../includes.sgml"> %includes;
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]>
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<!-- $FreeBSD$ -->
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<!-- $FreeBSD: www/en/security/security.sgml,v 1.13 1999/09/06 07:02:58 peter Exp $ -->
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<html>
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&header;
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@ -208,14 +208,14 @@ your program reads environment variables, be paranoid. Be very paranoid!
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is a symbolic link?"
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<P></P></LI>
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<LI>Make sure to use mkstemp() instead of mktemp(), tempnam(), mkstemp() and
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etc. Also make sure to look for races in /tmp in general, being aware that
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<LI>Make sure to use mkstemp() instead of mktemp(), tempnam(), etc.
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Also make sure to look for races in /tmp in general, being aware that
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there are very few things which can be atomic in /tmp:
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<UL>
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<LI>Creating a directory. This will either succeed or fail.</LI>
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<LI>Opening a file O_CREAT | O_EXECL</LI>
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</UL>
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If you use mkstemp - above cases will be properly handled for you. Hence
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If you use mkstemp() - above cases will be properly handled for you. Hence
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all temp files should use mkstemp() to guarantee there is not race
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condition and that the permissions are correct.
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<P></P></LI>
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@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN" [
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<!ENTITY base CDATA "..">
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<!ENTITY date "$FreeBSD$">
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<!ENTITY date "$FreeBSD: www/en/security/security.sgml,v 1.13 1999/09/06 07:02:58 peter Exp $">
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<!ENTITY title "FreeBSD Security Information">
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<!ENTITY % includes SYSTEM "../includes.sgml"> %includes;
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]>
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<!-- $FreeBSD$ -->
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<!-- $FreeBSD: www/en/security/security.sgml,v 1.13 1999/09/06 07:02:58 peter Exp $ -->
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<html>
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&header;
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@ -208,14 +208,14 @@ your program reads environment variables, be paranoid. Be very paranoid!
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is a symbolic link?"
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<P></P></LI>
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<LI>Make sure to use mkstemp() instead of mktemp(), tempnam(), mkstemp() and
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etc. Also make sure to look for races in /tmp in general, being aware that
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<LI>Make sure to use mkstemp() instead of mktemp(), tempnam(), etc.
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Also make sure to look for races in /tmp in general, being aware that
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there are very few things which can be atomic in /tmp:
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<UL>
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<LI>Creating a directory. This will either succeed or fail.</LI>
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<LI>Opening a file O_CREAT | O_EXECL</LI>
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</UL>
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If you use mkstemp - above cases will be properly handled for you. Hence
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If you use mkstemp() - above cases will be properly handled for you. Hence
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all temp files should use mkstemp() to guarantee there is not race
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condition and that the permissions are correct.
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<P></P></LI>
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@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 3.2//EN" [
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<!ENTITY base CDATA "..">
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<!ENTITY date "$FreeBSD$">
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<!ENTITY date "$FreeBSD: www/en/security/security.sgml,v 1.13 1999/09/06 07:02:58 peter Exp $">
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<!ENTITY title "FreeBSD Security Information">
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<!ENTITY % includes SYSTEM "../includes.sgml"> %includes;
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]>
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<!-- $FreeBSD$ -->
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<!-- $FreeBSD: www/en/security/security.sgml,v 1.13 1999/09/06 07:02:58 peter Exp $ -->
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<html>
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&header;
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@ -208,14 +208,14 @@ your program reads environment variables, be paranoid. Be very paranoid!
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is a symbolic link?"
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<P></P></LI>
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<LI>Make sure to use mkstemp() instead of mktemp(), tempnam(), mkstemp() and
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etc. Also make sure to look for races in /tmp in general, being aware that
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<LI>Make sure to use mkstemp() instead of mktemp(), tempnam(), etc.
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Also make sure to look for races in /tmp in general, being aware that
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there are very few things which can be atomic in /tmp:
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<UL>
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<LI>Creating a directory. This will either succeed or fail.</LI>
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<LI>Opening a file O_CREAT | O_EXECL</LI>
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</UL>
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If you use mkstemp - above cases will be properly handled for you. Hence
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If you use mkstemp() - above cases will be properly handled for you. Hence
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all temp files should use mkstemp() to guarantee there is not race
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condition and that the permissions are correct.
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<P></P></LI>
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